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Color preference is an important aspect of visual experience, but little is known about why people in general like some colors more than others. Previous research suggested explanations based on biological adaptations [Hurlbert AC, Ling YL (2007) Curr Biol 17:623-625] and color-emotions [Ou L-C, Luo MR, Woodcock A, Wright A (2004) Color Res Appl 29:381-389]. In this article we articulate an ecological valence theory in which color preferences arise from people's average affective responses to color-associated objects. An empirical test provides strong support for this theory: People like colors strongly associated with objects they like (e.g., blues with clear skies and clean water) and dislike colors strongly associated with objects they dislike (e.g., browns with feces and rotten food). Relative to alternative theories, the ecological valence theory both fits the data better (even with fewer free parameters) and provides a more plausible, comprehensive causal explanation of color preferences.

Most economists define rationality in terms of consistency principles. These principles place \"bounds\" on rationality-bounds that range from perfect consistency to weak stochastic transitivity. Several decades of research on preferential choice has demonstrated how and when people violate these bounds. Many of these violations are interconnected and reflect systematic behavioral principles. We discuss the robustness of the violations and review the theories that are able to predict them. We further discuss the adaptive functions of the violations. From this perspective, choices do more than reveal preferences; they also reflect subtle, yet often quite reasonable, dependencies on the environment.

Student understanding of the nature of science (NOS) improves in response to focused reflection about its aspects—an explicit, reflective (ER) pedagogy. However, whether this approach is effective within the two most common instructional models of undergraduate science laboratories— expository, which confirms predetermined outcomes, and inquiry, which is student driven and involves undetermined outcomes—is unknown. We manipulated underlying pedagogy (expository or inquiry based) and NOS treatment (ER or no ER) randomly across 31 sections of an introductory biology laboratory (n = 602 students). The students' understanding of several NOS aspects, assessed by their responses on two validated surveys, was significantly affected by the treatment. However, different NOS aspects were promoted by different treatments, which suggests that no single model or pedagogy can increase all aspects of NOS understanding. Instead, the instructional approach should be selected on the basis of the desired NOS learning outcomes.

It is widely thought that functionalism and the qualia theory are better positioned to accommodate the 'affective' aspect (i.e., the hurtfulness) of pain phenomenology than representationalism. In this paper, we attempt to overturn this opinion by raising problems for both functionalism and the qualia theory on this score. With regard to functionalism, we argue that it gets the order of explanation wrong: pain experience gives use to the effects it does because it hurts, and not the other way around. With regard to the qualia theory, we argue that it fails to capture the sense in which pain's affective phenomenology rationalises vanous bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviours. Representationalism, in contrast, escapes both of these problems: it gets the order explanation nght and it explains how pain's affective phenomenology can rationalise bodily-directed beliefs, desires, and behaviours. For this reason, we argue that representationalism has significant advantage in the debates about pain's affective phenomenology. We end the paper by examining objections, including the question of what representationalists should say about so-called 'disassociation cases', such as pain asymbolia.

Following on from work on stakeholder identification, this paper constructs a typology of stakeholder theories based on the extent to which serving the interests of non-shareholders relative to those of shareholders is accepted as a responsibility of companies. A typology based on the division of stakeholder theories into normative, descriptive, and instrumental is rejected on the grounds that the latter two designations refer to second order theories rather than divisions within stakeholder theory and the first is a designation which, for the purposes of business ethics, applies to all stakeholder theories. The crucial distinction between stockholder and stakeholder theory is argued to be their respective rejection and acceptance of role-specific responsibilities toward non-shareholders that are \"ultimate objective fulfilling\". From this starting point, a typology is constructed using a division of stakeholder theories into those which do and do not give priority to the interests of shareholders over those of non-shareholders, do and do not posit perfect duties towards non-shareholders as well as shareholders, do and do not accept accountability to non-shareholders as well as shareholders.

