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Does the consumption of ideologically congruent news on social media exacerbate polarization? I estimate the effects of social media news exposure by conducting a large field experiment randomly offering participants subscriptions to conservative or liberal news outlets on Facebook. I collect data on the causal chain of media effects: subscriptions to outlets, exposure to news on Facebook, visits to online news sites, and sharing of posts, as well as changes in political opinions and attitudes. Four main findings emerge. First, random variation in exposure to news on social media substantially affects the slant of news sites that individuals visit. Second, exposure to counter-attitudinal news decreases negative attitudes toward the opposing political party. Third, in contrast to the effect on attitudes, I find no evidence that the political leanings of news outlets affect political opinions. Fourth, Facebook’s algorithm is less likely to supply individuals with posts from counter-attitudinal outlets, conditional on individuals subscribing to them. Together, the results suggest that social media algorithms may limit exposure to counter-attitudinal news and thus increase polarization.

This study explores whether the diffusion of gender-equitable attitudes towards female employment is associated with fertility. We argue that any positive effect on fertility requires not only high levels of gender-equitable attitudes overall, but also attitude convergence between men and women. We analyse 27 countries using data from the World Values Surveys and European Values Studies. We find support for a U-shaped relationship between changes in gender role attitudes and fertility: an initial drop in fertility is observed as countries move from a traditional to a more gender-symmetric model. Beyond a certain threshold, additional increases in gender egalitarianism become positively associated with fertility. This curvi-linear relationship is moderated by the difference in attitudes between men and women: when there is more agreement, changes are more rapid and the effect of gender egalitarian attitudes on fertility strengthens.

Using new cross-country survey and experimental data, we investigate how beliefs about intergenerational mobility affect preferences for redistribution in France, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Americans are more optimistic than Europeans about social mobility. Our randomized treatment shows pessimistic information about mobility and increases support for redistribution, mostly for “equality of opportunity” policies. We find strong political polarization. Left-wing respondents are more pessimistic about mobility: their preferences for redistribution are correlated with their mobility perceptions; and they support more redistribution after seeing pessimistic information. None of this is true for right-wing respondents, possibly because they see the government as a “problem” and not as the “solution.”

What types of asylum seekers are Europeans willing to accept? We conducted a conjoint experiment asking 18,000 eligible voters in 15 European countries to evaluate 180,000 profiles of asylum seekers that randomly varied on nine attributes. Asylum seekers who have higher employability, have more consistent asylum testimonies and severe vulnerabilities, and are Christian rather than Muslim received the greatest public support. These results suggest that public preferences over asylum seekers are shaped by sociotropic evaluations of their potential economic contributions, humanitarian concerns about the deservingness of their claims, and anti-Muslim bias. These preferences are similar across respondents of different ages, education levels, incomes, and political ideologies, as well as across the surveyed countries.This public consensus on what types of asylum seekers to accept has important implications for theory and policy.

•Normally, conservatives seek more variety in their grocery purchases than liberals.•During crisis-induced threats, conservatives seek less variety in their purchases than usual.•During crisis-induced threats, liberals seek more variety in their purchases than usual.•Findings are consistent for brand, manufacturer and UPC level variety seeking. In an era marked by heightened political polarization and escalating crises, our study provides timely, empirics-first insights into how political ideology influences consumers’ variety-seeking behaviors when they experience crisis-induced threats—specific events that are perceived to endanger physical and financial well-being—versus normal conditions. We advance knowledge by investigating the interplay between political ideology, variety seeking, and crisis-induced threats using a large-scale dataset of over 32 million U.S. grocery transactions before and during the initial wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as county-level voting results. In doing so, we seek to answer three questions: (1) How does political ideology influence variety seeking under normal conditions? (2) How do crisis-induced threats influence variety seeking? and (3) How does political ideology influence variety seeking under crisis-induced threats? Our findings reveal that, under normal conditions, conservatives show greater variety seeking than liberals. Yet, during crisis-induced threats, conservatives decrease their variety seeking, whereas liberals increase theirs. These results complement existing studies that, using lab experiments and surveys, have identified various mechanisms––oftentimes competing––that influence variety seeking. We advance this work with externally validated and robust empirical evidence on how consumers’ variety seeking behaviors change substantially during crisis-induced threats versus normal conditions. These insights provide retail practitioners with marketing-relevant insights and strategies, tailored to the political composition of their consumer base, that can enhance their crisis preparedness and responses. [Display omitted]

