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"Egypt Foreign relations Israel."
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Sinai : Egypt's linchpin, Gaza's lifeline, Israel's nightmare
\"Enclosed by the Suez Canal and bordering Gaza and Israel, Egypt's rugged Sinai Peninsula has been the cornerstone of the Egyptian-Israeli peace accords, yet its internal politics and security have remained largely under media blackout. While the international press descended on the capital Cairo in January 2011, Sinai's armed rebellion was ignored. The regime lost control of the peninsula in a matter of days and, since then, unprecedented chaos has reigned and the Islamist insurgency has gathered pace. In this crucial analysis, Mohannad Sabry argues that Egypt's shortsighted security approach has continually proven to be a failure. Decades of flawed policies have exacerbated immense social and economic problems, and maintained a superficial stability under which arms trafficking, the smuggling tunnels, and militancy could silently thrive-and finally prevail following the overthrow of Mubarak. Sinai is vital reading for scholars, journalists, policy makers, and all those concerned by the plunge of one of the Middle East's most critical regions into turmoil.\"--Book jacket.
Book
Israel and the peace process, 1977-1982 : in search of legitimacy for peace
No detailed description available for \"Israel and the Peace Process 1977-1982\".
eBook
Full effort to avoid peace: the failure of the first Rogers plan
This article, which draws on US and Israeli archival documents as well as insights gained from recent studies, analyzes the path that led to the formation of the 'October Proposal' and 'The Rogers Plan,' their goals, and the reasons for their failure. It treats both initiatives as a unit, not separately, as has been customary in the past. This reveals how eager the State Department was to display flexibility and compromise, sometimes without any quid pro quo from the Soviets, in order to produce an agreement between Israel and the Arab states. The author's primary conclusion is that at this state of the Egypt-Israel conflict, the parties were not yet ready to reach a peace agreement and did everything they could to stymie the process. Furthermore, the disagreements within the State Department and between the State Department and the National Security Advisor, which were exploited primarily by Israel, were major contributors to the lack of success.
Journal Article
The \Camp David Consensus\: Ideas, Intellectuals, and the Division of Labor in Egypt's Foreign Policy toward Israel
This paper explores the nature, background, and evolution of the \"Camp David consensus.\" Under this consensus, Egyptian intellectuals and political movements broadly accept that the Egyptian regime must deal constructively and \"correctly\" with Israel as a state, but insist that society has the right and responsibility to resist Zionism. The consensus rests on particular ways of understanding Israel, and the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, that can be traced back to the formative years of the Egyptian republic under Nasser. This has served the interests of both regimes and opposition movements and in this sense represents a \"double instrumentalization\" of foreign policy. The paper, which examines a range of regime and intellectual pronouncements during the Nasser and Sadat periods, as well as more recently, challenges the growing use within International Relations, particularly in the Middle East context, of the concept of \"identity\" to explain state behavior.
Journal Article
The Road to Jerusalem through Tahrir Square: Anti-Zionism and Palestine in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution
This article addresses an aspect of Egypt's 2011 revolution almost entirely ignored in most Western media accounts: Israel and Palestine as prominent themes of protest. In reviewing Egyptian mobilization opposing normalization and in support of the Palestinian cause starting from Sadat's peace initiative of the mid-1970s, the author shows how the anti-Mubarak movement that took off as of the mid-2000s built on the Palestine activism and networks already in place. While the trigger of the revolution and the focus of its first eighteen days was domestic change, the article shows how domestic and foreign policy issues (especially Israel and Palestine) were inextricably intertwined, with the leadership bodies of the revolution involved in both.
Journal Article
The Winner Takes All: The 1949 Island of Rhodes Armistice Negotiations Revisited
Why is there no peace between Israel and the Palestinians? This article draws the line all the way back to the very first Arab-Israeli negotiations. In 1949, on the Island of Rhodes, UN mediator Ralph Bunche negotiated an armistice agreement between Israel and Egypt. The outcome of the first Arab-Israeli war constituted the immediate context for the negotiations and was important for the final outcome. Israel had won; the Arab states had lost the war. A large number of Palestinians had fled and had lost their homeland. After the war, Israel was in a much stronger military position than Egypt, and could resume the war if necessary. New empirical evidence shows that this imbalance of power on the ground was strengthened by strong support in Israel's favor from the UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie, as well as from the US administration. Such support served to limit the UN mediator's room for maneuver and ultimately contributed to a biased agreement. An analysis of the negotiations between Israel and Egypt at Rhodes sheds light on and widens our understanding of the approach and power relations which marked the 1949 negotiations. The armistice negotiations represent the first example of a process and an agreement based largely on Israeli premises. Such an agreement could not provide the basis for peace in the Middle East.
Journal Article
The White House Middle East Policy in 1973 as a Catalyst for the Outbreak of the Yom Kippur War
We focus on the part that was played by the U.S. Administration, in particular by National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, in the failure of efforts to bring about an Israeli-Egyptian settlement in 1973, the year in which the Yom Kippur War broke out. Documents recently declassified in the United States and Israel support that the behavior of the White House, especially of Nixon's influential NSA, Kissinger, in the Middle East arena that year not only failed to prevent war but also indeed catalyzed its outbreak. We shall claim that in the examined period Kissinger led a \"stalemate policy\", which in practice meant undermining any peace initiative that surfaced if it was not in accordance with Israel's position on a possible settlement. With this in mind, the Egyptian government understood that the United States would have no real interest in promoting a peace process, pressuring Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula and perhaps also from other territories occupied in the Six-Day War. This assessment prompted the Egyptians to abandon diplomacy and (together with Syria) attack Israel in October 1973. They assumed that such a move would get the White House directly involved in the peace process in the Middle East and lead to the return of Egyptian territories occupied by Israel in the Six-Day War.
Journal Article
Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat's Peace Initiative of February 1973 and its Failure
Most studies of the attempts to reach a political solution to the Egyptian-Israeli dispute between the wars of 1967 and 1973 focus predominantly on the Jarring mission (1968-71), the Rogers plan (1969-70) and Sadat's plan for a partial agreement in the Canal sector (early 1971). However, as this article shows on the basis of new archival documents, the most important diplomatic initiative during this period was Sadat's proposal for a comprehensive settlement of the Egyptian-Israeli dispute, which was secretly submitted to Kissinger in February 1973. Despite the fact that it met most of Israel's requirements regarding peace, Sadat's proposal was rejected by Golda Meir, who refused to return the territories occupied in 1967. Meir's stand did not change even when, in April 1973, Israel's leadership concluded that the only alternative to the diplomatic process was war - which would break out soon. By making this decision, Golda Meir and her colleagues opted for war rather than peace and turned the October 1973 Yom Kippur War into 'a war of choice'.
Journal Article