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This paper examines the theory underpinning the design of optimal tariffs in a developing economy, and the experience of implementation of tariff reforms. A central issue is whether and when a case can be made for a uniform tariff structure. While theory advocates a differentiated tariff structure (except under a balance of payments objective), political economy considerations, inadequate information, and administrative convenience point to a minimally differentiated tariff structure. The experience of reform indicates that tariff structures are mainly influenced by income distribution and protection objectives. The ability to successfully reduce tariffs depends on measures taken to alleviate fiscal and balance of payments constraints.

Ukraine's Trade Policy identifies the key drivers of Ukraine's recent trade performance, assesses current trade policies, and proposes recommendations to strengthen the Ukraine’s trade integration strategy. It also identifies core bottlenecks in the ongoing integration processes, including global and regional integration. The study concludes that the main obstacles to furthering Ukraine’s trade integration are domestic, and relate to deficiencies in the business environment. Problems in customs administration, standardization, and administrative barriers for new entry require immediate attention. The report highlights specific policy issues that hamper WTO accession, such as trade legislation, protection of intellectual property rights, government support for specific industries, and export restrictions. It also recommends improvements in the structure of Ukraine’s import tariffs, reform of both the regime of free economic zones and mechanism of VAT refund, and investment in a major upgrade of government capacity for investment and export promotion. The report also draws attention to the importance of the post-WTO accession agenda for Ukraine. To take advantage of WTO membership, the Government will need to undertake significant institutional reforms to implement WTO regulatory rules in ways that facilitate integration into the world economy and provide benefits to private sector participants.

This paper studies the optimal design of monetary policy in an optimizing two-country sticky price model. We suppose that the production sequence of final consumption goods stretches across both countries and is associated with vertical trade. Prices of final consumption goods are sticky in the consumer's currency. Pursuing an inward-looking policy, as suggested in recent work, is not optimal in this set-up. We also ask which simple, i.e. non-optimal, targeting rule best supports the welfare maximizing policy. The results hinge critically on the degree of price flexibility and the relative importance of cost-push and productivity shocks. In many cases, a strict targeting of price indices like producer or consumer price indices is dominated by rules that allow for some fluctuations in prices such as nominal income or monetary targeting.

In pre-2005 period, most Indian analysts had approached the four export control regimes - the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the Australia Group (AG), with suspicion, which was quite natural considering the fact that the first two, namely the NSG and the MTCR had actively worked against Indian interests. A few others felt that there should be further discussion before a decision is taken. [...]at the end of the Seoul Plenary there were three groups of countries, each taking a different stand on India's application:

[...]though the US can help somewhat in supporting the Indian case for membership, it has so far not been able to overturn China's veto. If this is so, then New Delhi should expect that China will continue to oppose India's membership purely for political reasons than because of any demerit in India's case. [...]given the consensus rule under which the NSG operates, it is very likely that China will be able to prevent Indian membership or potentially even the consideration of India's membership.

According to reports in 1982, as revealed by A. Q Khan, China provided Pakistan 50 kg of weapons-grade uranium as part of a 'broad-ranging, secret nuclear deal' between the two countries. [...]India must convey to those countries, including China, who vehemently argue that NSG membership should be based on 'objective criteria', that the same was not a norm earlier and that countries like Argentina, Brazil and France have joined NSG before becoming NPT signatories.

There is no compliance mechanism and members are expected to apply the agreed export control guidelines on a voluntary basis. [...]these operate outside the formal multilateral or United Nations system and have no sanction under international law. Since 2010, India has declared its intention to seek membership of all 4 regimes.

[...]becoming a member of these groups would prove profitable for both parties as India also has a lot to offer towards the creation and management of a peaceful nuclear architecture. [...]India has also signed and ratified most of the treaties such as The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), etc.

[...]the need for India to find a way of redesigning its relationship with the NSG can best be explained through the growing electricity demand *The in the 2000s once the economy perked. [...]in 2008, the NSG granted a waiver to its members to engage in nuclear commerce with India.