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Expropriation risk has a binding effect on foreign direct investment (FDI). However, state-owned multinational corporations may counter the monopoly power of the host state by leveraging the political influence of their home government. The magnitude of this counter force, we argue, may vary, depending on the strength of political relations between the home and host state, and the level of economic dependence of the host country on the home market. We find supporting evidence of our hypotheses using Chinese firm-level FDI information between 2003 and 2010.

States burdened with conflict have been considered to be undesirable destinations for foreign direct investment (FDI) due to, inter alia, political instability, regulatory unpredictability, and expropriation risk. However, we develop an alternative view based on corporate governance and real option theories. We analyze a dataset of FDI location decisions made in the Oil and Gas sector by 250 US firms across 44 countries between 2007 and 2013. After controlling for energy reserves, the results show counter-intuitively, that civil war and terrorism risks, and terrorist events are positively associated with US investment in Oil and Gas. US subsidiaries also show high levels of ownership commitment. It is tempting to conclude that US Oil and Gas is a wholly unique, resource-bound case, but we argue that this disconnect may have occurred for two reasons. First, a threat of conflict and violence can make MNEs exercise their growth options and expand resource extraction sooner rather than later. Second, political instability does not necessarily lead to higher levels of FDI expropriation risk. On the contrary, instability can reduce the incentives for the state to seize assets from technologically superior MNEs, i.e. it may reduce expropriation risk. Just as the rule of law and 'good' governance can constrain a state from expropriation, there are theoretical reasons why 'bad' governance resulting from instability and incapacity may do so, too.

I study a model of investment and sale of ideas and test its empirical implications using a novel data set from the market for original movie ideas. Consistent with the theoretical results, I find that buyers are reluctant to meet unproven sellers for early-stage ideas, which restricts sellers to either developing the ideas fully (to sell them later) or abandoning them. In contrast, experienced sellers can attract buyers at any stage, and they sell worse ideas sooner and better ideas later. These results have important managerial implications for buyers and sellers and show that, in such contexts, policy interventions that discourage buyer participation—such as stronger intellectual property protection—may diminish the market for ideas and hurt inexperienced sellers. This paper was accepted by Bruno Cassiman, business strategy.

This study examines the impact of political risk on Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) and what motivates their preferred location. The study also analyzes the OFDI of other countries to enhance the comparison of China and other countries' OFDI sensitivity to political risk. The study used annual panel data on 134 countries from 2003 to 2017. The results indicate that China's OFDI tends to favor countries and regions with higher expropriation risk, and China's OFDI exhibits strong resource-seeking motives and weak market-seeking motives. On the other hand, OFDI in countries around the world tends to favor countries and regions with lower expropriation risk and conflict risk, and OFDI in those countries exhibits market-seeking motives. The study results also show that China's political risk preference and investment motives depend on the level of economic development and the presence of natural resources in the host country.

This article examines the concepts of obsolescing bargain and economic equilibrium in international energy investment contracts. Equilibrium means the balance of interests that the parties’ contract embodies. Part of the idea of equilibrium is to entrench a way to keep their interests in harmony. Equilibrium is the point that host governments and foreign investors reach at the time when they strike the bargain. The equilibrium is stable if it is resilient to events which challenge it and have the potential of disrupting the balance. The point to the obsolescing bargain model is that the equilibrium is inherently unstable and therefore, there is a need for a proper framework surrounding the investment contract in order to reinforce the stability of the equilibrium. This is the key point the obsolescing bargain model makes in relation to the instability of the contractual equilibrium. If we look at it such relationship as a one-off set of rights and duties, then it is unstable. But, instead if we look at the equilibrium as a relationship that is dynamic and evolves, then it can be stable. This article underscores the significance of maintaining equilibrium in the relation of foreign investor and host state to avoid obsolescing bargain and international investment disputes. Economic equilibrium, foreign investor, host state, international energy investment contracts, obsolescing bargain, risk of expropriation, international investment disputes, contractual flexibility, allocation of risk, contractual stability

This article analyses the relevance of the agency problems that exist between shareholders and managers (type I agency problems) and between majority and minority shareholders (type II agency problems), in determining the composition of the board of directors, differentiating between family owned and non-family owned firms. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 173 Spanish listed companies for the period 2004–2011. The results of our study indicate that, on one hand, as type I agency problems increase, firms increase their percentage of outside directors and, on the other, as type II agency problems increase, firms increase the ratio of independent to nominee directors. Whether the company is a family firm or not does moderate the influence of insider ownership over the composition of the board. Generally speaking, our findings support the view that firms configure their board of directors in such a way as to best signal to the market both efficient management and a balance of the interests of all shareholders. Likewise, these results could be taken into account when formulating recommendations on the composition of the board of directors.

