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Ancient writers, including philosophers such as Aristotle, often depict friendship as a source of pleasure; by contrast, in his Laelius de amicitia, Cicero describes such relationships as sweet and delightful, but never connects them with uoluptas, which for him is a largely negative term reserved for Epicurean doctrine. This paper argues that there is more to this pointed use of language than Cicero’s well-known dislike of Epicureanism. Considering first the Latin philosophical vocabulary of pleasure and then the vexed question of what exactly qualifies as pleasure according to the Epicurean system, the paper makes the case that Cicero believed (probably correctly) that the pleasures of friendship as conceived of by himself and many ordinary language-users would not in fact qualify as instances of Epicurean uoluptas. If, as Epicurus appears to have held, all pleasures are either bodily or mental, and all mental pleasures are derived from bodily ones, then many activities experienced as pleasurable in and of themselves—including many traditional elements of friendship—are not in fact Epicurean pleasures.

Abstract This article examines three sections of the proem to Lucretius' De rerum natura: the so-called hymn to Venus (Lucr. 1.1-43), the praise of Epicurus (1.62-79), and the Iphigenia passage (1.80-101). The article's goal is to show that distinct, interconnected political echoes are perceptible in these three sections of Lucretius' proem, and that Lucretius intertwines his philosophical teaching with Roman political culture in such a way as to make his Epicurean message more acceptable to Roman audiences. The article demonstrates Lucretius' interaction with the use of myth in political language in Rome in the 60s and 50s BCE. It analyzes the relevance of the Mithridatic wars to Roman discussions of imperialism and Lucretius' exploitation of this conflict's iconic status. This article suggests that Memmius' political action in the 60s may have made him a particularly suitable addressee for Lucretius' poem. It also explores the implications of this new reading of the proem for the date of Lucretius' De rerum natura.

This article contributes to our understanding of women in the Epicurean school. Focussing on the second- and first-century b.c.e. philosophers Zeno of Sidon and Philodemus of Gadara, it examines some neglected textual evidence and argues that a misogynist position can be traced back to Zeno. While Epicureanism contains many progressive ideas on women and early Epicureans admitted women in their communities, Zeno was much more dismissive of women than other Epicureans. This points to a significant doctrinal development in the Epicurean school.

Cicero often challenged Epicureanism on the grounds of inconsistency. Cicero personifies the charge through his character Torquatus, who defends Epicureanism in De finibus 1–2. Cicero highlights the discrepancies among Torquatus’ beliefs and between them and his behaviour. Torquatus holds that the senses incontestably verify the tenets of Epicureanism, and that logic is superfluous. Yet he is sensitive to the fact that Epicurus’ teachings are not intuitive and require a fair amount of logical argumentation in its defence. Therefore, he defends his school against Cicero's criticisms. But by engaging in a defence of the system, Torquatus has already spoken against his commitment to the obviousness of Epicureanism and his disavowal of logic.

Verse epitaphs are our main and very abundant source for responses to individual deaths. We can almost never know exactly whose attitudes or values they express, but we can assume that they embody attitudes and values that it was acceptable to express publicly. Many at all dates seek merely to commemorate the dead person or convey grief, but, from about 400 bce onwards, others adopt a position on the fate of the dead person, though often hedged with a cautious ‘if’. Very many possibilities emerge: they range from a plain denial that anything survives death, via claims that the dead person is now (e.g.) in the aither/in the home of the blessed/on Olympos/with the heroes, to, very rarely, declarations that s/he is now actually a god. Strangely enough, support for such claims is never sought in the fact of the dead person being an initiate in a cult that promised advantage in the afterlife. In all this we see not so much individual choices as the range of options available for individuals to believe in. But we must also suspect that belief in the more optimistic options can seldom have been as firm as in a society where such options were authoritatively endorsed and alternatives not publicly countenanced.

This article will investigate a certain similarity between Origen’s response to Celsus’ True Logos and the criticisms against Longinus’ interpretation of the early pages of Plato’s Timaeus made in Proclus’ Commentary by a certain Origenes, usually held to be a pagan though without compelling evidence. Origen begins by assuming that ‘Celsus’ was an Epicurean of that name, even though it has long been obvious that ‘Celsus’ has adopted a Platonist point of view and that Origen’s answers often rely on Plato’s authority; in Proclus, Origenes regularly regards Longinus’ explanations as turning Plato into a hedonist by having him aim at the reader’s pleasure, and at one point Longinus even made reference to Epicurus. The paper uses recent work on the presence in Porphyry and Lucian of alternative names, whether inside philosophic schools or as a nom de plume, to argue that Origen could not be sure of his opponent’s identity, but that as he wrote he came to suspect that ‘Celsus’ was in fact his younger contemporary Longinus, the initial teacher of Porphyry himself. Hence the allusions to his ‘philological’ tendencies. If this is correct, then there is additional reason to identify Origen with Origenes.

In the fourth line of her first speech in Book 1, to Ilioneus and the Trojan castaways, Dido quotes the first word of the first line of Lucretius’ De rerum natura, and in the fourth line of her second speech, to Aeneas, she quotes the first words of the second line of the De rerum natura. This is not a coincidence but a signal of the importance of Lucretius and Epicureanism for the characterization of Dido in the Aeneid.

Cicero’s treatise De Fato, written during the political crisis of the Roman Republic, is a fundamental work for understanding the development of philosophical thought on fate and free will in antiquity. Influenced by Academic Skepticism, Cicero aimed to critically examine the positions of the major Greek philosophical schools, such as Stoicism and Epicureanism, regarding causality and the determination of future events. The concept of fate, however, was not only a philosophical matter but also a religious one in antiquity, deeply intertwined with practices such as divination and the belief in the gods’ influence over the cosmos. This study explores the historical and philosophical context in which De Fato emerged, as well as the Greek sources that shaped Cicero’s arguments. It analyzes the debate between the Stoics and Epicureans on fate, highlighting how Cicero adopts, adapts, and critiques their ideas. Additionally, it examines the structure and method of his work, identifying the three main approaches—physical, logical, and ethical—that he employs to address the question of fate. Finally, this study considers how Cicero’s treatment of fate reflects not only philosophical but also religious concerns, especially regarding human freedom and the divine role in shaping the future. The enduring influence of De Fato on philosophical tradition and its relevance to contemporary discussions on human freedom is also considered.

This article uncovers the intellectual traditions behind Dio Chrysostom's Oration 20: On Anachôrêsis. The examination reveals a variety of subtexts and traditions with which Dio engages, and shows that at its core the text inspects three types of lives promoted by three philosophical schools: Epicurean, Stoic and Peripatetic. They are never referred to directly, however, which raises questions concerning Dio's strategy of not acknowledging the sources of the ideas with which he engages. The article also develops our understanding of anachôrêsis and the controversies surrounding it in pagan antiquity.

J. S. Mill is typically thought of as a liberal utilitarian disciple of Jeremy Bentham, and in other readings as a modern Socratic or even a modern Epicurean. Mill and the Epicureans are alike in several respects: they theorize personal freedom and active character versus determinism and passivity, they oppose excessive love and praise friendship, and they are critical of traditional religiosity. In spite of these similarities, Mill and the Epicureans have a different conception of active character and citizenship, stemming from a difference in first principles. Mill's philosopher does not share the Epicurean aim of untroubledness ( ataraxia ), and Mill accepts the demanding task of educating and regenerating a mass democratic society. Below, I assess Mill's troubled hedonism , that is, his acceptance of often intense and long-term mental perturbations, justified by a decidedly non-Epicurean social reform project.