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We evaluate how country-level entrepreneurship—measured via the national system of entrepreneurship—triggers total factor productivity (TFP) by increasing the effects of Kirznerian and Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. Using a database for 45 developed and developing countries during 2002–2013, we employ non-parametric techniques to build a world technology frontier and compute TFP estimates. The results of the common factor models reveal that the national system of entrepreneurship is a relevant conduit of TFP, and that this effect is heterogeneous across countries. Policies supporting Kirznerian entrepreneurship—e.g., increased business formation rates—may promote the creation of low value-adding businesses which is not associated with higher TFP rates. Policy interventions targeting Schumpeterian entrepreneurship objectives—e.g., innovative entrepreneurship and the development of new technologies—are conducive to technical change by promoting upward shifts in the countries’ production function and, consequently, productivity growth.

Probably because of their interpretability and transparent nature, synthetic controls have become widely applied in empirical research in economics and the social sciences. This article aims to provide practical guidance to researchers employing synthetic control methods. The article starts with an overview and an introduction to synthetic control estimation. The main sections discuss the advantages of the synthetic control framework as a research design, and describe the settings where synthetic controls provide reliable estimates and those where they may fail. The article closes with a discussion of recent extensions, related methods, and avenues for future research.

Geophysicists examine and document the repercussions for the earth’s climate induced by alternative emission scenarios and model specifications. Using simplified approximations, they produce tractable characterizations of the associated uncertainty. Meanwhile, economists write highly stylized damage functions to speculate about how climate change alters macroeconomic and growth opportunities. How can we assess both climate and emissions impacts, as well as uncertainty in the broadest sense, in social decision-making? We provide a framework for answering this question by embracing recent decision theory and tools from asset pricing, and we apply this structure with its interacting components to a revealing quantitative illustration.

Long-run growth in many models is the product of two terms: the effective number of researchers and their research productivity. We present evidence from various industries, products, and firms showing that research effort is rising substantially while research productivity is declining sharply. A good example is Moore’s Law. The number of researchers required today to achieve the famous doubling of computer chip density is more than 18 times larger than the number required in the early 1970s. More generally, everywhere we look we find that ideas, and the exponential growth they imply, are getting harder to find.

Motivated by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, we present a theory of Keynesian supply shocks: shocks that reduce potential output in a sector of the economy, but that, by reducing demand in other sectors, ultimately push aggregate activity below potential. A Keynesian supply shock is more likely when the elasticity of substitution between sectors is relatively low, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is relatively high, and markets are incomplete. Fiscal policy can display a smaller multiplier, but the insurance benefit of fiscal transfers can be enhanced. Firm exits and job destruction can amplify and propagate the shock.

After decades of supporting free trade, in 2018 theUnited States raised import tariffs and major trade partners retaliated. We analyze the short-run impact of this return to protectionism on the U.S. economy. Import and retaliatory tariffs caused large declines in imports and exports. Prices of imports targeted by tariffs did not fall, implying complete pass-through of tariffs to duty-inclusive prices. The resulting losses to U.S. consumers and firms that buy imports was $51 billion, or 0.27% of GDP. We embed the estimated trade elasticities in a general-equilibrium model of the U.S. economy. After accounting for tariff revenue and gains to domestic producers, the aggregate real income loss was $7.2 billion, or 0.04% of GDP. Import tariffs favored sectors concentrated in politically competitive counties, and the model implies that tradeable-sector workers in heavily Republican counties were the most negatively affected due to the retaliatory tariffs.

We provide evidence that democracy has a positive effect on GDP per capita. Our dynamic panel strategy controls for country fixed effects and the rich dynamics of GDP, which otherwise confound the effect of democracy. To reduce measurement error, we introduce a new indicator of democracy that consolidates previous measures. Our baseline results show that democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20 percent in the long run. We find similar effects using a propensity score reweighting strategy as well as an instrumental-variables strategy using regional waves of democratization. The effects are similar across different levels of development and appear to be driven by greater investments in capital, schooling, and health.

We study the conditional distribution of GDP growth as a function of economic and financial conditions. Deteriorating financial conditions are associated with an increase in the conditional volatility and a decline in the conditional mean of GDP growth, leading the lower quantiles of GDP growth to vary with financial conditions and the upper quantiles to be stable over time. Upside risks to GDP growth are low in most periods while downside risks increase as financial conditions become tighter. We argue that amplification mechanisms in the financial sector generate the observed growth vulnerability dynamics.

What is the aggregate real rate of return in the economy? Is it higher than the growth rate of the economy and, if so, by how much? Is there a tendency for returns to fall in the long run? Which particular assets have the highest long-run returns? We answer these questions on the basis of a new and comprehensive data set for all major asset classes, including housing. The annual data on total returns for equity, housing, bonds, and bills cover 16 advanced economies from 1870 to 2015, and our new evidence reveals many new findings and puzzles.

We examine conventional approaches to evaluating the economic impact of protectionist trade policies. We illustrate these conventional approaches by applying them to the tariffs introduced by the Trump administration during 2018. In the wake of this increase in trade protection, the United States experienced substantial increases in the prices of intermediates and final goods, dramatic changes to its supply-chain network, reductions in availability of imported varieties, and the complete pass-through of the tariffs into domestic prices of imported goods. Therefore, the full incidence of the tariffs has fallen on domestic consumers and importers so far, and our estimates imply a reduction in aggregate US real income of $1.4 billion per month by the end of 2018. We see similar patterns for foreign countries that have retaliated with their own tariffs against the United States, which suggests that the trade war has also reduced the real income of these other countries.