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Marriage influences the economic rights of spouses when joint community property is created. When a marriage is dissolved, joint community property has to be divided. Each country sets different rules about how joint community property should be divided between spouses. Lithuania has chosen the presumption of equal shares in joint community property. Courts may depart from equal shares of spouses because of such important circumstances as interests of children, health state of a spouse, and personal income used to increase joint community property. However, courts have never departed from the equal shares principle due to differing contributions by spouses to matrimonial property. Meanwhile, other countries take into account contribution of spouses in order to divide property fairly and to protect the interests of the spouse who has contributed significantly to joint property, if the marriage was brief and the marriage produced no children. The impossibility to depart from equal shares to different contribution of spouses could increase the misuse of the institution of marriage and the unjust division of joint community property when the spouse who has not contributed to joint community property receives an equal share of it.

We consider a finite society with of individuals distributed along the real line. The individuals form jurisdictions to consume public projects, equally share their costs and, in addition, bear a transportation cost to the location of the project. We examine a core and Nash notions of stable jurisdiction structures and show that in hedonic games both solution sets could be empty. We demonstrate that in a quasi-hedonic set-up there is a Nash stable partition, but, in general, there are no core stable partitions. We then examine a subclass of societies that admits the existence of both types of stable partitions.

A central task of climate justice is to agree upon a just distribution of the right to emit greenhouse gases. According to the equal per capita shares view, the right to emit should be divided equally between every inhabitant of Earth, since to emit is to use up the resource of atmospheric absorptive capacity, and this is a resource to which no one person has any stronger claim than any other. The fact that a significant proportion of the Earth’s ability to absorb and sequester greenhouse gases actually comes not from the atmosphere, but from terrestrial climate sinks that are located within national borders, and that are therefore plausibly subject to legitimate territorial claims, poses a serious challenge to the intuitive egalitarian simplicity of the equal per capita shares view. A defence of this view, then, is tantamount to a defence of the redistribution of terrestrial sink capacity, and therefore must involve either (1) an argument against the legitimacy of territorial claims to terrestrial sink capacity, or (2) an argument for why legitimate territorial claims to terrestrial sink capacity should nevertheless be ignored in favour of an equal per capita distribution of emissions shares. One strategy for doing so involves applying Charles Beitz’s resource redistribution principle to terrestrial sink capacity. Some authors have argued that this strategy will fail due to important differences between the nature of ‘conventional’ natural resources, and the nature of a resource link climate sink capacity. In this paper, I consider five arguments to this effect that seek to establish the legitimacy of territorial claims to terrestrial sink capacity. Respectively, they appeal to attachment, identity, self-determination, improvement and fairness in order to do so. I argue that each one either fails to establish the legitimacy of territorial claims to terrestrial sink capacity, or, where they do plausibly establish legitimacy, they do so in a way that renders them vulnerable to type-(2) objections that suggest territorial claims to terrestrial sink capacity should nevertheless be ignored. I conclude that, if one is willing to adopt the resource redistribution principle, a just distribution of emissions shares need not respect territorial claims to terrestrial sink capacity.

Countries of the Southeast Europe (SEE) region have witnessed significant economic improvement since the beginning of their transition to market economies in the early 1990s. Growth has been particularly strong in the past six years, but still lower than in other fast growing countries in the East Asia and Baltic regions, or some of the other new member states of the European Union (EU). The purpose of this study is twofold: (i) to present recent trends in intra regional trade in SEE, in particular following the implementation of Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA); and (ii) to bring the attention of policy makers to some of the remaining impediments to enhanced intra regional trade. The rest of the study is organized as follows. Chapter two describes intraregional trade patterns, both prior and after the entry of CEFTA into force, including more detailed analysis of trade structure. Chapter three emphasizes the role of nontariff barriers (NTBs), such as technical regulations and standards, and their potential impact on trade enhancement, as well as the importance of the trade related environment drawing on global surveys and reports (doing business, Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), logistics performance indicator, and the enabling trade index). It also looks at rules of origin and their role in trade creation. Chapter four aims to present the view of the private sector on CEFTA and on trade related reforms in general through two case studies of regional firms. Finally, chapter five concludes by summarizing the key recommendations of the study.

