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Using novel microdata, we document an important, unintended consequence of the Protestant Reformation: a reallocation of resources from religious to secular purposes. To understand this process, we propose a conceptual framework in which the introduction of religious competition shifts political markets where religious authorities provide legitimacy to rulers in exchange for control over resources. Consistent with our framework, religious competition changed the balance of power between secular and religious elites: secular authorities acquired enormous amounts of wealth from monasteries closed during the Reformation, particularly in Protestant regions. This transfer of resources had significant consequences. First, it shifted the allocation of upper-tail human capital. Graduates of Protestant universities increasingly took secular, especially administrative, occupations. Protestant university students increasingly studied secular subjects, especially degrees that prepared students for public sector jobs, rather than church sector specific theology. Second, it affected the sectoral composition of fixed investment. Particularly in Protestant regions, new construction shifted from religious toward secular purposes, especially the building of palaces and administrative buildings, which reflected the increased wealth and power of secular lords. Reallocation was not driven by preexisting economic or cultural differences. Our findings indicate that the Reformation played an important causal role in the secularization of the West.

Research summary: In this article, we investigate the firm-specific environment and its impact on firm strategy focusing on adverse changes in the policy environment and their effect on divestitures. We argue that experiencing a negative change in the firm-specific policy environment causes firms to reassess their exposure to policy risk and their ability to manage their policy environment, making them more likely to divest. Operationalizing negative shifts in the firm-specific policy environment through formal policy disputes between firms and governments, we find that following a dispute, firms are more likely to divest both in the country where the dispute occurs and in other countries in the same region. However, the impact of disputes on divestitures is firm specific, applying only to firms directly involved in a dispute. Managerial summary: What is the impact of change in the firm-specific environment on firm strategy? We argue that when firms directly experience a negative change in their policy environment that is specific to them, they negatively reassess their exposure to policy risk and their ability to manage their policy environment, which makes them more likely to undertake a divestiture. We analyze formal disputes between firms and governments that arise from adverse changes in policy and find that, following a dispute, firms are more likely to divest in the country where the dispute occurs and in other countries in the same region. However, the impact of disputes on divestitures is firm specific as it applies only to firms directly involved in a dispute.

Research summary: We examine the relationship between the geographic concentration of a firm's sales and the firm's vulnerability to expropriation hazards. Although expanding outside the home location can initially increase a firm's exposure to government expropriation, we find that this effect reverses when a firm's sales outside its home location have reached a point at which it has sufficient resources to better influence government actions and to pose a credible threat to exit the market in which it is being targeted. We supplement this main result by identifying two moderating factors: the firm's level of political capital and the effectiveness of institutional constraints on government behavior. We find support for these hypotheses from survey data on privately owned enterprises in China. Managerial summary: This research advises firm managers that certain market activities might knock their firms' economic interests out of alignment with the government's political interests, and thus, influence the political hazards they face, particularly in emerging markets such as China, which has attracted strong interest of many firms with respect to entering the market. Here, all else being equal, the firms' geographic concentration exposes them to different levels of state expropriation—but not in a simple linear fashion as suggested by the conventional wisdom of local protectionism or that of the bargaining advantage generated by the threat of relocation: Those who are \"stuck in the middle\" ended up paying twice or even three times as much unauthorized levies as the purely local or the most expansive firms.

Familiar, exploitation-centered conceptions of capitalism cannot explain its persistent entanglement with racial oppression. In their place, I suggest an expanded conception that also encompasses an ongoing but disavowed moment of expropriation. By thematizing that other ex, I disclose, first, the crucial role played in capital accumulation by unfree and dependent labor, which is expropriated, as opposed to exploited; and second, the equally indispensable role of politically enforced status distinctions between free, exploitable citizen-workers and dependent, expropriable subjects. Treating such political distinctions as constitutive of capitalist society and as correlated with the color line, I demonstrate that the racialized subjection of those whom capital expropriates is a condition of possibility for the freedom of those whom it exploits. After developing this proposition systematically, I historicize it, distinguishing four regimes of racialized accumulation according to how exploitation and expropriation are distinguished, sited, and intertwined in each. I end by making the case for combined struggles against both exes and against the larger social system that generates their symbiosis.

Expropriation risk has a binding effect on foreign direct investment (FDI). However, state-owned multinational corporations may counter the monopoly power of the host state by leveraging the political influence of their home government. The magnitude of this counter force, we argue, may vary, depending on the strength of political relations between the home and host state, and the level of economic dependence of the host country on the home market. We find supporting evidence of our hypotheses using Chinese firm-level FDI information between 2003 and 2010.

