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Drug wars : how big pharma raises prices and keeps generics off the market
\"While the shockingly high prices of prescription drugs continue to dominate the news, the strategies used by pharmaceutical companies to prevent generic competition are poorly understood, even by the lawmakers responsible for regulating them. In this groundbreaking work, Robin Feldman and Evan Frondorf illuminate the inner workings of the pharmaceutical market and show how drug companies twist health policy to achieve goals contrary to the public interest. In highly engaging prose, they offer specific examples of how generic competition has been stifled for years, with costs climbing into the billions and everyday consumers paying the price. Drug Wars is a guide to the current landscape, a roadmap for reform, and a warning of what is to come. It should be read by policymakers, academics, patients, and anyone else concerned with the soaring costs of prescription drugs\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Predicting patent challenges for small-molecule drugs: A cross-sectional study
The high cost of prescription drugs in the United States is maintained by brand-name manufacturers' competition-free period made possible in part through patent protection, which generic competitors must challenge to enter the market early. Understanding the predictors of these challenges can inform policy development to encourage timely generic competition. Identifying categories of drugs systematically overlooked by challengers, such as those with low market size, highlights gaps where unchecked patent quality and high prices persist, and can help design policy interventions to help promote timely patient access to generic drugs including enhanced patent scrutiny or incentives for challenges. Our objective was to characterize and assess the extent to which market size and other drug characteristics can predict patent challenges for brand-name drugs.
This cross-sectional study included new patented small-molecule drugs approved by the FDA from 2007 to 2018. Market size, patent, and patent challenge data came from IQVIA MIDAS pharmaceutical quarterly sales data, the FDA's Orange Book database, and the FDA's Paragraph IV list. Predictive models were constructed using random forest and elastic net classification. The primary outcome was the occurrence of a patent challenge within the first year of eligibility. Of the 210 new small-molecule drugs included in the sample, 55% experienced initiation of patent challenge within the first year of eligibility. Market value was the most important predictor variable, with larger markets being more likely to be associated with patent challenges. Drugs in the anti-infective therapeutic class or those with fast-track approval were less likely to be challenged. The limitations of this work arise from the exclusion of variables that were not readily available publicly, will be the target of future research, or were deemed beyond the scope of this project.
Generic competition does not occur with the same timeliness across all drug markets, which can leave granted patents of questionable merit in place and sustain high brand-name drug prices. Predictive models may help direct limited resources for post-grant patent validity review and adjust policy when generic competition is lacking.
Journal Article
Sotorasib: First Approval
Sotorasib (LUMAKRAS
™
) is a RAS GTPase family inhibitor being developed by Amgen for the treatment of solid tumours with
KRAS
mutations, including non-small cell lung cancer (NSCLC) and colorectal cancer. In May 2021, sotorasib was granted accelerated approval by the US FDA for the treatment of adult patients with
KRAS
G12C-mutated locally advanced or metastatic NSCLC, as determined by an FDA-approved test, who have received at least one prior systemic therapy. This article summarizes the milestones in the development of sotorasib leading to this first approval for
KRAS
G12C-mutated NSCLC.
Journal Article
The prevalence of post-NDA drug patents and their relationship to the timing of generic approval
Patent applications filed after a New Drug Application (NDA) is approved are uncommon and do not appear to substantially delay approval of generic drugs in most cases.
Journal Article
Fixed-Dose Combination Drug Approvals, Patents and Market Exclusivities Compared to Single Active Ingredient Pharmaceuticals
Fixed-dose combinations (FDC) contain two or more active ingredients. The effective patent and exclusivity life of FDC compared to single active ingredient has not been assessed.
Trends in FDA approved FDC in the period 1980-2012 and time lag between approval of FDC and single active ingredients in the combination were assessed, and the effective patent and exclusivity life of FDC was compared with their single active ingredients.
New molecular entities (NMEs), new therapeutic biologics license applications (BLAs) and FDC data were collected from the FDA Orange Book and Drugs@FDA. Analysis included FDC containing one or more NMEs or BLAs at first FDA approval (NMEs-FDC) and only already marketed drugs (Non-NMEs-FDC). Descriptive, Kruskal-Wallis and Wilcoxon Rank Sum analyses were performed.