In this paper, we consider a population represented by a continuum of individuals uniformly distributed over the unit interval that faces a problem of location and financing of public facilities under the equal share rule. We examine three notions of stability of emerging jurisdiction structures (stability under unanimous consent, free mobility and core) and provide a characterization of stable structures. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

When a small cake has to be cut in two pieces to be shared by two people, and the person who cuts the cake is also the person who chooses which half to take, then there is no guarantee that one of the two people will not be disadvantaged. The best way to avoid any complaints about the division of the cake is for one person to cut the cake and the other to choose which half to take. This way, it is in the first person’s interest to divide the cake as fairly as possible, as otherwise he or she might very well end up with the smaller piece. It is a wise solution, requiring that two persons, basically motivated by egotism, cooperate with one another in such a way that neither is deprived of a fair share.

Traditionally, formal fraction instruction begins at about the third grade. Before then teachers concentrate on the establishment of whole number competence. Typically formal fraction instruction begins by the teacher cutting an apple into halves and then into quarters. Students progress to shading halves, quarters and thirds of geometric shapes. During these lessons teachers are attempting to provide conceptual underpinings for the symbolism of fractions. Once children are competent at writing symbols and shading corresponding shapes, computation with fractions begins. Riess (1955) reported that when talking about fractions, many teachers used diagrams drawn on the chalkboard or an apple or a pie was cut. Little opportunity was given to manipulate instructional materials. Children were then compelled to learn a set of rules for dealing with fractions and be able to correctly apply these whenever the practical need arose. What teachers both then and now have neglected to do is establish what cognitive skills children possess upon which meaningful bases for the language and symbols of fractions can be established.

In this reply to Stojmenovska, Bol, and Leopold's comment on my 2009 ASR article, \"Does Diversity Pay?\" I offer an updated analysis of the relationship between racial and gender diversity in business organizations and such business outcomes as sales revenue, number of customers, market share, and relative profits. Despite the claims in their comment, an updated analysis supports the business case for diversity perspective. Racial and gender diversity are related to business outcomes in the direction predicted. I conclude that diversity is still a good thing, not just because it is related to business outcomes, but also because it reinforces the belief that everyone deserves an equal opportunity.

Purpose - On the one hand, everyone agrees that economics should be fair, that workers should get equal pay for equal work. Any instance of unfairness causes a strong disagreement. On the other hand, in many companies, advanced workers – who produce more than others - get paid disproportionally more for their work, and this does not seem to cause any negative feelings. In this paper, the authors analyze this situation from the economic viewpoint. Design/methodology/approach - To analyze the problem, the authors use general mathematical models of how utility - and hence, decisions - depends on the pay-per-unit. Findings - The authors show that from the economic viewpoint, additional payments for advanced workers indeed make economic sense, benefit everyone, and thus - in contrast to the naive literal interpretation of fairness - are not unfair. As a consequence of this analysis, the authors also explain why the labor share of the companies’ income is, on average, close to 50% - an empirical fact that, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, was never previously explained. Originality/value - To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper that explains the empirical fact - that the labor share of the income is close to 50%.

Using a longitudinal dataset covering the period 1987-2000, the authors explore the impact of female employers and gender segregation on wages in Portugal. In the context of Becker's (1957) taste for discrimination theory, they investigate whether the gender of a firm manager affects gender wage differences. They find that females benefit from higher wages in female-led firms than in male-led firms. Further, when females lead, the wage gap between female and male workers is reduced by 1.5%, regardless of the gender composition of the firm's workforce. At the same time, the higher the share of females in a firm, the lower the wages overall for both female and male workers. The authors' results are compatible with the notion that job promotion is an important factor in wage increases. The more females are mentored and promoted, the less men will be. However, as more females in the firm compete for promotion, opportunities for both females and males to be promoted diminish.