Klein (1994) points out that within the treatment of the temporal semantics of English that he proposes, there is no need to maintain the traditional distinction between perfect aspect and anterior tense. An analysis of the semantics of perfect aspect in terms of placing the topic time in the post-time of the event under description can account for the anterior tense readings of the pluperfect as well. In this article, I argue that \"Klein's Conjecture\" appears more problematic once extended to other languages, drawing on evidence from Japanese, Kituba, Kalaallisut, Korean, and Yucatec Maya. Languages such as Japanese have expressions of anterior tense that do not fit Klein's analysis of perfect aspect (topic time after event time), while others—e.g., Yucatec Maya—have expressions that fit Klein's analysis, but do not have anterior tense readings. The additions to Klein's theory necessary so it can accommodate the new evidence comprise a revised viewpoint aspect component that distinguishes not only relations between topic and event time, but also relations between topic time and the runtimes of states preceding and following the event in a causal chain, as well as an updated tense module that distinguishes relations between topic time and perspective times in addition to relations between topic time and utterance time.

We would like to thank Jack Goldstone and Bert Useem for their thoughtful comment on our article in Sociological Theory. As they say, there are many things about which we agree. In the interest of debate, we focus on those issues that we think require clarification and others on which we may have genuine differences of opinion. Creating something as general as a theory of fields is a daunting task. Goldstone and Useem rightly point out that such a theory has to be less sensitive to the particular ongoing struggles of a particular field and offer more generic propositions. This is a useful exercise because it clarifies what is general about field structure and dynamics, which, we contend, can help us make sense of the distinctive history of any given field. We are comfortable arguing that, for all their differences, democratic politics, a financial market, a division within a firm, and a cultural arena within a given society adhere to common field dynamics. We intend this as a bold claim that offers analysts of these arenas of action a common language and set of concepts and dynamic principles to focus on in understanding the idiosyncratic features of their field of interest. Adapted from the source document.

aim in this essay is to elaborate a mode of political theorizing that is not beholden to the “how do you know?” question of epistemic validation. Rather than focusing on epistemological arguments, I propose that people interested in studying political theory address the partiality of aspects that emerge when engaging works, and the participation of media in the creation of political concepts. Central to my elaborations is the aesthetic notion that there is no overarching rule that will determine how objects, peoples, and events relate to one another and stand out as relevant to political theory, and that there are no necessary qualifications for participation in political theorizing. The essay is comprised of three sections. The first engages three thinkers of the interpretive turn in political theory: Charles Taylor, Quentin Skinner, and James Tully. The second section assembles three images of thought drawn from three different expressions of three diverse thinkers: Roland Barthes, Stanley Cavell, and Jacques Derrida. In the third section I depart from the theoretical experimentation and interpretive work of the previous sections and redirect attention to the participation of media in political theorizing. I conclude the essay by suggesting that political theory is process of mediation between and amongst a diversity of elements that have no common measure.

The domain of social influence is central to social psychology, and is claimed as a core aspect of the explanatory domain of two important theories: self-categorization theory and the theory of status characteristics and expectation states. In this paper we contrast predictions derived from each theory about the relative influence of group members who differ both on shared category membership and on status characteristics. In the first of two experiments, participants were asked to decide which of four people were most likely to know the correct answer to a task; shared group membership, relative group status, and relevant/irrelevant expertise were varied. We found both status and in-group identity effects. A second experiment provided evidence about the importance of perceptions of relative competence and similarity, as related to shared identity and status, in the influence process.

In dem Artikel wird die Verwendung perfektiver und imperfektiver Verben in direkten Sprechakten analysiert. Seit Koschmieder wird diese dahingehend interpretiert, dass der perfektive Aspekt in einer performativen Äußerung die Handlung, die durch den Ausspruch des Verbums selbst erfolgt, deutlich ausdrückt, und sich perfektive Formen deshalb besser eignen als imperfektive Formen. Eine genauere Untersuchung der Kontexte perfektiver performativer Verben zeigt, dass es sich oft um typische Ereignisverben handelt, die im Futur stehen und in eine Sequenz anderer Ereignisse eingeordnet sind. Das Auftreten echt performativ verwendeter perfektiver Verben außerhalb einer Ereignissequenz hingegen lässt sich als Ergebnis einer Höflichkeitsstrategie interpretieren. So stellt die mit dieser Verwendung verbundene Aspekt-und Tempusverschiebung eine typische Hedge-Strategie der negativen Höflichkeit dar, die einen potenziell gesichtsbedrohenden Akt im Präsens kompensieren soll. Die Analyse basiert auf Korpusdaten des Polnischen, Tschechischen und Slovakischen.