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This paper investigates whether Tether, a digital currency pegged to the U.S. dollar, influenced Bitcoin and other cryptocurrency prices during the 2017 boom. Using algorithms to analyze blockchain data, we find that purchases with Tether are timed following market downturns and result in sizable increases in Bitcoin prices. The flow is attributable to one entity, clusters below round prices, induces asymmetric autocorrelations in Bitcoin, and suggests insufficient Tether reserves before month-ends. Rather than demand from cash investors, these patterns are most consistent with the supply-based hypothesis of unbacked digital money inflating cryptocurrency prices.

This paper examines the behavior of U.S. core inflation, as measured by the weighted median of industry price changes. We find that core inflation since 1985 is well-explained by an expectations-augmented Phillips curve in which expected inflation is measured with professional forecasts and labor-market slack is captured by the short-term unemployment rate. We also find that expected inflation was backward-looking until the late 1990s, but then became strongly anchored at the Federal Reserve’s target. This shift in expectations changed the relationship between inflation and unemployment from an accelerationist Phillips curve to a level-level Phillips curve. Our specification explains why high unemployment during the Great Recession did not reduce inflation greatly: partly because inflation expectations were anchored, and partly because short-term unemployment rose less sharply than total unemployment.

Using a small Bayesian dynamic factor model of the euro area, we estimate the deviations of output from its trend that are consistent with the behavior of inflation. We label these deviations the output gap. In order to pin down the features of the model, we evaluate the accuracy of real-time inflation forecasts from different model specifications. The version that forecasts inflation best implies that after the 2011 sovereign debt crisis, the output gap in the euro area has been much larger than the official estimates. Versions featuring a secular stagnation-like slowdown in trend growth, and hence a small output gap after 2011, do not adequately capture the inflation developments.

We present estimates of monetary non-neutrality based on evidence from high-frequency responses of real interest rates, expected inflation, and expected output growth. Our identifying assumption is that unexpected changes in interest rates in a 30-minute window surrounding scheduled Federal Reserve announcements arise from news about monetary policy. In response to an interest rate hike, nominal and real interest rates increase roughly one-for-one, several years out into the term structure, while the response of expected inflation is small. At the same time, forecasts about output growth also increase—the opposite of what standard models imply about a monetary tightening. To explain these facts, we build a model in which Fed announcements affect beliefs not only about monetary policy but also about other economic fundamentals. Our model implies that these information effects play an important role in the overall causal effect of monetary policy shocks on output.

This paper evaluates the role of redistribution in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy to consumption. Three channels affect aggregate spending when winners and losers have different marginal propensities to consume: an earnings heterogeneity channel from unequal income gains, a Fisher channel from unexpected inflation, and an interest rate exposure channel from real interest rate changes. Sufficient statistics from Italian and US data suggest that all three channels are likely to amplify the effects of monetary policy.

To overcome the limits on traditional monetary policy imposed by the effective lower bound on short-term interest rates, in recent years the Federal Reserve and other advanced-economy central banks have deployed new policy tools. This lecture reviews what we know about the new monetary tools, focusing on quantitative easing (QE) and forward guidance, the principal new tools used by the Fed. I argue that the new tools have proven effective at easing financial conditions when policy rates are constrained by the lower bound, even when financial markets are functioning normally, and that they can be made even more effective in the future. Accordingly, the new tools should become part of the standard central bank toolkit. Simulations of the Fed’s FRB/US model suggest that, if the nominal neutral interest rate is in the range of 2–3 percent, consistent with most estimates for the United States, then a combination of QE and forward guidance can provide the equivalent of roughly 3 percentage points of policy space, largely offsetting the effects of the lower bound. If the neutral rate is much lower, however, then overcoming the effects of the lower bound may require additional measures, such as a moderate increase in the inflation target or greater reliance on fiscal policy for economic stabilization.

We examine conventional approaches to evaluating the economic impact of protectionist trade policies. We illustrate these conventional approaches by applying them to the tariffs introduced by the Trump administration during 2018. In the wake of this increase in trade protection, the United States experienced substantial increases in the prices of intermediates and final goods, dramatic changes to its supply-chain network, reductions in availability of imported varieties, and the complete pass-through of the tariffs into domestic prices of imported goods. Therefore, the full incidence of the tariffs has fallen on domestic consumers and importers so far, and our estimates imply a reduction in aggregate US real income of $1.4 billion per month by the end of 2018. We see similar patterns for foreign countries that have retaliated with their own tariffs against the United States, which suggests that the trade war has also reduced the real income of these other countries.

This paper analyzes how bounded rationality affects monetary and fiscal policy via an empirically relevant enrichment of the New Keynesian model. It models agents’ partial myopia toward distant atypical events using a new microfounded “cognitive discounting” parameter. Compared to the rational model, (i) there is no forward guidance puzzle; (ii) the Taylor principle changes: with passive monetary policy but enough myopia equilibria are determinate and economies stable; (iii) the zero lower bound is much less costly; (iv) price-level targeting is not optimal; (v) fiscal stimulus is effective; (vi) the model is “neo-Fisherian” in the long run, Keynesian in the short run.

This article uses an experiment embedded in a survey to analyze the response of consumers' long-run inflation expectations to information about the Federal Reserve's inflation target and past inflation. On average, respondents revise forecasts toward the 2% target with either information treatment. Forecast uncertainty and heterogeneity decline with the treatments, but remain substantial. Since the information in the treatments is publicly available, these findings are consistent with models of imperfect information in which agents do not fully and continually update their information sets or incorporate all available information into their expectations. Response to treatments varies with prior informedness and with demographic characteristics.

This paper studies how changes in oil supply expectations affect the oil price and the macroeconomy. Using a novel identification design, exploiting institutional features of OPEC and high-frequency data, I identify an oil supply news shock. These shocks have statistically and economically significant effects. Negative news leads to an immediate increase in oil prices, a gradual fall in oil production, and an increase in inventories. This has consequences for the US economy: activity falls, prices and inflation expectations rise, and the dollar depreciates, providing evidence for a strong channel operating through supply expectations.