Growing conventional wisdom suggests that authoritarian legislatures prevent oil nationalizations in party-based regimes. However, country scholars and media outlets remain skeptical. We develop a theory aligning with the skeptics. We argue that oil expropriations and legislative closures are endogenous to the process of the consolidation of party-based autocracies. New authoritarian parties close legislatures when they seize power and do not reopen them until they can ensure their dominance of the new legislature, a process abetted by oil expropriations. We test the argument using recently developed cross-case comparative Bayesian qualitative techniques. Evidence shows support for our theory. Our findings suggest that authoritarian legislatures are less constraining in terms of oil nationalizations than new conventional wisdom suggests. Additionally, our evidence points to a different interpretation of the role legislatures play in the evolution of authoritarian regimes.

The deep and personal story-told through history, poetry, and images-of the forced displacement of the Sámi people from their homeland in northern Norway and Sweden and its reverberations today More than a hundred years have passed since the Sámi were forcibly displaced from their homes in northern Norway and Sweden, a hundred years since Elin Anna Labba's ancestors and relations drove their reindeer over the strait to the mainland for the last time. The place where they lived has remained empty ever since. We carry our homes in our hearts, Labba shares, citing the Sámi poet Áillohaš. How do you bear that weight if you were forced to leave? In a remarkable blend of historical reportage, memoir, and lyrical reimagining, Labba travels to the lost homeland of her ancestors to tell of the forced removal of the Sámi in the early twentieth century and to reclaim a place in history, and in today's world, for these Indigenous people of northern Scandinavia. When Norway became a country independent from Sweden in 1905, the two nations came to an agreement that called for the displacement of the Northern Sámi, who spent summers on the Norwegian coast and winters in Sweden. This \"dislocation,\" as the authorities called it, gave rise to a new word in Sámi language, bággojohtin, forced displacement. The first of the sirdolaččat, or \"the displaced,\" left their homes fully believing they would soon return. Through stories, photographs, letters, and joik lyrics, Labba gathers a chorus of Sámi expression that resonates across the years, evoking the nomadic life they were required to abandon and the immense hardship and challenges they endured: children left behind with relatives, reindeer lost when they returned to familiar territory, sorrow and estrangement that linger through generations. Starkly poetic and emotionally heart-wrenching, this dark history is told through the voices of the sirdolaččat, echoing the displacements of other Indigenous people around the world as it depicts the singular experience of the Northern Sámi. For her extraordinary work, Labba was awarded Sweden's most important national book prize in 2020, the August Prize for Best Nonfiction.

This article uses the enactment of China’s 2007 Property Law (the Law), which reduces the risk of expropriation by local governments, as the setting to investigate the importance of property rights protection for private firm investment. Using propensity score matching and a difference-in-differences design, we find that firms facing weaker property rights protection prior to the Law significantly increase their investment and investment efficiency after the Law. Cross-sectional analyses document evidence consistent with a decrease in firms’ perceived expropriation risk as the main mechanism underlying the Law’s effect. Finally, we show that the Law improves local economic outcomes and employment.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine expropriation, valuation, compensation and rehabilitation practices and their impacts on expropriated households.Design/methodology/approachThis study employed a mixed research approach. The target populations of the study were expropriated households in Debre Markos City from 2019 to 2022. The study uses purposive and systematic random sampling techniques. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics, narration and thematic clustering.FindingsThe findings of this study revealed that the expropriation process was not participatory and the right holders were not treated as what is expected. It is further found that economic losses, moral damage and social disturbance payments were not considered in the compensation package. The displacement compensation given was also inadequate and sometimes delayed and the time value of money was not taken into account for delayed payments. This creates social and economic problems. The rehabilitation and resettlement program was inadequate and ineffective. The expropriation, valuation, compensation and rehabilitation practice in general lack transparency and accountability.Practical implicationsTo ensure efficient and effective expropriation, valuation and compensation, there should be a well-organized government system that provides an accurate valuation on the one hand and restores the livelihood of the displaced on the other.Originality/valueThis paper is the first on expropriation, valuation, compensation and rehabilitation within the framework of transparency, accountability, effective rehabilitation and resettlement and institutional arrangements to ensure the sustainable livelihoods of affected households.

We propose a tractable variant of the open economy neoclassical growth model that emphasizes political economy and contracting frictions. The political economy frictions involve a preference for immediate spending, while the contracting friction is a lack of commitment regarding foreign debt and expropriation. We show that the political economy frictions slow an economy's convergence to the steady state due to the endogenous evolution of capital taxation. The model rationalizes why openness has different implications for growth depending on the political environment, why institutions such as the treatment of capital income evolve over time, why governments in countries that grow rapidly accumulate net foreign assets rather than liabilities, and why foreign aid may not affect growth.