During the study period, the FDA approved 28 NMEs-FDC (3.5% of NMEs) and 117 non-NMEs-FDC. FDC approvals increased from 12 in the 1980s to 59 in the 2000s. Non-NMEs-FDC entered the market at a median of 5.43 years (interquartile range 1.74, 10.31) after first FDA approval of single active ingredients in the combination. The Non-NMEs-FDC entered the market at a median of 2.33 years (-7.55, 2.39) before approval of generic single active ingredient. Non-NME-FDC added a median of 9.70 (2.75, 16.24) years to the patent and exclusivity life of the single active ingredients in the combination.
FDC approvals significantly increased over the last twenty years. Pharmaceutical companies market FDC drugs shortly before the generic versions of the single ingredients enter the market extending the patent and exclusivity life of drugs included in the combination.
Journal Article
A New Way to Contain Unaffordable Medication Costs — Exercising the Government’s Existing Rights
Existing laws could be used to help make many drugs more affordable. One gives the government a royalty-free license to use patented inventions that were discovered using federal funding; the other gives the government immunity from being sued for patent infringement.
Journal Article
Patents And Regulatory Exclusivities On Inhalers For Asthma And COPD, 1986–2020
Inhalers are the mainstay of treatment for asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). These products face limited generic competition in the US and remain expensive. To better understand the strategies that brand-name inhaler manufacturers have employed to preserve their market dominance, we analyzed all patents and regulatory exclusivities granted to inhalers approved by the Food and Drug Administration between 1986 and 2020. Of the sixty-two inhalers approved, fifty-three were brand-name products, and these brand-name products had a median of sixteen years of protection from generic competition. Only one inhaler contained an ingredient with a new mechanism of action. More than half of all patents were on the inhaler devices, not the active ingredients or other aspects of these drug-device combinations. Manufacturers augmented periods of brand-name market exclusivity by moving active ingredients from one inhaler device into another (device hops). The median time from approval of an originator product to the last-to-expire patent or regulatory exclusivity of branded follow-ons was twenty-eight years (across device hops on fourteen originator products). Regulatory and patent reform is critical to ensure that the rewards bestowed on brand-name inhaler manufacturers better reflect the added clinical benefit of new products.
Journal Article
The Myth of the Free Market for Pharmaceuticals
The Myth of the Free Market for PharmaceuticalsThe U.S. pharmaceutical market has always been influenced by government. The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act is the latest policy aiming to improve access and affordability while supporting innovation.
Journal Article
Generic Drugs and the Struggle to Compete: The Role of Skinny Labels
The generic drug industry currently faces multiple, serious issues that threaten the US drug supply. So-called “skinny labels” are one of the few tools authorized by Congress to expedite entry into the market by generic competitors when the first patent for a brand's drug compound (only) expires. This article reviews the law on this expedited marketing pathway for generic competitors, as well as limitations on its use.
We examined the literature on patent protection of brand drugs, including the timelines for production of generic competitors. We also examined the law concerning skinny labels, including a recent decision of the US Federal Circuit Court that clearly articulates the guidelines concerning entry into the generic market, including labeling, marketing, and promotion.
Skinny labels that follow the regulations set forth in the Hatch-Waxman Act, including the necessary carve-out procedure for “methods of use” still protected by 1 or more active patents, do not infringe a brand drug's label. Furthermore, the skinny label does not induce or contribute to infringement merely because its label contains US Food and Drug Administration–required safety profile data—even when the data cross-reference superiority studies on still-patent protected methods of use elsewhere in the label.
Generic drugs have become essential to the broad, general availability of clinical therapeutic agents. The Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to facilitate entry of generic competitors into the marketplace, and the skinny label is an important tool to accomplish that end. As long as the generic manufacturer follows the essential skinny-label rules, specifically including marketing the compound without promoting or advertising those methods of use still protected by ongoing patents, the law will not find induced or contributory infringement.
Journal Article