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This thesis discusses how a liberal egalitarian society should respond to the international movement of financial assets. Specifically, it addresses what constraints can be legitimately imposed on the freedom of individuals and corporations to transfer their financial assets, which include cash, bonds, and other types of liquid assets, out of the country. The thesis consists of two parts. The first part lays out the theoretical framework. It argues that there are three liberal egalitarian justifications for constraining an agent's claim and exercise of private property rights: the priority of the disadvantaged, the demand for fair contribution, and the requirement of membership. After that, it defends an internationalist interpretation of these constraints by defending a culturalist conception of justice under which two distinctive sets of principles of justice should apply to domestic liberal egalitarian societies and the international arena respectively. The justification for this two-tiered account of justice is that the public political culture that mediates the relation between the citizens of a liberal egalitarian society is fundamentally different from the one that mediates the relation between societies in the international arena. The second part of the thesis applies the theoretical framework developed in the first part to three different cases of international movement of financial assets: capital relocation, profit shifting, and personal asset migration. It argues that in each case a liberal egalitarian society has good reasons to impose constraints on the outflow of financial assets. The restrictions on capital outflow are justified because they prevent the interests of disadvantaged citizens from being sacrificed for the gains of the already advantaged. The ban on profit shifting is legitimate because it helps secure a fair financial contribution from the rich and multinationals. The constraints on emigrants' freedom to leave the country with their personal property are justified because a society has the right to impose financial conditions on emigration. Together, the thesis offers a critique of a pillar of global capitalism as it is known today-the international free movement of financial assets.

Egalitarian theories assess when and why distributive inequalities are objectionable. How should egalitarians assess inequalities between generations? One egalitarian theory is (telic) distributive egalitarianism: other things being equal, equal distributions of some good are intrinsically better than unequal distributions. I first argue that distributive egalitarianism produces counterintuitive judgements when applied across generations and that attempts to discount or exclude intergenerational inequalities do not work. This being so, intergenerational comparisons also undercut the intragenerational judgements that made distributive egalitarianism intuitive in the first place. I then argue that egalitarians should shed distributive egalitarianism: relational and instrumental arguments against inequality likely suffice to capture egalitarian concerns – including across generations – without encountering the problems produced by distributive egalitarianism.

I offer two objections to luck egalitarianism. The no-adequate-account objection takes note of the egalitarian insistence that the disvalue of inequality is only one of a plurality of values or disvalues that needs to be considered in arriving at a judgment about the ranking of alternative distributions of welfare. This turn to pluralism places a reasonable demand upon luck egalitarianism to provide an account of how the different sorts of values or disvalues that are supposed to attach to available distributions of welfare are to be aggregated or weighed against one another in that ranking procedure. I contend that the prospects for developing such an account are dim and that some salient responses to this objection misfire. The churlishness-envy objection against luck egalitarianism is that this doctrine countenances envy directed toward the faultless good fortune of others. This objection places a reasonable demand on luck egalitarians to formulate a version of their doctrine that does not underwrite envious responses toward those who gain through brute good luck. I contend that the most auspicious path toward satisfying the demand not to underwrite churlish envy advances a luck egalitarianism that asymmetrically affirms the badness of arbitrary disadvantage rather than the badness of both arbitrary disadvantage and arbitrary advantage. Since this is the strategy pursued in Shlomi Segall’s Why Inequality Matters, I offer critiques of Segall’s initial and revised versions of asymmetrical egalitarianism in support of my conclusion that luck egalitarianism seems unable to rebut or sidestep the churlishness-envy objection. I conclude that luck egalitarianism seems unable to satisfy either of the two reasonable demands upon it that I raise.

Social dominance orientation (SDO) is defined as the individual disposition to accept hierarchy and dominance among groups. The measurement of SDO has evolved accordingly with the development of the theory, providing several versions of this scale. This scale has demonstrated indicators of reliability and validity across contexts, but it also has some limitations related to potential ambiguities and the phrasing of items. In this article we present the adaptation and validation of the SDO7 scale in Spanish for the Colombian context, where some of these limitations are addressed. In 2 studies conducted with conventional samples (nStudy1 = 394; nStudy2 = 867), we provide evidence for the psychometric properties of the scale and the predictive validity of its dimensions on social/political attitudes within the Colombian context. Factor analyses confirmed the factorial structure of two substantive dimensions of SDO (dominance and anti-egalitarianism). Regression analyses suggested that both dimensions, dominance and anti-egalitarianism, were accordingly associated with different attitudes that justify inequality: Dominance was associated with more explicit and hostile attitudes, whereas anti-egalitarianism was linked to subtler measures that maintain inequality. This article contributes to the comprehension of one of the processes related to the legitimacy of inequality and to the development of tools for its empirical research.

