Catalogue Search | MBRL
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
{{itemTitle}}
22,845
result(s) for
"Emergency Powers"
Sort by:
War powers
Armed interventions in Libya, Haiti, Iraq, Vietnam, and Korea challenged the US president and Congress with a core question of constitutional interpretation: does the president, or Congress, have constitutional authority to take the country to war? War Powers argues that the Constitution doesn't offer a single legal answer to that question. But its structure and values indicate a vision of a well-functioning constitutional politics, one that enables the branches of government themselves to generate good answers to this question for the circumstances of their own times.
Mariah Zeisberg shows that what matters is not that the branches enact the same constitutional settlement for all conditions, but instead how well they bring their distinctive governing capacities to bear on their interpretive work in context. Because the branches legitimately approach constitutional questions in different ways, interpretive conflicts between them can sometimes indicate a successful rather than deficient interpretive politics. Zeisberg argues for a set of distinctive constitutional standards for evaluating the branches and their relationship to one another, and she demonstrates how observers and officials can use those standards to evaluate the branches' constitutional politics. With cases ranging from the Mexican War and World War II to the Cold War, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Iran-Contra scandal, War Powers reinterprets central controversies of war powers scholarship and advances a new way of evaluating the constitutional behavior of officials outside of the judiciary.
eBook
Emergency, narratives, and pandemic governance
Pandemics present opportunities for states to acquire emergency powers by narrativizing pandemics as “acts of God,” “acts of war,” “acts of outsiders,” “sanitation-hygiene,” or “acts of the invisible enemy.” These narratives conveniently justify the imposition of undefined and often unrestrained constitutional or extra-constitutional emergency powers to reshape individual, social, and governance modalities. These narratives conveniently establish the setting for states to justify the imposition of broad emergency powers by determining the plot of pandemic-appropriate modalities for individuals, society, and governance mechanisms and classifying the characters of pandemic as protagonists and antagonists as per the plot and settings of the preferred narrative. This article attempts to reveal the theoretical and applicational interconnections between state-sponsored narratives and exercise of emergency powers during the pandemic governance in plague, cholera, influenza, and Covid-19 pandemics.
Journal Article
Courts at War
On June 28, 2004, the US Supreme Court broke with a long-standing tradition of deference to the executive in wartime national security cases and became an important actor in an armed conflict. By declining to rubber-stamp the executive branch's actions, the judiciary would henceforth play a major role in shaping national security policies in the war on terror. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, lawyers, lawsuits, and court decisions have repeatedly altered the landscape in the policy areas of detention and military commissions. In Courts at War Gregory Burnep explores how, after 9/11, lawyers and judges became deeply involved in an armed conflict, with important consequences for presidential authority, the separation of powers, and the treatment of individuals suspected of posing a threat to the United States.
Courts at War goes beyond the postâ€\"9/11 armed conflict. It analyzes the changes in the position of courts vis-à-vis the other branches of government (courts in conflict with the executive, the legislature, or both)-even courts in conflict with other courts. The consequences included increased checks on presidential authority and greater levels of due process for suspected belligerents held in US custody. But Burnep also shows that there are unintended consequences that accompany these developments.
Burnep innovatively applies an interbranch perspective to persuasively argue that litigation and judicial involvement have important implications for changing patterns of policy development in a wide range of national security policy areas, including surveillance, interrogation, targeted killings, and President Trump's travel ban.
eBook
Choosing your battles
America's debate over whether and how to invade Iraq clustered into civilian versus military camps. Top military officials appeared reluctant to use force, the most hawkish voices in government were civilians who had not served in uniform, and everyone was worried that the American public would not tolerate casualties in war. This book shows that this civilian-military argument--which has characterized earlier debates over Bosnia, Somalia, and Kosovo--is typical, not exceptional. Indeed, the underlying pattern has shaped U.S. foreign policy at least since 1816. The new afterword by Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi traces these themes through the first two years of the current Iraq war, showing how civil-military debates and concerns about sensitivity to casualties continue to shape American foreign policy in profound ways.
eBook
BINDING THE BOUND
The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered an unprecedented increase in unilateral lawmaking by governors under each state’s emergency executive power statute. These actions have been met with controversy and a significant amount of resistance. This Note argues that the resistance to COVID-19 rules in the United States may be partially attributable to the way state emergency power statutes concentrate virtually all the power to enact emergency rules in the hands of governors.
As this Note demonstrates, the state executive emergency power regime, like all emergency power frameworks, grapples with the inherent tension between technocratic agility and democratic legitimacy. Drawing on a novel fifty-state survey, this Note shows how, notwithstanding the drafters’ attempt to balance executive power with legislative constraint, the statutes as written effectively place all substantive decisionmaking in the hands of the governor, leaving only a binary on/off switch for the legislature to terminate the state of emergency. This consolidation of power in a chronic emergency bypasses the deliberative legislative process, increasing technocratic agility at the expense of democratic legitimacy. This Note suggests a revision to the statutes, inspired by the Congressional Review Act, that would encourage legislative deliberation through a fast-track approval process, while still preserving the prerogative of the governor to enact pandemic policy.
Journal Article