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"Dualism"
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Mind-body Dualism: A critique from a Health Perspective
Philosophical theory about the nature of human beings has far reaching consequences on our understanding of various issues faced by them. Once taken as self-evident, it becomes the foundation on which knowledge gets built. The cause of concern is that this theoretical framework rarely gets questioned despite its inherent limitations and self-defeating consequences, leading to crisis in the concerned field. The field, which is facing crisis today, is that of medicine, and the paradigmatic stance that is responsible for the crisis is Cartesian dualism-a view that mind and body are essentially separate entities. This paper discusses Cartesian dualism in the context of the practice of medicine. Focusing more closely on how disease, health and treatment are defined through this position, the paper builds up its critique by throwing light on its accomplishments, limitations and self-defeating consequences. The paper also seeks to understand why this dualism is still alive despite its disavowal from philosophers, health practitioners and lay people.
Journal Article
Knowledge, thought, and the case for dualism
\"The relationship between mind and matter, mental states and physical states, has occupied the attention of philosophers for thousands of years. Richard Fumerton's primary concern is the knowledge argument for dualism - an argument that proceeds from the idea that we can know truths about our existence and our mental states without knowing any truths about the physical world. This view has come under relentless criticism, but here Fumerton makes a powerful case for its rehabilitation, demonstrating clearly the importance of its interconnections with a wide range of other controversies within philosophy. Fumerton analyzes philosophical views about the nature of thought and the relation of those views to arguments for dualism, and investigates the connection between a traditional form of foundationalism about knowledge, and a foundationalist view about thought that underlies traditional arguments for dualism. His book will be of great interest to those studying epistemology and the philosophy of mind\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Obrona dualizmu antropologicznego w filozofii Stanisława Judyckiego
The following paper summarizes the achievements of Stanisław Judycki in the field of philosophical anthropology. He takes the position of the absolute dualism, proclaiming the existence of the human soul as an independent being (a simple, immaterial and atemporal substance), of the Augustinian-Cartesian type (stating the possibility of capturing the “I” in the stream of one’s own consciousness, although behind the veil of semantic generality). In the text, I present Judycki’s arguments to support this position: (a) explaining such features of internal experience as the unity of the stream of consciousness is possible only in dualism, (b) the modal argument, (c) arguments against naturalism (according to Judycki, the only alternative to anthropological materialism is dualism). I also defend the view that the best arguments for dualism are arguments from group (c).
Journal Article
New perspectives on type identity : the mental and the physical
\"The type identity theory, according to which types of mental state are identical to types of physical state, fell out of favour for some years but is now being considered with renewed interest. Many philosophers are critically re-examining the arguments which were marshalled against it, finding in the type identity theory both resources to strengthen a comprehensive, physicalistic metaphysics and a useful tool in understanding the relationship between developments in psychology and new results in neuroscience. This volume brings together leading philosophers of mind, whose essays challenge in new ways the standard objections to type identity theory, such as the multiple realizability objection and the modal argument. Other essays show how cognitive science and neuroscience are lending new support to type identity theory and still others provide, extend and improve traditional arguments concerning the theory's explanatory power\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Viii—Defending Dualism
In the contemporary mental causation debate, two dualist models of psychophysical causal relevance have been proposed which entail that although mental events are causally relevant in the physical domain, this is not in virtue of them causing any physical event. It is widely assumed that the principle of the causal completeness of the physical domain provides a general argument against interactive dualism. But, whether the completeness principle presents a problem for these alternative forms of interactive dualism is questionable. In this paper, focusing on the popular no-gap argument for the completeness principle, I explore one reason why.
Journal Article
Material through and through
Materialists about human persons think that we are material through and through—wholly material beings. Those who endorse materialism more widely think that everything is material through and through. But what is it to be wholly material? In this article, I answer that question. I identify and defend a definition or analysis of ‘wholly material’.
Journal Article
Robert Louis Stevenson and Joseph Conrad : writers of transition
\"Assesses points of convergence between Robert Louis Stevenson and Joseph Conrad. Extends arguments about the authors' South Seas literature, offering new critiques on the writers' literary histories, writing styles, romance and adventure modes, fictions of duality, experience in Victorian London, explorations of the human psyche, and fame\"--Provided by publisher.
BOOK
Gestalt Theory and the Network of Traditional Hypotheses
Since at least the time of Helmholtz, the process of visual perception has been regarded as a two-stage affair consisting of an initial sensory stage corresponding to the proximal stimulus and a subsequent cognitive stage corresponding to the distal object. This construction amounts to an awkward mind body dualism wherein part of perception is done by the body and the other part is done by the mind. Gestalt theory rejected both raw sensations and their cognitive interpretation, offering a single unified perceptual process that responds to an extended pattern of stimulation. They proposed organizational rules that describe how objects arise from the indifferent retinal mosaic. The same grouping principles by which objects are segmented also function to segregate regions of uniform illumination. Lightness values can then be computed by comparing luminance values within each such framework of illumination, with no need for the mystical concept of taking the illumination into account.
Journal Article