Explore the vast range of titles available.

The idea of a \"third sector\" beyond the arenas of the state and the market is probably one of the most perplexing concepts in modern political and social discourse, encompassing as it does a tremendous diversity of institutions and behaviors that only relatively recently have been perceived in public or scholarly discourse as a distinct sector, and even then with grave misgivings. Initial work on this concept focused on what is still widely regarded as its institutional core, the vast array of private, nonprofit institutions (NPIs), and the volunteer as well as paid workers they mobilize and engage. These institutions share a crucial characteristic that makes it feasible to differentiate from for-profit enterprises: the fact that they are prohibited from distributing any surplus they generate to their investors, directors, or stakeholders and therefore presumptively serve some broader public interest. Many European scholars have considered this conceptualization too narrow; however, arguing that cooperatives, mutual societies, and, in recent years, \"social enterprises\" as well as social norms should also be included. However, this broader concept has remained under-conceptualized in reliable operational terms. This article corrects this short-coming and presents a consensus operational reconceptualization of the third sector fashioned by a group of scholars working under the umbrella of the European Union's Third Sector Impact Project. This re-conceptualization goes well beyond the widely recognized definition of NPIs included in the UN Handbook on Nonprofit Institutions in the System of National Accounts by embracing as well some, but not all, of these additional institutions and forms of direct individual activity, and does so in a way that meets demanding criteria of comparability, operationalizability, and potential for integration into official statistical systems. L'idée qu'un « tiers secteur » puisse exister au-delà de l'État et du marché est possiblement un des concepts les plus déconcertants des discours politique et social modernes, englobant, comme il le fait, une incroyable diversité d'organismes et de comportements qui, jusqu'à tout récemment, étaient perçus, dans les discussions publiques et savantes, comme appartenant à un secteur indépendant, même si sous réserve. L'examen de ce concept s'est initialement concentré sur ce qui est toujours largement perçu comme son fondement institutionnel, soit une vaste gamme d'organismes privés et sans but lucratif et les bénévoles et travailleurs rémunérés qu'ils mobilisent et engagent. Ces organismes ont en commun une caractéristique essentielle permettant de les différencier des entreprises à but lucratif: l'interdiction de répartir les surplus qu'ils génèrent à leurs investisseurs, directeurs ou intervenants, et ce, dans l'intérêt présumé d'un plus vaste public. Plusieurs savants européens ont toutefois jugé que cette conceptualisation était trop étroite, affirmant que les coopératives, les mutuelles d'assurances et, plus récemment, les « entreprises sociales » devraient en faire partie, en plus de normes sociales données. Cet article présente une conceptualisation repensée du tiers secteur modelée par un groupe de savants oeuvrant dans le cadre du projet d'impact du Tiers secteur (Third Sector Impact) de l'Union européenne. Elle va bien au-delà de la définition largement reconnue des organismes sans but lucratif inclus dans le manuel des Nations Unies du système des comptes nationaux, en intégrant quelques-uns de ces organismes supplémentaires, pas tous, et des formes d'activités individuelles directes, et ce, de façon à satisfaire d'exigeants critères de comparabilité et d'opérationnalité et à être éventuellement intégrée aux systèmes statistiques officiels. Das Konzept eines „Dritten Sektors“ neben Staat und Mark ist wahrscheinlich eines der verblüffendsten Konzepte in modernen politischen und sozialen Diskussionen. Es ist äußerst umfassend, da eine große Vielfalt von Institutionen und Verhaltensweisen inbegriffen sind, die erst seit relativ kurzer Zeit in öffentlichen oder wissenschaftlichen Diskussionen als ein eigener Sektor betrachtet werden, und das auch nur unter großen Bedenken. Anfängliche Arbeiten zu diesem Konzept konzentrierten sich darauf, was noch immer weitgehend als sein institutioneller Kern betrachtet wird, nämlich die weite Reihe privater, gemeinnütziger Institutionen und die ehrenamtlichen und bezahlten Mitarbeiter, die sie mobilisieren und engagieren. Diese Institutionen teilen ein wichtiges Merkmal, aufgrund dessen eine Unterscheidung von gewinnorientierten Unternehmen praktikabel ist: die Tatsache, dass es ihnen nicht erlaubt ist, Gewinne an ihre Investoren, Direktoren oder Stakeholder auszuschütten, wodurch sie vermeintlich einem breiteren öffentlichen Interesse dienen. Viele europäische Wissenschaftler betrachten diese Konzeptualisierung jedoch als zu beschränkt und argumentieren, dass Genossenschaften, Gegenseitigkeitsgesellschaften und in den letzten Jahren „Sozialunternehmen“ sowie gesellschaftliche Normen ebenfalls eingeschlossen werden sollten. Dieser Beitrag präsentiert einen Konsens zur Rekonzeptualisierung des Dritten Sektors, die von einer Gruppe von Wissenschaftlern erstellt wurde, die im Rahmen des EU-Projekts zu den Auswirkungen des Dritten Sektors (Third Sector Impact Project) arbeiten. Diese Konzeptualisierung reicht weit über die weitgehend anerkannte Definition gemeinnütziger Institutionen laut dem UN Handbook on Nonprofit Instituions in the System of National Accounts hinaus, indem sie zudem einige, jedoch nicht alle, dieser zusätzlichen Institutionen und Formen direkter individueller Aktivität auf eine Weise umfasst, die die anspruchsvollen Kriterien der Vergleichbarkeit, der Operationalisierbarkeit und des Potenzials zur Integration in offiziellen statistischen Systemen erfüllt. La idea de un \"sector terciario\" más allá de los ámbitos del estado y del mercado es probablemente uno de los conceptos más desconcertantes en el discurso político y social moderno, englobando, como hace, una tremenda diversidad de instituciones y comportamientos que sólo relativamente hace poco han sido percibidos en el discurso público y erudito como un sector diferenciado, e incluso entonces con graves recelos. Los trabajos iniciales sobre este concepto se centraron en lo que se sigue considerando ampliamente como su núcleo institucional, la vasta variedad de instituciones privadas, sin ánimo de lucro y los voluntarios, así como también los trabajadores pagados que movilizan y contratan. Estas instituciones comparten una característica crucial que hace factible diferenciarlas de las empresas con ánimo de lucro: el hecho de que se les prohíbe distribuir cualquier excedente que generen a sus inversores, administradores o partes interesadas y por consiguiente sirven presuntamente a algún interés público más general. Sin embargo, muchos eruditos europeos han considerado esta conceptualización demasiado limitada, argumentando que las cooperativas, las sociedades mutuas y, en años recientes, las \"empresas sociales\", así como también las normas sociales también deben ser incluidas. El presente documento presenta un consenso, una reconceptualización del Sector Terciario fabricada por un grupo de eruditos que trabajan bajo los auspicios del Proyecto sobre el Impacto del Sector Terciario de la Unión Europea que va mucho más allá de la definición ampliamente reconocida de las instituciones sin ánimo de lucro incluidas en el Manual de las NU sobre las Instituciones Sin Ánimo de Lucro en el Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales abarcando también algunas, pero no todas, de estas instituciones y formas adicionales de actividad individual directa, y lo hace de una forma que satisface los exigentes criterios de comparabilidad, operacionalizabilidad y potencial de integración en los sistemas estadísticos oficiales.