Populist attitudes are generally measured in surveys through three necessary and non-compensatory elements of populism, namely anti-elitism, people-centrism, and Manicheanism. Using Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 5 (2016–2020) data for 30 countries, we evaluate whether this approach explains voting for populist parties across countries in Asia, Europe and the Americas. We show that the existing scales of populist attitudes effectively explain voting for populists in countries where populist leaders and parties are in opposition but fail to explain voting for populist parties in countries where they are in power . We argue that current approaches assume “the elite” to mean “politicians”, thus failing to capture attitudes towards “non-political elites” often targeted by populists in office—in particular, journalists, academics/experts, bureaucrats, and corporate business leaders. The results reveal limits to the usefulness of existing survey batteries in cross-national studies of populism and emphasize the need to develop approaches that are more generalizable across political and national contexts.

Context: Many athletes continue to participate in practices and games while experiencing concussion-related symptoms, potentially predisposing them to subsequent and more complicated brain injuries. Limited evidence exists about factors that may influence concussion-reporting behaviors. Objective: To examine the influence of knowledge and attitude on concussion-reporting behaviors in a sample of high school athletes. Design: Cross-sectional study. Setting: Participants completed a validated survey instrument via mail. Patients or Other Participants: A total of 167 high school athletes (97 males, 55 females, 5 sex not indicated; age = 15.7 ± 1.4 years) participating in football, soccer, lacrosse, or cheerleading. Intervention(s): Athlete knowledge and attitude scores served as separate predictor variables. Main Outcome Measure(s): We examined the proportion of athletes who reported continuing to participate in games and practices while symptomatic from possible concussion and the self-reported proportion of recalled concussion and bell-ringer events disclosed after possible concussive injury. Results: Only 40% of concussion events and 13% of bell-ringer recalled events in the sample were disclosed after possible concussive injury. Increased athlete knowledge of concussion topics (increase of 1 standard deviation = 2.8 points) was associated with increased reporting prevalence of concussion and bell-ringer events occurring in practice (prevalence ratio [PR] = 2.27, 95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.60, 3.21) and the reporting prevalence of bell-ringer-only events overall (PR = 1.87, 95% CI = 1.38, 2.54). Athlete attitude scores (increase of 1 standard deviation = 11.5 points) were associated with decreases in the proportion of athletes stating they participated in games (PR = 0.74, 95% CI = 0.66, 0.82) and practices (PR = 0.67, 95% CI = 0.59, 0.77) while symptomatic from concussions. Conclusions: Most recalled concussion events in our study were not reported to a supervising adult. Clinicians should be aware that knowledge and attitude influence concussion reporting. Clinicians and administrators should make concussion education a priority and encourage an optimal reporting environment to better manage and prevent concussive injuries in young athletes. Verf.-Referat.

We explore how support for radical parties of both the left and right may be shaped by what we call ‘positional deprivation’, where growth in income of individuals at a given point in the income distribution is outpaced by income growth elsewhere in that distribution. We argue that positional deprivation captures the combination of over-time and relative misfortune that can be expected to distinctly spur support for radical left and right parties. We explore this possibility by matching new measures of positional deprivation to individual-level survey data on party preferences in 20 European countries from 2002 to 2014. We find that positional deprivation is robustly correlated with supporting radical populist parties. First, positional deprivation generally, measured as average income growth across deciles of a country’s income distribution minus a respondent’s own decile’s growth, is associated with respondents’ retreat from mainstream parties and with support for both radical right and, particularly, radical left parties. Second, positional deprivation relative to the highest and the lowest ends of the income spectrum play out differently for radical right and for radical left support. A respondent’s positional deprivation relative to the wealthiest decile’s growth in his or her country tends to spur support for radical left but not radical right parties. In contrast, positional deprivation relative to the poorest decile’s growth in a respondent’s country tends to spur support for radical right but not left parties. The results suggest that the combination of over-time and relative economic misfortune may be key to how economic experience shapes radical backlash of the left and right.

This paper develops a learning model of cultural change to investigate why women's labor force participation (LFP) and attitudes toward women's work both changed dramatically. In the model, women's beliefs about the long-run payoff from working evolve endogenously via an intergenerational learning process. This process generically generates the data's S-shaped LFP curve and introduces a novel role for wage changes via their effect on the speed of intergenerational learning. The calibrated model does a good job of replicating the evolution of female LFP in the United States over the last 120 years and finds that the new role for wages was quantitatively significant.