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result(s) for
"Economic equilibrium theory"
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Finding equilibrium : Arrow, Debreu, McKenzie and the problem of scientific credit
\"Finding Equilibrium explores the post-World War II transformation of economics by constructing a history of the proof of its central dogma--that a competitive market economy may possess a set of equilibrium prices. The model economy for which the theorem could be proved was mapped out in 1954 by Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu collaboratively, and by Lionel McKenzie separately, and would become widely known as the \"Arrow-Debreu Model.\" While Arrow and Debreu would later go on to win separate Nobel prizes in economics, McKenzie would never receive it. Till Dèuppe and E. Roy Weintraub explore the lives and work of these economists and the issues of scientific credit against the extraordinary backdrop of overlapping research communities and an economics discipline that was shifting dramatically to mathematical modes of expression.Based on recently opened archives, Finding Equilibrium shows the complex interplay between each man's personal life and work, and examines compelling ideas about scientific credit, publication, regard for different research institutions, and the awarding of Nobel prizes. Instead of asking whether recognition was rightly or wrongly given, and who were the heroes or villains, the book considers attitudes toward intellectual credit and strategies to gain it vis-لa-vis the communities that grant it.Telling the story behind the proof of the central theorem in economics, Finding Equilibrium sheds light on the changing nature of the scientific community and the critical connections between the personal and public rewards of scientific work\"-- Provided by publisher.
Employment Fluctuations with Equilibrium Wage Stickiness
2005
Following a recession, the aggregate labor market is slack-employment remains below normal and recruiting efforts of employers, as measured by help-wanted advertising and vacancies, are low. A model of matching friction explains the qualitative responses of the labor market to adverse shocks, but requires implausibly large shocks to account for the magnitude of observed fluctuations. The incorporation of wage stickiness vastly increases the sensitivity of the model to driving forces. I develop a new model of the way that wage stickiness affects unemployment. The stickiness arises in an economic equilibrium and satisfies the condition that no worker-employer pair has an unexploited opportunity for mutual improvement. Sticky wages neither interfere with the efficient formation of employment matches nor cause inefficient job loss. Thus the model provides an answer to the fundamental criticism previously directed at sticky-wage models of fluctuations.
Journal Article
Collateral equilibrium, I: a basic framework
2014
Much of the lending in modern economies is secured by some form of collateral: residential and commercial mortgages and corporate bonds are familiar examples. This paper builds an extension of general equilibrium theory that incorporates durable goods, collateralized securities, and the possibility of default to argue that the reliance on collateral to secure loans and the particular collateral requirements chosen by the social planner or by the market have a profound impact on prices, allocations, market structure, and the efficiency of market outcomes. These findings provide insights into housing and mortgage markets, including the subprime mortgage market.
Journal Article
The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies
2005
This paper argues that the textbook search and matching model cannot generate the observed business-cycle-frequency fluctuations in unemployment and job vacancies in response to shocks of a plausible magnitude. In the United States, the standard deviation of the vacancy-unemployment ratio is almost 20 times as large as the standard deviation of average labor productivity, while the search model predicts that the two variables should have nearly the same volatility. A shock that changes average labor productivity primarily alters the present value of wages, generating only a small movement along a downward-sloping Beveridge curve (unemployment-vacancy locus). A shock to the separation rate generates a counterfactually positive correlation between unemployment and vacancies. In both cases, the model exhibits virtually no propagation.
Journal Article
The Sensitivity of Long-Term Interest Rates to Economic News: Evidence and Implications for Macroeconomic Models
by
Swanson, Eric
,
Gürkaynak, Refet S.
,
Sack, Brian
in
Business cycles
,
Econometrics
,
Economic equilibrium theory
2005
Current macroeconomic models provide appealing, succinct descriptions of business cycle dynamics in the United States and other countries, but less is known about the extent to which these models accurately replicate the economy's long-term characteristics. In part, this reflects that economists have far fewer observations about long-run behavior, given the limited sample sizes available. But while less is known about the long-run characteristics of the economy, many macroeconomic models impose very strong assumptions about this behavior - that the long-run levels of inflation and the real interest rate are constant over time and perfectly known by all economic agents. This paper empirically tests those assumptions and proposes alternative ones. Specially, the authors focus on the effects of macroeconomic and monetary policy surprises on the term structure of interest rates.
Journal Article
Relative difference contest success function
by
Beviá, Carmen
,
Corchón, Luis C
in
Behavioral/Experimental Economics
,
Contests
,
Decision making
2015
In this paper, we present a contest success function (CSF), which is homogeneous of degree zero and in which the probability of winning the prize depends on the relative difference of efforts. In a simultaneous game with two players, we present a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium is unique and interior. This condition does not depend on the size of the valuations as in an absolute difference CSF. We prove that several properties of Nash equilibrium with the Tullock CSF still hold in our framework. Finally, we consider the case of
n
players, generalize the previous condition and show that this condition is sufficient for the existence of a unique interior Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. For some parameter values of our CSF and when all players are identical, equilibrium entails full rent dissipation for any number of players.
Journal Article
Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market
2007
Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputationbuilding models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium (FRE) with stereotyping (perceived type correlation) in which cooperation is predicted in early periods of a finitely repeated market with anonymous interactions. New experiments generate results in line with the FRE prediction, including final-period reversions to stage-game equilibrium and noncooperative play under unfavorable payoff parameters.
Journal Article
The Case for Open-Market Purchases in a Liquidity Trap
2005
Prevalent thinking about liquidity traps suggests that the perfect substitutability of money and bonds at a zero short-term nominal interest rate renders open-market operations ineffective for achieving macroeconomic stabilization goals. We show that even were this the case, there remains a powerful argument for large-scale open market operations as a fiscal policy tool. As we also demonstrate, however, this same reasoning implies that open-market operations will be beneficial for stabilization as well, even when the economy is expected to remain mired in a liquidity trap for some time. Thus, the microeconomic fiscal benefits of open-market operations in a liquidity trap go hand in hand with standard macroeconomic objectives. Motivated by Japan's recent economic experience, we use a dynamic general-equilibrium model to assess the welfare impact of open-market operations for an economy in Japan's predicament. We argue Japan can achieve a substantial welfare improvement through large open-market purchases of domestic government debt.
Journal Article
Distance, Time, and Specialization: Lean Retailing in General Equilibrium
2005
Transport time increases with distance traveled, and time is valuable. We show the implications of these facts for global specialization and trade: products where timely delivery is important will be produced near the source of final demand, where wages will be higher as a result. In the model, timely delivery is important because it allows retailers to respond to final demand fluctuations without holding costly inventories, and timely delivery is possible only from nearby locations. Using a unique dataset that allows us to measure the retail demand for timely delivery, we show that the sources of U.S. apparel imports have shifted in the way predicted by the model, with products for which timeliness matters increasingly imported from nearby countries.
Journal Article