Traditional stochastic inventory models assume full knowledge of the demand probability distribution. However, in practice, it is often difficult to completely characterize the demand distribution, especially in fast-changing markets. In this paper, we study the newsvendor problem with partial information about the demand distribution (e.g., mean, variance, symmetry, unimodality). In particular, we derive the order quantities that minimize the newsvendor's maximum regret of not acting optimally. Most of our solutions are tractable, which makes them attractive for practical application. Our analysis also generates insights into the choice of the demand distribution as an input to the newsvendor model. In particular, the distributions that maximize the entropy perform well under the regret criterion. Our approach can be extended to a variety of problems that require a robust but not conservative solution.

We consider a firm that invests in capacity under demand uncertainty and thus faces two related but distinct types of risk: mismatch between capacity and demand and profit variability. Whereas mismatch risk can be mitigated with greater operational flexibility, profit variability can be reduced through financial hedging. We show that the relationship between these two risk mitigating strategies depends on the type of flexibility: Product flexibility and financial hedging tend to be complements (substitutes)-i.e., product flexibility tends to increase (decrease) the value of financial hedging, and, vice versa, financial hedging tends to increase (decrease) the value of product flexibility-when product demands are positively (negatively) correlated. In contrast to product flexibility, postponement flexibility is a substitute to financial hedging as intuitively expected. Although our analytical results assume perfect flexibility and perfect hedging and rely on a linear approximation of the value of hedging, we validate their robustness in an extensive numerical study.

This paper investigates repetitive purchase decisions of perishable items in the face of uncertain demand (the newsvendor problem). The experimental design includes: high, or low profit levels; and uniform, or normal demand distributions. The results show that in all cases both learning and convergence occur and are effected by: (1) the mean demand; (2) the order-size of the maximal expected profit; and (3) the demand level of the immediately preceding round. In all cases of the experimental design, the purchase order converges to a value between the mean demand and the quantity for maximizing the expected profit.