Organisational silence is an essential aspect of the field of organisational behaviour, examining why and how information, ideas or opinions are withheld by individuals within organisations. Silence in the organisation can take place between employees and their managers, thus cutting across different levels of an organisation. Attempts are made to understand this phenomenon through exploring the specific types of - and reasons for - silence. Whilst existing literature has provided an important contribution to the field, it arguably has many shortcomings in relation to adequately explaining or understanding this phenomenon. According to the existing literature, which addresses the main four types of silence (Prosocial, Acquiescent, Quiescent and Opportunistic), this study intended to further explore these forms of silence using Grid-Group Cultural Theory (GGCT). It is suggested that this theory provides a more effective approach to understanding silence; through examining how types of silence are produced through thought styles; including fatalistic, individualistic, hierarchical and egalitarian. In addition, GGCT helps to determine more types of silence than currently exist in the literature. This study was based on a qualitative methodology seeking to understand why people tend to keep silent. Semi-structured interviews were held with 32 respondents, made up of six managers and 26 employees. These were based in six female educational institutions, working under the umbrella of the education ministry to supervise public and private schools, from kindergarten to high school, in Riyadh, in the context of Saudi Arabia. Using semi-structured interviews, the respondents were asked questions relating to their thoughts and reasons for silence in the work setting. The data collected from the respondents were analysed using NVivo and three key results emerged. First, there are more types of silence than indicated in the existing literature. Each form of culture tends to come with a certain type of silence. Fatalistic thought style, for example, produces acquiescent and quiescent types of silence. Egalitarian thought style, on the other hand, produces prosocial types of silence. The individualistic thought style produces opportunistic silence and hierarchical thought style produces some types of silence, including respectful, empathetic and silence for the purpose of feigning ignorance. The research data suggested that each type of silence comes with one dominant type of thought style, which conflicts with findings of voice studies which show how voice emerges through a combination of thought styles. The fatalistic thought style, however, was found to be a key element (if only a small element) which worked with all other types of thought styles, in order to produce silence. Further research is needed to explain why and to what extent the fatalistic thought style plays a role here. Research into how thought styles produce silence and voice at the same time would also be beneficial, as the boundaries between silence and voice remain unclear.

This thesis defends egalitarianism about knowledge and belief, on which neither is understood in terms of the other, from what I call the abductive argument. This argument is meant to favour views opposed to egalitarianism: doxasticism, on which knowledge is understood in terms of belief, and epistemicism, on which belief is understood in terms of knowledge. The abductive argument turns on the idea that doxasticism and epistemicism, by contrast with egalitarianism, explain certain data about knowledge and belief, in particular the similarity of their downstream consequences and the entailment from knowledge to belief. I argue, however, that no versions of doxasticism and epistemicism currently on offer are preferable to egalitarianism on abductive grounds. Egalitarianism should thus remain our default view of the relation between knowledge and belief. As part of my argument, I also defend the claim that knowledge, by contrast with belief, is an attitude towards a fact and explore the implications of this claim for doxasticism and epistemicism.

Despite their egalitarian ethos, schools are social sorting machines, creating categories that serve as the foundation of later life inequalities. In this review, we apply the theory of categorical inequality to education, focusing particularly on contemporary American schools. We discuss the range of categories that schools create, adopt, and reinforce, as well as the mechanisms through which these categories contribute to production of inequalities within schools and beyond. We argue that this categorical inequality frame helps to resolve a fundamental tension in the sociology of education and inequality, shedding light on how schools can-at once-be egalitarian institutions and agents of inequality. By applying the notion of categorical inequality to schools, we provide a set of conceptual tools that can help researchers understand, measure, and evaluate the ways in which schools structure social inequality.

The chief executive role will be replaced with that of national secretary and and board of directors by a national executive, to bring NZNO into line with \"more egalitarian\" union structures, the panel's presentation (https://www.nzno.org.nz/get_involved/conferen ce_and_agm/sgm_information) outlines. NZNO's Maori governance board, Te Poari, will have equal status and decision-making power with the national executive. [...]a constitutional review panel, with an equal mix of NZNO board and Te Poari members, has been drafting a new foundational document, in consultation with members and membership groups around the motu.

This article challenges the implicit assumption of many cross-national studies that gender-role attitudes fall along a single continuum between traditional and egalitarian. The authors argue that this approach obscures theoretically important distinctions in attitudes and renders analyses of change over time incomplete. Using latent class analysis, they investigate the multidimensional nature of gender-role attitudes in 17 postindustrial European countries. They identify three distinct varieties of egalitarianism that they designate as liberal egalitarianism, egalitarian familism, and flexible egalitarianism. They show that while traditional gender-role attitudes have precipitously and uniformly declined in accordance with the “rising tide” narrative toward greater egalitarianism, the relative prevalence of different egalitarianisms varies markedly across countries. Furthermore, they find that European nations are not converging toward one dominant egalitarian model but rather, remain differentiated by varieties of egalitarianism.