Catalogue Search | MBRL
Are you sure you want to remove the book from the shelf?
{{itemTitle}}
1,039
result(s) for
"Epictetus"
Sort by:
How to be free : an ancient guide to the stoic life : Encheiridion and selections from Discourses
\"Born a slave, the Roman Stoic philosopher Epictetus (c. 55-135 AD) taught that mental freedom is supreme, since it can liberate one anywhere, even in a prison ... Freedom, for Epictetus, is not a human right or a political prerogative but a psychological and ethical achievement, a gift that we alone can bestow on ourselves ... How to Be Free features splendid new translations and the original Greek on facing pages, a compelling introduction that sets Epictetus in context and describes the importance of Stoic freedom today, and an invaluable glossary of key words and concepts. The result is an unmatched introduction to this powerful method of managing emotions and handling life's situations, from the most ordinary to the most demanding.\"--Provided by the publisher.
BOOK
All as σκύβαλα beside the μέγιστον τῶν ἀγαθῶν: Philippians 3:7–11 in Dialogue with Epictetus
In Philippians 3:8, Paul holds all things to be loss (ζημία) and even dung (σκύβαλον) in comparison with Christ. Similarly, beside a precise conception of the good (ἀγαθὸν), Epictetus considers earthly achievements and physical benefits as “indifferents” (ἀδιάφορα), which he defines as things that are neither good nor evil. This paper employs a comparative analysis of Paul and Epictetus to examine the tension inherent in both authors as they seek to explain the sufferings and enjoyments of human existence in light of humankind’s ultimate end. Despite Paul’s strong language, he still recognizes the value of temporal goods, including release from prison, recovery from illness, and financial assistance. Thus, a person can value these benefits when they are joined to the greatest good, as illustrated by Augustine’s conception of ordered loves. Like Paul, Epictetus affirms the lesser value of indifferents, particularly when they enable participation in the good. This paper argues that both Paul and Epictetus acknowledge a secondary value in things that are joined to the supreme good, but that Paul differs from Epictetus in classifying them as goods that can be rightly desired and in acknowledging temporary sufferings to be an evil even as they can bring about good.
Journal Article
Reasons not to worry : how to be Stoic in chaotic times
\"Like many people today, Brigid Delaney was searching for answers to timeless questions: How can we be good? Find inner peace? Properly grieve? Tame our insecurities, such as the fear of missing out? Determine what truly matters? Centuries ago, the Stoics pondered many of these same questions. And so, at an important inflection point in her own life, Brigid decided to let these ancient philosophers be her guide. Brigid is rash where the Stoics are logical; she runs on chaos, while the Stoics relinquish control of things beyond their reach. Over the course of a year, she dedicated herself to following the wisdom of Seneca, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius. She hoped to discover how best to live, how she could use the wisdom of these ancient thinkers to navigate life in the modern world. Here, Brigid shares what she learned, showing us how we, too, can draw on the Stoics to regain a sense of agency and tranquility and find meaning in our lives. From learning to relinquish control to cultivating daily awareness of our mortality to building community, Brigid's insights are very funny and very wise.\" -- Provided by publisher.
Book
Stoic Ethics
Soon after Aristotle's death, several schools of ancient philosophy arose, each addressing the practical question of how to live a good, happy life.The two biggest rivals, Stoicism and Epicureanism, came to dominate the philosophical landscape for the next 500 years.
eBook
Epictetusian rationality
According to Epictetus, mental freedom and happiness can be achieved by distinguishing between, on the one hand, things that are upon our control (our judgements, desires and acts), and, on the other hand, things that are not upon our control (our body, property and reputation), and by wishing for nothing that is outside our control. We propose two economic accounts of Epictetus’s precept, which extend the symmetric factor of the preference relation beyond its boundaries under non-ethical preferences. The I1 account requires indifference between outcomes differing only on circumstances. The I2 account requires indifference between outcomes that are the best under each circumstance. We explore implications of these precepts for the structure of Epictetusian rationality. When revisiting consumer theory, we show that income/wealth has a purely instrumental value (I1 account) or no value (I2 account). Adaptive desires are ruled out by the I1 account. In game-theoretical contexts, the two accounts of Epictetus’s precept exclude the existence of prisoner’s dilemmas.
Journal Article
Metaquotation: Homer and the Emperor
For the emperor, quoting Homer was both a danger and an opportunity. Suetonius’ Lives shows that anecdotes of quotation circulated widely to characterise the emperor for good or for ill. Subsequently, these moments could themselves become the subject of allusion. If you quote a line of Homer that was famously quoted by the emperor, are you quoting the poet or Caesar? This phenomenon, whereby a poetic cliché could be reborn as charged reference to a prior use of that tag by a well-known figure, might be termed metaquotation. This ambiguity of reference was exploited throughout Seneca's Apocolocyntosis, and in turn by readers of that text in antiquity.
Journal Article
