Explore the vast range of titles available.

The use of artificial intelligence (AI) to generate automated early warnings in epidemic surveillance by harnessing vast open-source data with minimal human intervention has the potential to be both revolutionary and highly sustainable. AI can overcome the challenges faced by weak health systems by detecting epidemic signals much earlier than traditional surveillance. AI-based digital surveillance is an adjunct to—not a replacement of—traditional surveillance and can trigger early investigation, diagnostics and responses at the regional level. This narrative review focuses on the role of AI in epidemic surveillance and summarises several current epidemic intelligence systems including ProMED-mail, HealthMap, Epidemic Intelligence from Open Sources, BlueDot, Metabiota, the Global Biosurveillance Portal, Epitweetr and EPIWATCH. Not all of these systems are AI-based, and some are only accessible to paid users. Most systems have large volumes of unfiltered data; only a few can sort and filter data to provide users with curated intelligence. However, uptake of these systems by public health authorities, who have been slower to embrace AI than their clinical counterparts, is low. The widespread adoption of digital open-source surveillance and AI technology is needed for the prevention of serious epidemics.

Formal infectious disease surveillance in Ukraine has been disrupted by Russia's 2022 invasion, leading to challenges with tracking and containing epidemics. To analyze the effects of the war on infectious disease epidemiology, we used open-source data from EPIWATCH, an artificial intelligence early-warning system. We analyzed patterns of infectious diseases and syndromes before (November 1, 2021-February 23, 2022) and during (February 24-July 31, 2022) the conflict. We compared case numbers for the most frequently reported diseases with numbers from formal sources and found increases in overall infectious disease reports and in case numbers of cholera, botulism, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, rabies, and salmonellosis during compared with before the invasion. During the conflict, although open-source intelligence captured case numbers for epidemics, such data (except for diphtheria) were unavailable/underestimated by formal surveillance. In the absence of formal surveillance during military conflicts, open-source data provide epidemic intelligence useful for infectious disease control.

Influenza outbreaks pose a significant threat to global public health. Traditional surveillance systems and simple algorithms often struggle to predict influenza outbreaks in an accurate and timely manner. Big data and modern technology have offered new modalities for disease surveillance and prediction. Influenza-like illness can serve as a valuable surveillance tool for emerging respiratory infectious diseases like influenza and COVID-19, especially when reported case data may not fully reflect the actual epidemic curve. This study aimed to develop a predictive model for influenza outbreaks by combining Baidu search query data with traditional virological surveillance data. The goal was to improve early detection and preparedness for influenza outbreaks in both northern and southern China, providing evidence for supplementing modern intelligence epidemic surveillance methods. We collected virological data from the National Influenza Surveillance Network and Baidu search query data from January 2011 to July 2018, totaling 3,691,865 and 1,563,361 respective samples. Relevant search terms related to influenza were identified and analyzed for their correlation with influenza-positive rates using Pearson correlation analysis. A distributed lag nonlinear model was used to assess the lag correlation of the search terms with influenza activity. Subsequently, a predictive model based on the gated recurrent unit and multiple attention mechanisms was developed to forecast the influenza-positive trend. This study revealed a high correlation between specific Baidu search terms and influenza-positive rates in both northern and southern China, except for 1 term. The search terms were categorized into 4 groups: essential facts on influenza, influenza symptoms, influenza treatment and medicine, and influenza prevention, all of which showed correlation with the influenza-positive rate. The influenza prevention and influenza symptom groups had a lag correlation of 1.4-3.2 and 5.0-8.0 days, respectively. The Baidu search terms could help predict the influenza-positive rate 14-22 days in advance in southern China but interfered with influenza surveillance in northern China. Complementing traditional disease surveillance systems with information from web-based data sources can aid in detecting warning signs of influenza outbreaks earlier. However, supplementation of modern surveillance with search engine information should be approached cautiously. This approach provides valuable insights for digital epidemiology and has the potential for broader application in respiratory infectious disease surveillance. Further research should explore the optimization and customization of search terms for different regions and languages to improve the accuracy of influenza prediction models.

Background Public health intelligence (PHI) allows for timely detection of public health threats. Exchange and close cooperation between PHI teams are crucial for early threat detection and standards harmonization, yet a comprehensive overview documenting their activities is lacking. We aimed to enhance mutual awareness and collaboration possibilities by mapping and characterizing PHI teams. Methods We developed and distributed an online survey through network sampling (June-November 2023) via regional Centres for Disease Prevention and Control (Africa CDC, ECDC, US CDC), the International Association of National Public Health Institutes (IANPHI), the Robert Koch-Institute, and the World Health Organization (WHO). We identified and described PHI teams and their activities, including implementation of PHI processes, workforce, capacity building, priorities and perspectives on challenges and opportunities, by WHO regions and type of institution. Results We identified 132 PHI teams from 87 countries in all regions, primarily in public health institutions (40%, 53/132) and ministries (27%, 35/132). Potential public health threats are monitored at national (39%, 51/132), international (20%, 26/132), and both levels (42%, 55/132). Most teams (89%, 114/128) integrate indicator-based and event-based surveillance. Teams focus mainly on human communicable diseases (95%, 125/132), healthcare-associated infections/antimicrobial resistance (66%, 87/132) and health in natural disasters (64%, 85/132). Nearly half of the teams (43%, 50/117) are not part of early event detection networks. All teams based in regional public health institutions (7/7) and United Nations (UN) institutions (10/10) are able to scale up their activities if needed. More than half of the teams (59%, 71/120) provide training activities on early detection. There is a strong interest in capacity building and networking. Conclusion PHI teams worldwide perform partially overlapping tasks, suggesting benefits from broader exchange. The interest in trainings and networking underscores the need for platforms supporting exchange, peer-to-peer cooperation and capacity building. International partner institutions are key in fostering global development of PHI.

