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This report assesses the potential of electricity contract auctions as a procurement option for the World Bank's client countries. It focuses on the role of auctions of electricity contracts designed to expand and retain existing generation capacity. It is not meant to be a 'how-to' manual. Rather, it highlights some major issues and options that need to be taken into account when a country considers moving towards competitive electricity procurement through the introduction of electricity auctions. Auctions have played an important role in the effort to match supply and demand. Ever since the 1990s, the use of long-term contract auctions to procure new generation capacity, notably from private sector suppliers, has garnered increased affection from investors, governments, and multilateral agencies in general, as a means to achieve a competitive and transparent procurement process while providing certainty of supply for the medium to long term. However, the liberalization of electricity markets and the move from single-buyer procurement models increased the nature of the challenge facing system planners in their efforts to ensure an adequate and secure supply of electricity in the future at the best price. While auctions as general propositions are a means to match supply with demand in a cost-effective manner, they can also be and have been used to meet a variety of goals.

This paper theoretically and empirically analyzes the financing terms that support international trade. The choice of trade finance terms balances the risk that an importer defaults on an exporter and the possibility that an exporter does not deliver goods as specified. Analysis of transaction-level data from a US exporter reveals that importers located in countries with weak enforcement of contracts typically finance transactions, but these firms are able to overcome the constraints of such environments if they can establish a relationship with the exporter. Furthermore, the manner in which trade is financed shapes the impact of crises.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is situated near the Persian Gulf in the North Eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula. Established in 1971 by the late Sheikh Zayed Al Nahyan, the UAE forms a federation of seven Emirates consisting of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm Al-Quwain, Ras Al Khaimah (The Emirate of Ras Al Khaimah had officially joined the federation on the 11 of February 1972.), and Fujairah. Because of its diversity and cosmopolitan nature, the country has always been a crossroad and prime location for people and trade. As Islam and Islamic principles have influenced Gulf societies in the very core of its existence, the Islamic way of conduct in trade relations and dispute resolutions are an element of paramount significance. This Article explores the role of Shari’a Law and its impact on the economic development of Muslim and non-Muslim business relations in the UAE and in particular in the Emirate of Dubai. The law and development from an Islamic perspective introduces a new vision on the theories of law and development by addressing the influence of Shari’a Law in economic development. In international trade relations and dispute resolution mechanisms such as formal contract enforcements in the Dubai International Finance Centre (DIFC) and the Dubai International Arbitration Centre (DIAC) the plurality of laws leads to the adoption of Shari’a Law over the Civil and Common Law regimes.

This paper provides evidence on the importance of reputation in the context of the Kenyan rose export sector. A model of reputation and relational contracting is developed and tested. A seller's reputation is defined by buyer's beliefs about seller's reliability. We show that (i) due to lack of enforcement, the volume of trade is constrained by the value of the relationship; (ii) the value of the relationship increases with the age of the relationship; and (iii) during an exogenous negative supply shock deliveries are an inverted-U shaped function of relationship's age. Models exclusively focusing on enforcement or insurance considerations cannot account for the evidence.

Is a country's ability to enforce contracts an important determinant of comparative advantage? To answer this question, I construct a variable that measures, for each good, the proportion of its intermediate inputs that require relationship-specific investments. Combining this measure with data on trade flows and judicial quality, I find that countries with good contract enforcement specialize in the production of goods for which relationship-specific investments are most important. According to my estimates contract enforcement explains more of the pattern of trade than physical capital and skilled labor combined.

We examine how local and global political risks affect industry return volatility. Our central premise is that some industries are more sensitive to political events than others. We find that industries that are more dependent on trade, contract enforcement, and labor exhibit greater return volatility when local political risks are higher. Political uncertainty in countries of trading partners of trade-dependent industries similarly results in greater volatility. Volatility decomposition results indicate that while systematic volatility is associated with domestic political uncertainty, global political risks translate into larger idiosyncratic volatility.

Building on institutional and transaction cost economics, this article proposes that legal enforceability increases the use of contract over relational reliability (e.g., beliefs that the other party acts in a non-opportunistic manner) to safeguard market exchanges characterized by non-trivial hazards. The results of 399 buyer-supplier exchanges in China show that: (1) when managers perceive that the legal system can protect their firm's interests, they tend to use explicit contracts rather than relational reliability to safeguard transactions involving risks (i.e., asset specificity, environmental uncertainty, and behavioral uncertainty); and (2) when managers do not perceive the legal system as credible, they are less likely to use contracts, and instead rely on relational reliability to safeguard transactions associated with specialized assets and environmental uncertainty, but not those involving behavioral uncertainty. We further find that legal enforceability does not moderate the effect of relational reliability on contracts, but does weaken the effect of contracts on relational reliability. These results endorse the importance of prior experience (e.g., relational reliability) in supporting the use of explicit contracts, and alternatively suggest that, under conditions of greater legal enforceability, the contract signals less regarding one's intention to be trustworthy but more about the efficacy of sanctions.

