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Using data from a two-year pricing experiment, we study the impact of subsidy policies on weather insurance take-up. Results show that subsidies increase future insurance take-up through their influence on payout experiences. Exploring mechanisms of the payout effect, we find that for households that randomly benefited from financial education, receiving a payout provides a one-time learning experience that improves take-up permanently. In contrast, households with poor insurance knowledge continuously update take-up decisions based on recent experiences with disasters and payouts. Combining subsidy policies with financial education can thus be effective in promoting long-run insurance adoption.

I examine the learning process that economic agents use to update their expectation of an uncertain and infrequently observed event. I use a new nation-wide panel dataset of large regional floods and flood insurance policies to show that insurance take-up spikes the year after a flood and then steadily declines to baseline. Residents in nonflooded communities in the same television media market increase take-up at one-third the rate of flooded communities. I find that insurance take-up is most consistent with a Bayesian learning model that allows for forgetting or incomplete information about past floods.

I identify the effects of financial constraints on firms' product pricing decisions, using insurance groups containing both life and property & casualty (P&C) divisions. Following P&C divisions' losses, life divisions change prices in a manner that can generate more immediate financial resources: premiums fall (rise) for life policies that immediately increase (decrease) insurers' financial resources. Premiums change more in groups that are more constrained. Life divisions increase transfers to P&C divisions, suggesting P&C divisions' shocks are transmitted to life divisions. Results hold when instrumenting for P&C divisions' losses with exposure to unusual weather damages, implying that the effects are causal.

Why do many households remain exposed to large exogenous sources of nonsystematic income risk? We use a series of randomized field experiments in rural India to test the importance of price and nonprice factors in the adoption of an innovative rainfall insurance product. Demand is significantly price sensitive, but widespread take-up would not be achieved even if the product offered a payout ratio comparable to US insurance contracts. We present evidence suggesting that lack of trust, liquidity constraints, and limited salience are significant nonprice frictions that constrain demand.We suggest possible contract design improvements to mitigate these frictions.

We undertake the first large-scale analysis of flood insurance claims in the United States, analyzing over 1 million claims from the federally managed National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) over the period 1978–2012. Using fixed effects regressions and other statistical analyses, we test several hypotheses about the nature and drivers of flood claims (e.g., the impact of flood zone, characteristics of the house, individual and collective mitigation, and repetitive loss properties), as well as uncover quantitative relationships on the determinants of claims payments. We also examine how claims are distributed across time and space. Our findings, several surprising, provide a quantitative basis for exploring the challenges associated with low insurance demand and also can contribute to more informed policy decisions regarding reform of the NFIP, as well as flood insurance markets around the world.

Natural disaster losses have been increasing worldwide. Insurance is thought to play a critical role in improving resilience to these events by both promoting recovery and providing incentives for investments in hazard mitigation. This review first examines the functioning of disaster insurance markets broadly and then turns to reviewing empirical studies on the role of natural disaster insurance in recovery and the impacts of disaster insurance on incentives for ex ante hazard mitigation and land use. Rigorous empirical work on these topics is limited. The work that has been done suggests that insurance coverage does improve recovery outcomes, but impacts on risk reduction may be modest. More studies comparing outcomes across insured and uninsured properties are needed, particularly for better understanding the role of insurance in climate adaptation.

Moral hazard in natural disaster insurance markets results in policyholders preparing less, increasing the risk they face. However, moral hazard may not arise, due to high risk aversion or market context. We study the relationship between disaster risk reduction and insurance coverage to assess the presence of moral hazard for two different natural hazards, using four econometric models on survey data from Germany and the United States. The results show that moral hazard is absent. Nevertheless, adverse risk selection may be present. This has significant policy relevance such as opportunities for strengthening the link between insurance and risk reduction measures.

Little is known about how affected residents are able to cope with the financial shock of a natural disaster. This paper investigates the impact of flooding on household finance. Spikes in credit card borrowing and overall delinquency rates for the most flooded residents are modest in size and short-lived. Greater flooding results in larger reductions in total debt. Lower debt levels are driven by homeowners using flood insurance to repay their mortgages rather than to rebuild. Mortgage reductions are larger in areas where reconstruction costs exceeded pre-Katrina home values and where mortgages were likely to be originated by nonlocal lenders.

This paper quantifies frictions in uptake, tests for adverse selection, and analyzes welfare effects of proposed reforms in natural disaster insurance markets. I find that willingness to pay is remarkably low. In high-risk flood zones, fewer than 60 percent of homeowners purchase flood insurance even though premiums are only two-thirds of own costs. Estimating flood insurance demand and cost elasticities using house-level variation in premiums from recent US congressional reforms reveals that these homeowners select into insurance based on observable differences in adaptation but not private information about risk. These findings change the sign of predicted welfare effects of proposed policies.

This paper provides evidence on the price and perception of rare natural disasters. We exploit a unique, spatially extremely detailed, dataset on predicted flood water levels in the Netherlands. This dataset, in combination with information on the universe of home sales over the period 1999–2011, allows us to identify people's willingness to pay to avoid flood risk using a border discontinuity design. We find that house prices are on average 1% lower in places that are at risk of flooding. This flood risk discount is more pronounced in neighborhoods with higher predicted flood water levels. Our estimates imply that average perceived flood risk in the Netherlands is much higher than the official protection levels at which the government claims to uphold the country's flood defenses. People expect a flood to happen at least once every 100 years. Depending on the predicted flood water level in their neighborhood, people in flood prone areas are willing to pay 9%–36% more for their flood protection than what the Dutch government currently spends on it.