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I exploit the adoption of state-level labor protection laws as an exogenous increase in employee firing costs to examine how the costs associated with discharging workers affect capital structure decisions. I find that firms reduce debt ratios following the adoption of these laws, with this result stronger for firms that experience larger increases in firing costs. I also document that, following the adoption of these laws, a firm's degree of operating leverage rises, earnings variability increases, and employment becomes more rigid. Overall, these results are consistent with higher firing costs crowding out financial leverage via increasing financial distress costs.

Throughout the \"New South,\" relationships based on race, class, social status, gender, and citizenship are being upended by the recent influx of Latina/o residents. Doing Good examines these issues as they play out in the microcosm of a community health center in North Carolina that previously had served mostly African American clients but now serves predominantly Latina/o clients. Drawing on eighteen months of experience as a participant- observer in the clinic and in-depth interviews with clinic staff at all levels, Natalia Deeb-Sossa provides an informative and fascinating view of how changing demographics are profoundly affecting the new social order.Deeb-Sossa argues persuasively that \"moral identities\" have been constructed by clinic staff. The high-status staff-nearly all of whom are white-see themselves as heroic workers. Mid- and lower-status Latina staff feel like they are guardians of people who are especially needy and deserving of protection. In contrast, the moral identity of African American staffers had previously been established in response to serving \"their people.\" Their response to the evolving clientele has been to create a self-image of superiority by characterizing Latina/o clients as \"immoral,\" \"lazy,\" \"working the system,\" having no regard for rules or discipline, and being irresponsible parents.All of the health-care workers want to be seen as \"doing good.\" But they fail to see how, in constructing and maintaining their own moral identity in response to their personal views and stereotypes, they have come to treat each other and their clients in ways that contradict their ideals.

France and Spain have similar labour market institutions and their unemployment rates were both around 8% just before the Great Recession but subsequently that rate has increased to 10% in France and to 23% in Spain. In this article, we assess the part of this differential that is due to the larger gap between the firing costs of permanent and temporary contracts, and the laxer rules on the use of the latter in Spain. A calibrated search and matching model indicates that Spain could have avoided about 45% of its unemployment surge had it adopted the French employment protection legislation.

When contracts are incomplete, dismissal laws prevent employers from arbitrarily discharging employees and thereby limit employers’ ability to hold up innovating employees after an innovation is successful. Therefore, dismissal laws can enhance employees’ innovative efforts and encourage firms to invest in risky but potentially groundbreaking projects. Other forms of labor laws that do not affect dismissal of employees do not have this bright side. We find support for these predictions in empirical tests that exploit country-level changes in dismissal laws in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany: more stringent dismissal laws foster innovation, particularly in innovation-intensive industries, but other labor laws do not.

This article provides a simple model that explains the choice between permanent and temporary jobs. This model, which incorporates important features of actual employment protection legislations neglected by the economic literature so far, reproduces the main stylized facts about entries into permanent and temporary jobs observed in Continental European countries. We find that job protection has very small effects on total employment but induces large substitution of temporary jobs for permanent jobs, which significantly reduces aggregate production.

The theoretical effects of labor regulations, such as employment protection legislation (EPL), on innovation is ambiguous. EPL increases job security, and the greater enforceability of job contracts may increase woiker investment in innovative activity. But EPL increases firms' adjustment costs, which may lead to underinvestment in activities that are likely to require adjustment, including technologically advanced innovation. In this paper, we find empirical evidence that these effects are at work—in particular, a higher share of multinational enterprise innovative activity in countries with high EPL is technologically advanced.

Labour market reforms increasing flexibility 'at the margin' have been recently paying out in terms of employment growth. This article argues that two-tier labour market reforms have a transitional 'honeymoon', job creating effect. In a dynamic model of labour demand under uncertainty, the article predicts that in the aftermath of reforms, beyond an increase in employment, there should be a reduction in 'employment inaction' and in the mean and cross-sectional variance of labour productivity. Based on a variety of firm-level data on Italy in the period 1995-2000, we find evidence of our empirical implications.

Teacher contracts that condition pay and retention on demonstrated performance can improve selection into and out of teaching. I study alternative contracts in a simulated teacher labor market that incorporates dynamic self-selection and Bayesian learning. Bonus policies create only modest incentives and thus have small effects on selection. Reductions in tenure rates can have larger effects, but must be accompanied by substantial salary increases; elimination of tenure confers little additional benefit unless firing rates are extremely high. Benefits of both bonus and tenure policies exceed costs, though optimal policies are sensitive to labor market parameters about which little is known.

This study investigates the influence of managerial incentives to meet or beat the zero earnings benchmark on labor cost behavior of private Belgian firms. We posit that relative to managers of firms reporting healthy profits, managers meeting or beating the zero earnings benchmark will increase labor costs to a smaller extent when activity increases and decrease labor costs to a larger extent when activity decreases. This should take the form of more symmetric labor cost behavior for firms that report a small profit. Our findings are consistent with this prediction. Using detailed employee data, we show that managers of firms reporting a small profit focus on firing employees who are relatively low cost to fire. To protect their reputation in the labor market, managers of other firms, particularly those reporting healthy profits, limit the numbers of dismissals and react to activity changes by changing the number of hours that employees work.