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International security debates surrounding the European Union (EU) energy supply challenge commonly invoke the need for more EU hard power - e.g. getting tough on Russia or engaging directly with other exporters. This article investigates whether what might be labelled 'soft power with a hard edge' instead amounts to a consistent policy strategy for the EU. The central argument is that the EU has turned a weakness into strength, and developed a set of tools that sharpen the way soft power is exercised in the energy sector. The article explores how soft power affects companies that 'come and play' on the EU market: the rules of the Single European Market (SEM) and how they affect external firms. It also assesses the long reach of the SEM: both the gravitational 'pull' the SEM exerts in the 'near aboard', and the EU's 'push' to facilitate the development of midstream infrastructure and upstream investment. The conclusion is that the EU regulatory state is emerging as an international energy actor in its own right. It limits the ways states like Russia can use state firms in the geopolitical game; and it exports its model into the near abroad, thus stabilizing energy supply and transit routes.

Since 2007, the European Commission (EC) has opened numerous competition cases regarding Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, and Meta (AAAM). Enforcement, however, has remained elusive, prompting a new regulatory paradigm in the EU known as the Digital Markets Act. In this study, we analyze the EC’s competition policy approach regarding big tech with an emphasis on AAAM. Rather than implementing a consumer welfare friendly neoclassic economics analysis, we adopt a critical political economy of communications (CPE) approach to analyze these cases. The article explores whether EU competition policy does enough to yield the required measures to preserve a healthy digital economy sector for political and social welfare as much as for consumer welfare.

There is lack of research on the evaluation of state aid provided to food industry enterprises in Poland, within the framework of general principles of the European Union competition policy, taking into account structure of the industry. The aim of the study is to assess the scale of general public aid for dairies, taking into account the type of enterprises, their size and location. The statistical analysis is based on SUDOP data. The amount of aid granted in 2015–2021 increased as well as the number of beneficiaries of the aid. The highest value share involved subsidies for R&D projects. The share of large dairies in funds is similar to their market share. We witness a significant concentration of aid regionally and among the beneficiaries. Dairy cooperatives accounted for a greater share of the employment of disabled persons and prisoners than other entities, which may be due to their bimodal nature.

The coming fourth industrial revolution means many inevitable changes in firms’ competition and the challenges they pose to industrial and competition policies. Therefore, to examine how it is going to affect competition and competition policy, this paper reviews the related literature of industrial policy, industrial organization and new trade theory. For this purpose, employing the semi-systematic review method, the report explores the theoretical background of the Industry 4.0 policy carried out by the EU, how it affects its competition policy and what threats it imposes to competition between firms. We have come to conclusions that the fourth industrial revolution might be quite challenging for the sustainability of firm’s competition and the structure of industry and markets. However, the ‘soft’ EU industrial policy adequately addresses this problem by supporting SMEs with innovation and RD to ensure sustainable competition in the long term.

Is the competition policy connected and relevant to security? Is a nonjuridical and non-economic theory capable to cover the dynamics of EU competition issues? The answers included in this article will focus on the unconventional dimensions of security as interconnections between social and economic layers of individual, business and public interests. The final outcome would be alternative scenarios and solutions for a better understanding of the overall human security in relationship with the deepening of EU Competition Policy

The article provides a critical overview of the most important elements of EU competition policy reforms and presents a comparative analysis between EU and U.S. competition policies. The main focus is on the analysis of cartel enforcement policy, monopoly policy, and merger control.

The economic importance of public procurement within the EU is undeniable, given its pre-eminent role in the overall economic performance of the Union. Its regulation is thus conceived as a priority. Further, the creation of an EU-wide level playing field for economic operators is submitted as indispensable to combat Member States' preferential treatment towards their domestic firms. In this scenario, the achievement of a Single Public Procurement Market, working under conditions of vigorous competition, is menaced by the immunity from competition constraints of some public behaviours. In this research we are going to analyse the different public activities that may distort the competitive dynamics of the market. First we are going to evaluate the adequacy of not submitting certain public activities to the EU Competition law. Then, some clarifications will be made and the material scope of the EU Competition law will be expanded as to cover public non-regulatory economic activities. Finally, with regard to public regulatory activities and public non-regulatory non-economic activities, it will be argued, with a view of achieving the Single Public Procurement Market, the imperative necessity of observing competition constraints and, consequently, of submitting such activities to EU Competition policy considerations.

This article investigates how the general principles of the Treaty have been applied to the car sector in the EU, where the soft law provisions are of particular interest. A detailed quantitative analysis from 1990 to 2008 highlights a reduction of aid over time. A shift from sectoral to “regional development” motives in granting aid to the sector is also observed in the last 10 years. However, sector specific aid is now less explicit but it remains important. Large amounts of public money are spent without a consistent strategy, reducing capacity in some cases, expanding it in others. The scarcity of public funds calls for a more focussed European policy for this industry.

This Insight on the legislative proposal for a Digital Markets Act (DMA), issued on 15 December 2020 by the Eu-ropean Commission, discusses the importance of clearly delineating the objectives under which enforcement of the said act will take place. This is necessitated because of the closeness, if not overlap with the domain of EU Competition Policy and the concomitant danger of over- or double-enforcement against the norm addressees of the DMA.

In the light of the outcome of the 23rd June 2016 UK referendum to leave the European Union and the May government’s consequent approach to Brexit, this paper explores the likely changes that these will bring to a key EU–UK relationship, the competition policy relationship. It is suggested that changes are likely not only in public enforcement and private actions but also in the need for a new competition cooperation architecture between the EU and the UK. In order to appreciate how the competition relationship is likely to change after Brexit, an understanding of the current architecture in respect of the said areas is necessary and thus outlined early in the paper. Thereafter, it is argued that, post the implementation period, as the UK will no longer come under the direct jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice or indeed be a member of the Single European Market, a considerable loosening or separation of the strands that shape the current EU–UK competition relationship will occur. This unwinding of the currently intertwined EU and UK competition regimes will affect both public enforcement and private actions, thereby opening up the possibility of further regulatory divergence, unless consciously checked. Moreover, as the separation will see the Commission’s jurisdictional remit no longer include the UK, the domain will become the sole regulatory concern of UK institutions, particularly the Competition and Markets Authority. This will lead to dual regulatory capture, often of significant and complex antitrust and merger cases, given the overlapping nature of EU and UK markets. Clearly, this necessitates the UK regulator having the appropriate staffing to vet such cases, as it moves from essentially a regional player to one on a par with the Commission and regulators in the USA and China. In fact, the dual capture of such cases reinforces the importance of effective cooperation between the EU and UK regulators. However, given that the current competition cooperation relationship will end at the conclusion of the implementation period, the paper articulates a likely new EU–UK competition cooperation architecture, reflecting the fact that the UK would be outside the EU, but still enabling close, effective cooperation. Of course, and echoing the EU, it is also in the UK’s interest to agree similar competition cooperation bilaterals with key non-EU regulators. Yet, because this will take time, and because cooperation can indeed fail, the UK, like the EU, must ensure its competition instruments have the necessary extra-territorial reach.