'Investor Protection and Corporate Governance' analyzes the impact of corporate governance on firm performance and valuation. Using unique datasets gathered at the firm-level—the first such data in the region—and results from a homogeneous corporate governance questionnaire, the book examines corporate governance characteristics, ownership structures, dividend policies, and performance measures. The book's analysis reveals the very high levels of ownership and voting rights concentrations and monolithic governance structures in the largest samples of Latin American companies up to now, and new data emphasize the importance of specific characteristics of the investor protection regimes in several Latin American countries. By and large, those firms with better governance measures across several dimensions are granted higher valuations and thus lower cost of capital. This title will be useful to researchers, policy makers, government officials, and other professionals involved in corporate governance, economic policy, and business finance, law, and management.

Events like the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), Georgetown symposium demonstrate that there is much to be learned through the sharing of experiences and thinking together about the critical issues that confront our industry as well as new products and ideas. MIGA opened a new Asian hub in Singapore with underwriters in Hong Kong SAR, China and business development staff in Beijing and Tokyo. This hub aims to capitalize on Asian emerging as a new center of outbound investment growth. We have seen a growing base of investors in China as well as other Asian countries looking to go into the challenging market. MIGA also opened a business development office in Paris, which will focus on new business opportunities in Europe as well as the Middle East and North Africa. We view both of these hubs as providing an excellent opportunity for MIGA to support the economic growth of low-income countries through providing the support to South-South investments. Providing political risk insurance (PRI) for outbound investment from the rich and other middle-income countries has become more important as the level of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) growth from these countries has increased.

This paper applies the methodology of real options for valuing firms that for any reason are subject to a possible expropriation. In the development of this research is added to the valuation by discounted cash flows the value of the premium which shareholders would receive as compensation for the risk of expropriation. This assumes that the returns of companies with a potential threat of expropriation are conducted by a diffusion process mixed with jumps in the event of financial crisis. This research values the real option of expropriation (call option) in which, at the request of the government, the investor must sell the company (the underlying asset) to the government in exchange for compensation (the strike price). Finally, the developed methodology is applied to the case of Banamex.// Este artículo aplica la metodología de opciones reales en la valoración de empresas que por alguna circunstancia están sujetas a una posible expropiación. El trabajo añade, a la valoración por flujos de efectivo descontados, el valor de la prima que deberían recibir los accionistas como compensación por el riesgo de expropiación. Para ello se supone que los rendimientos de las empresas con amenaza de una posible expropiación son conducidos por un proceso de difusión con saltos en caso de crisis financiera. En esta investigación se valora la opción real de expropiación (opción de compra), en la que, a petición del gobierno, el inversionista deberá entregarle la empresa (el activo subyacente) al gobierno a cambio de una indemnización (precio de ejercicio). Por último, la metodología desarrollada es aplicada al caso de Banamex.

We consider a simple political-economic model where capitalist investment is constrained by the government's temptation to expropriate. Political liberalization can relax this constraint, increasing the government's revenue, but also increasing the ruler's political risks. We analyze the ruler's optimal liberalization, where our measure of political liberalization is the probability of the ruler being replaced if he tried to expropriate private investments. Poorer endowments can support reputational equilibria with more investment, even without liberalization. So we find a resources curse, where larger resource endowments can decrease investment and reduce the ruler's revenue. The ruler's incentive to liberalize can be greatest with intermediate resource endowments. Strong liberalization becomes optimal in cases where capital investment yields approximately constant returns to scale. Adding independent revenue decreases optimal liberalization and investment. Mobility of productive factors that complement capital can increase incentives to liberalize, but equilibrium prices may adjust so that liberal and authoritarian regimes co-exist.