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Regarding his alleged abduction, the Syrian sources said that Nayyuf had in fact been in hiding in the town of Hamnaya near Damascus. They wondered how anyone could accept Nayyuf's \"claims\". According to these sources, Nayyuf stressed in Paris that Ali Duba, the former chief of Syrian Military Intelligence, is under house arrest and under guard to prevent him from fleeing Syria. Nayyuf said also that he too was under house arrest at the same time. So how could Duba, who, as Nayyuf said, was under house arrest abduct him and keep him in custody for more than 24 hours?

In a telephone interview with Syrian opposition figure Dr Husam al-Diri, secretary general of the Grouping of Democratic National Liberals and member of the Executive Committee of the Syrian National Council, Al-Diri asked, then answered, an important question. The question is: Was Minister Kan'an killed or did he commit suicide? Al-Diri said: The fact that we have to keep in mind is that if the minister's death is the result of an assassination I can say that President [Bashar] al-Asad, his brother Mahir, or their brother-in-law Asif Shawkat are incapable of making such a serious decision. Asked if be believes that Major General Kan'an, who ruled Lebanon during the Syrian occupation from 1982 to 2002, was killed or did he commit suicide, Al-Diri said: First we must explain that a man commits suicide either because he is brave or is a hero. If Ghazi Kan'an committed suicide, by so doing he sacrificed himself as a kamikaze for the sake of Bashar al-Asad's regime, a reference to the Japanese pilots in World War II who attacked the US fleet, or he had other reasons known to him personally and some pillars in the regime. Al-Diri was asked if he believes that the killing of Major General Kan'an was part of a deal with the United States to loosen the noose around the neck of the Syrian regime within the framework of a set of secret deals talked about recently. In other words, Maj- Gen Kan'an was the scapegoat to maintain life in the Syrian regime for a few more years.

  Yahya Omaiqa, who goes by the name of Yahia Columbus and who used to be one of Al-Mudara's \"friends,\" takes a very different view on Al-Mudara's social circle, which he refers to as a \"gang.\" Siham Al-Qubati, 19, recalls hearing the fearfully screamed words \"it's Quraish gang\" a couple of times in the past. \"I was raised hearing terrible stories about Quraish and other gangs,\" she recounts. \"Everyone knows what Musaik gangs are. They like to make trouble till this day,\" said Ousama Al-Duba'ee, a taxi driver who resides multiple kilometers away from Musaik on Al-Zubairi Street. \"Their reputation is even known here in my neighborhood. They hold weapons and are not welcoming to those who go to their neighborhood, especially if from an enemy neighborhood.\"

Si la rive arabe du golfe Persique semble bien désormais être le centre actif du Moyen-Orient à l’heure de la mondialisation, cela ne tient pas seulement aux ressources en hydrocarbures, mais aussi à une politique de diversification des activités dans la perspective de l’après-pétrole qui passe notamment par la multiplication des zones franches. On en dénombre une quinzaine, principalement localisées aux Émirats Arabes Unis, surtout à Doubaï. À une préférence pour le littoral et une prédilection pour les abords du détroit d’Ormuz s’ajoute le fait que les zones franches n’ont pas les faveurs des pays les plus riches en hydrocarbures ou les plus conservateurs de la région. Considérées comme un outil permettant d’attirer les entreprises étrangères, elles n’ont pas ici pour objectif de fournir des emplois à une population locale nombreuse, mais reposent sur le faible coût d’une main- d’oeuvre immigrée. Elles sont surtout un instrument de contournement du droit permettant d’échapper à la kafala, pratique qui régit traditionnellement les relations d’affaires avec l’extérieur. By passing the law in relation to economic development : free zones on the Arab shore of the Persian Gulf At the time of globalization, the Arab shore of the Persian Gulf seems to be now the active core of Middle East region. This is not only due to the resources coming from oil and gas exportation. It is also the result of a policy whose objective is to diversify economic activities in a post oil perspective. Free zones are one of the tools to realise this strategy founded on economic liberalism, international exchanges and foreign investment. Around fifteen free zones can be counted along the Arab shore of the Persian Gulf, mainly located in the United Arab Emirates, especially in Dubai. Those free zones prefer coastal areas at the vicinity of the straight of Hormuz. The richest oil and gas producers and the more conservative States are less favourable to the creation of free zones whose aim in the region is not to give work to unemployed poor population as the manpower is low cost immigrants workers. They appear as a way to by pass the law and to avoid the kafala, a traditional and legal obligation, prescribing the foreign companies and establishments to have a local sponsor and to share the capital and benefit with a local associate.