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19,885 result(s) for "EXTERNALITIES"
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The cost of globalization : dangers to the earth and its people
\"This volume examines the many pitfalls of globalization from the perspective of impoverished and indigenous peoples, including the widening wealth gap, the struggle for restoration of dispossessed lands and cultural rights, global warming and ecological annihilation, and the experiences of women in underdeveloped regions who receive little benefit from their labor and are subject to violence\"-- Provided by publisher.
Pecuniary Externalities in Economies with Financial Frictions
This article characterizes the efficiency properties of competitive economies with financial constraints, in which phenomena such as fire sales and financial amplification may arise. We show that financial constraints lead to two distinct types of pecuniary externalities: distributive externalities that arise from incomplete insurance markets and collateral externalities that arise from price-dependent financial constraints. For both types of externalities, we identify three sufficient statistics that determine optimal taxes on financing and investment decisions to implement constrained efficient allocations. We also show that fire sales and financial amplification are neither necessary nor sufficient to generate inefficient pecuniary externalities. We demonstrate how to employ our framework in a number of applications. Whereas collateral externalities generally lead to over-borrowing, the distortions from distributive externalities may easily flip sign, leading to either under- or over-borrowing. Both types of externalities may lead to under- or over-investment.
Governing for the long term : democracy and the politics of investment
\"This book examines how democratic governments manage long-term policy challenges, asking how elected politicians choose between providing policy benefits in the present and investing in the future\"-- Provided by publisher.
Are There Environmental Benefits from Driving Electric Vehicles? The Importance of Local Factors
We combine a theoretical discrete-choice model of vehicle purchases, an econometric analysis of electricity emissions, and the AP2 air pollution model to estimate the geographic variation in the environmental benefits from driving electric vehicles. The second-best electric vehicle purchase subsidy ranges from $2,785 in California to —$4,964 in North Dakota, with a mean of —$1,095. Ninety percent of local environmental externalities from driving electric vehicles in one state are exported to others, implying they may be subsidized locally, even when the environmental benefits are negative overall. Geographically differentiated subsidies can reduce deadweight loss, but only modestly.
Showrooming and Webrooming: Information Externalities Between Online and Offline Sellers
In a product market where consumers are open to uninformed purchases, we study competition between a traditional and an online retailer in the presence of showrooming. Several results are obtained. First, showrooming intensifies competition and lowers both firms’ profits, thus supporting traditional and online retailers’ recent strategy of carrying more exclusive varieties. Second, lowering consumer search costs may aggravate showrooming and decrease the traditional retailer’s profits for intermediate search costs. Third, opening an online store expands the demand of the traditional retailer but intensifies competition, thus lowering its profits under certain conditions. Fourth, a return policy by the online retailer alleviates showrooming and relaxes competition but weakly reduces its demand, increasing its profits only for intermediate search costs. The return policy (weakly) increases the traditional retailer’s profits. Fifth, when search cost is not high enough, price matching by the traditional retailer may also intensify competition and hurt its profits. We then examine how webrooming interacts with showrooming. When webrooming resolves partial match uncertainty, it may increase both firms’ profits by inducing more consumers to participate. The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2018.1084 .
Decentralization and Pollution Spillovers: Evidence from the Re-drawing of County Borders in Brazil
Decentralization can improve service delivery, but it can also generate externalities across jurisdictional boundaries. We examine the nature and size of water pollution externalities as rivers flow across jurisdictions. Panel data on water pollution in Brazilian rivers coupled with county splits that change the locations of borders allow us to identify the spatial patterns of pollution as rivers approach and cross borders, controlling for fixed effects and trends specific to each location. The theory of externalities predicts that pollution should increase at an increasing rate as the river approaches the downstream exit border, that there should be a structural break in the slope of the pollution function at the border, and that a larger number of managing jurisdictions should exacerbate pollution externalities. We find support for all four predictions in the data. Satellite data on growth in night-time lights along rivers show that local authorities allow more settlements to develop close to rivers in the downstream portions of counties, which is the likely underlying mechanism. The border effects on pollution are not as pronounced when the cost of inter-jurisdictional coordination is lower.
Green Economy in Sustainable Development and Improvement of Resource Efficiency
In the expansion of volumes of industrial production, there is an increase of anthropogenic influence and deterioration of the external environment that became the reason for the impossibility of a functioning market system without taking into account negative externalities. The article considers the directions and principles of a “green economy” functioning as the basis for further development of society. The current state and trends of the impact of environmental factors on other indicators of quality of life have been analysed and comparative analysis has been made on the example of developed and developing countries. Effective indices and instruments of influence on the level of ecological and economic development and main tendencies and problems arising at the introduction of “green economy”, have been considered. The use of indicators that take into account negative externalities, such as the Pigouvian tax, has been demonstrated to be more visible than widely used indices. The losses from the negative impact on the resulting economic indicators have been analysed, and a significant decrease in the per capita GDP level has been proved with the extensive development of the economy.Implications for Central European audience: This paper aims to contribute to the development of a green economy as part of a policy aimed at reducing environmental risks in the process of economic growth. The proposed indicators and tools for influencing the level of environmental and economic development arising from the implementation of the “green economy” as the main vector of sustainable development, which can be used further research and development and can be implemented by European companies.
Too Much Data
When a user shares her data with online platforms, she reveals information about others. In such a setting, externalities depress the price of data because once a user's information is leaked by others, she has less reason to protect her data and privacy. These depressed prices lead to excessive data sharing. We characterize conditions under which shutting down data markets improves welfare. Platform competition does not redress the problem of excessively low data prices and too much data sharing and may further reduce welfare. We propose a scheme based on mediated data sharing that improves efficiency.
TARGETING INTERVENTIONS IN NETWORKS
We study games in which a network mediates strategic spillovers and externalities among the players. How does a planner optimally target interventions that change individuals’ private returns to investment? We analyze this question by decomposing any intervention into orthogonal principal components, which are determined by the network and are ordered according to their associated eigenvalues. There is a close connection between the nature of spillovers and the representation of various principal components in the optimal intervention. In games of strategic complements (substitutes), interventions place more weight on the top (bottom) principal components, which reflect more global (local) network structure. For large budgets, optimal interventions are simple—they essentially involve only a single principal component.
On the core of auctions with externalities: stability and fairness
In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and \"fairness.\" Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by paying more and deviations by refusing to pay. In high-stakes auctions where bidders also care about their reputation, the latter are unlikely to occur, or else can be prevented by legal interventions. In contrast, the former is more undesirable in the sense that the seller and the bidders experience justified envy. We show that the core is nonempty if bidders cannot refuse to pay.