An ongoing debate in the interfirm exchange literature concerns whether economic and social governance mechanisms function as substitutes or complements. We advance a more nuanced approach to examining how detailed contracts and centralized control interact with relational governance differentially in curbing local supplier opportunism in emerging markets. We suggest that where legal institutions are weak, detailed contracts are ineffective in containing partner opportunism in contractually specified areas. Under such circumstances, relational governance provides a proxy for legal institutions to ensure contract execution. Meanwhile, relational governance serves as an alternative mechanism to centralized control for ensuring contingency adaptations. Based on a sample of 168 foreign buyer-local supplier exchanges in China, we find that relational governance complements detailed contracts but substitutes for centralized control in curtailing opportunism. Therefore foreign firms must be cautious in their combinative use of social and economic mechanisms in governing exchanges with local suppliers in emerging markets.

Purpose This study aims to understand what primary relationship problem mechanisms can exist in the franchise channel and how exchange partners respond to them. This study demonstrates how the franchisor’s relationship problem mechanisms (threat, contract enforcement) affect the franchisee’s negative active responses (venting, threatened withdrawal). Design/methodology/approach This study tested hypotheses through multiple regression analysis using data from 200 franchisees in Korea-based food franchise systems. Findings The results indicated that threat increases venting and threatened withdrawal, while contract enforcement only increases venting. Venting increases threatened withdrawal. In addition, the results indicated that the franchisor’s behavior monitoring positively moderates the relationship between relationship problem mechanisms and negative active responses. Originality/value This study helps strategically manage responses to relationship problems by categorizing ‘relationship problem mechanisms’ into intentional relationship problem mechanisms based on communication (threat) and unintentional relationship problem mechanisms based on action (contract enforcement). This study finds that both relationship problem mechanisms, intentional or unintentional, eventually cause threatened withdrawal directly or indirectly. Even if the threat is merely communication, not action, it is more likely to cause relationship dissolution than contract enforcement by directly triggering any negative active response. This study also finds that behavior monitoring can affect exchange partners through interaction with other management mechanisms rather than directly affecting them.

Purpose By drawing upon institutional theory, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of four critical resources (credit, electricity, contract enforcement and political governance) in explaining the quality of entrepreneurship and the depth of the supporting entrepreneurship ecosystem in Africa. Design/methodology/approach A quantitative approach based on ordinary least squares regression analysis was used. Three data sources were employed. First, the Global Entrepreneurship Index (GEI) of 35 African countries was used to measure the quality of entrepreneurship and the depth of the entrepreneurial ecosystem in Africa which represents the dependent variable. Second, the World Bank’s data on access to credit, electricity and contract enforcement in Africa were also employed as explanatory variables. Third, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance was used as an explanatory variable. Finally, country-specific data on four control variables (GDP, foreign direct investment, population and education) were gathered and analysed. Findings To support entrepreneurship development, Africa needs broad financial inclusion and state institutions that are more effective at enforcing contracts. Access to credit was non-significant and therefore did not contribute to the dependent variable (entrepreneurship quality and depth of entrepreneurial support in Africa). Access to electricity and political governance were statistically significant and correlated positively with the dependent variables. Finally, contract enforcement was partially significant and contributed to the dependent variable. Research limitations/implications A lack of GEI data for all 54 African countries limited this study to only 35 African countries: 31 in sub-Saharan Africa and 4 in North Africa. Therefore, the generalisability of this study’s findings to the whole of Africa might be limited. Second, this study depended on indexes for this study. Therefore, any inconsistencies in the index aggregation if any could not be authenticated. This study has practical implications for the development of entrepreneurship in Africa. Public and private institutions for credit delivery, contract enforcement and the provision of utility services such as electricity are crucial for entrepreneurship development. Originality/value The institutional void is a challenge for Africa. This study highlights the weak, corrupt nature of African institutions that supposedly support MSME growth. Effective entrepreneurship development in Africa depends on the presence of a supportive institutional infrastructure. This study engages institutional theory to explain the role of institutional factors such as state institutions, financial institutions, utility providers and markets in entrepreneurship development in Africa.