Strategic prescriptions drawn from pooled cross-sectional evidence of firm performance effects are not necessarily warranted. This is because firm characteristics can influence both the mean and variance of firm performance. Strategic inferences are warranted if empirically observed effects reflect increases in mean firm performance. If they reflect increases in firm performance variance, however, such inferences are warranted only if the increased odds of achieving high performance compensate sufficiently for the concomitantly increased risk of realizing poor performance. Our simulation study, which contrasts firm performance effects in pooled cross-section and within-firm over time, counsels caution when basing strategic prescriptions on pooled cross-sectional studies of firm performance in general, and in the case of network effects in particular.

A large body of theoretical work has explored the channels through which vertical contracts can induce efficiency improvements. However, it is also important to study vertical contracts empirically in order to gain insight into the relative size of different types of efficiency gains. In this paper, I empirically analyse a contractual innovation in the vertically separated video rental industry. Prior to 1998, video stores obtained inventory from movie distributors using simple linear-pricing contracts. In 1998, revenue-sharing contracts were widely adopted. I investigate the effect of the introduction of revenue-sharing contracts on firms' profits and consumer welfare. I analyse a new panel data set of home video retailers that includes information on individual retailers' contract and inventory choices, as well as rentals and contract terms for 246 movie titles and 6137 retailers in the U.S. during each week of 1998 and 1999 and the first half of 2000. A structural econometric model of firms' behaviour is developed that describes the nature of firms' contract choices. Estimates from this model indicate that both upstream and downstream profits increase by 10% under the revenue-sharing contract for popular titles. For less popular titles, the effects can be even larger. I also estimate that consumers benefit when revenue-sharing contracts are adopted.

I show that median earnings surprise has shifted rightward from small negative (miss analyst estimates by a small amount) to zero (meet analyst estimates exactly) to small positive (beat analyst estimates by a small amount) during the 16 years, 1984 to 1999. I show that a rightward temporal shift in median surprise from negative to positive describes earnings, but neither profits nor losses. Median profit surprise shifts within the positive quadrant, from zero to one cent per share. Median loss surprise shifts within the negative quadrant from extreme negative (about -33 cents per share) to zero. I show that the median surprise for profits exceeds that for losses in every year. I document significant positive temporal trends in both meet and beat analyst estimates for both profits and losses, but I find a greater frequency of profits that either meet or beat analyst estimates in every year. I find a significant positive temporal trend in positive profits that are \"a little bit of good news,\" and a significant negative temporal trend in managers who report losses that are an \"extreme amount of bad news.\" My results are robust to the four internal validity threats I consider-namely temporal changes in: (1) analyst forecast accuracy, (2) the mix of earnings of one sign preceded by earnings of another sign four quarters ago, (3) the timeliness of the most recent analyst forecast, and (4) the I/B/E/S definition of actual earnings. I find that managers of growth firms are relatively more likely than managers of value firms to report good news profits. I show that when they do report positive profit surprises, managers of growth firms are more likely to report \"a little bit of good news\" in every year.

The current research establishes a first-mover disadvantage in negotiation. We propose that making the first offer in a negotiation will backfire when the sender reveals private information that an astute recipient can leverage to his or her advantage. In two experiments, we manipulated whether the first offer was purely distributive or revealed that the sender's preferences were compatible with the recipient's preferences (i.e., the negotiators wanted the same outcome on an issue). When first offers contained only distributive issues, the classic first-mover advantage occurred, and first offers predicted final prices. However, a first-mover disadvantage emerged when senders opened with offers that revealed compatible preferences. These effects were moderated by negotiators' social value orientation: Proself negotiators were more likely to take advantage of compatible information than were prosocial negotiators. Overall, the key factor that determined whether the first-mover advantage or disadvantage emerged was whether the offer revealed compatible preferences. These results demonstrate that first offers not only provide numerical value but also convey qualitative information.

In situations where a seller has surplus stock and another seller is stocked out, it may be desirable to transfer surplus stock from the former to the latter. We examine how the possibility of such transshipments between two independent locations affects the optimal inventory orders at each location. If each location aims to maximize its own profits—we call this local decision making—their inventory choices will not, in general, maximize joint profits. We find transshipment prices which induce the locations to choose inventory levels consistent with joint-profit maximization.

This study investigated attitudes toward the use of deception in negotiation, with particular attention to the distinction between deception regarding the informational elements of the interaction (e.g., lying about or misrepresenting needs or preferences) and deception about emotional elements (e.g., misrepresenting one's emotional state). We examined how individuals judge the relative ethical appropriateness of these alternative forms of deception, and how these judgments relate to negotiator performance and long-run reputation. Individuals viewed emotionally misleading tactics as more ethically appropriate to use in negotiation than informational deception. Approval of deception predicted negotiator performance in a negotiation simulation and also general reputation as a negotiator, but the nature of these relationships depended on the kind of deception involved.