Epidemic intelligence activities are undertaken by the WHO Regional Office for Africa to support member states in early detection and response to outbreaks to prevent the international spread of diseases. We reviewed epidemic intelligence activities conducted by the organisation from 2017 to 2020, processes used, key results and how lessons learned can be used to strengthen preparedness, early detection and rapid response to outbreaks that may constitute a public health event of international concern. A total of 415 outbreaks were detected and notified to WHO, using both indicator-based and event-based surveillance. Media monitoring contributed to the initial detection of a quarter of all events reported. The most frequent outbreaks detected were vaccine-preventable diseases, followed by food-and-water-borne diseases, vector-borne diseases and viral haemorrhagic fevers. Rapid risk assessments generated evidence and provided the basis for WHO to trigger operational processes to provide rapid support to member states to respond to outbreaks with a potential for international spread. This is crucial in assisting member states in their obligations under the International Health Regulations (IHR) (2005). Member states in the region require scaled-up support, particularly in preventing recurrent outbreaks of infectious diseases and enhancing their event-based surveillance capacities with automated tools and processes.

Epidemic Intelligence (EI) encompasses all activities related to early identification, verification, analysis, assessment, and investigation of health threats. It integrates an indicator-based (IBS) component using systematically collected surveillance data, and an event-based component (EBS), using non-official, non-verified, non-structured data from multiple sources. We described current EI practices in Europe by conducting a survey of national Public Health (PH) and Animal Health (AH) agencies. We included generic questions on the structure, mandate and scope of the institute, on the existence and coordination of EI activities, followed by a section where respondents provided a description of EI activities for three diseases out of seven disease models. Out of 81 gatekeeper agencies from 41 countries contacted, 34 agencies (42%) from 26 (63%) different countries responded, out of which, 32 conducted EI activities. Less than half (15/32; 47%) had teams dedicated to EI activities and 56% (18/34) had Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in place. On a national level, a combination of IBS and EBS was the most common data source. Most respondents monitored the epidemiological situation in bordering countries, the rest of Europe and the world. EI systems were heterogeneous across countries and diseases. National IBS activities strongly relied on mandatory laboratory-based surveillance systems. The collection, analysis and interpretation of IBS information was performed manually for most disease models. Depending on the disease, some respondents did not have any EBS activity. Most respondents conducted signal assessment manually through expert review. Cross-sectoral collaboration was heterogeneous. More than half of the responding institutes collaborated on various levels (data sharing, communication, etc.) with neighbouring countries and/or international structures, across most disease models. Our findings emphasise a notable engagement in EI activities across PH and AH institutes of Europe, but opportunities exist for better integration, standardisation, and automatization of these efforts. A strong reliance on traditional IBS and laboratory-based surveillance systems, emphasises the key role of in-country laboratories networks. EI activities may benefit particularly from investments in cross-border collaboration, the development of methods that can automatise signal assessment in both IBS and EBS data, as well as further investments in the collection of EBS data beyond scientific literature and mainstream media.

Recent public health emergencies, including the COVID-19 pandemic, MERS, and Avian Influenza outbreaks, underscore the need for effective surveillance systems for respiratory pathogens with epidemic and pandemic potential. In 2022, WHO initiated a project to help national public health professionals identify and address gaps in coordinating multiple surveillance systems for early detection and monitoring of viral respiratory events. The project involved developing country-specific approaches to address these gaps and identifying generalizable best practices. WHO headquarters collaborated with the WHO Regional Office for Africa (AFRO) to select three pilot countries: South Africa, Togo, and the United Republic of Tanzania. Each country conducted a landscape assessment of relevant surveillance activities followed by national workshops to discuss coordination, collaboration, and strengthening of Public Health Intelligence (PHI) for respiratory surveillance. National workshops were held in Dar es Salaam (United Republic of Tanzania), Kpalimè (Togo), and Johannesburg (South Africa), bringing together professionals from various domains and sectors. The workshops highlighted system-specific and cross-cutting challenges and best practices related to respiratory surveillance. These findings informed a stakeholder workshop at the WHO Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence in Berlin on 24–25 July 2024, which convened stakeholders from WHO headquarters, WHO AFRO, US CDC, and representatives from the pilot countries. The workshop underscored the critical importance of coordination and collaboration in respiratory surveillance. By integrating multiple surveillance systems and fostering cross-sectoral communication, countries can enhance their ability to detect and respond to respiratory pathogens with epidemic and pandemic potential. The shared best practices and recommendations provide a valuable framework for strengthening global health security and preparedness.

This research letter introduces readers to health intelligence by conceptualizing critical components and providing a primer for research within political science broadly considered. Accordingly, a brief review of the literature is provided, concluding with possible future research agendas. The aim is to elaborate on the importance of public health intelligence to national security studies, and to political science more generally.

Since 1951, the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS) of the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has trained physicians, nurses, scientists, veterinarians, and other allied health professionals in applied epidemiology. To understand the program’s effect on graduates’ leadership outcomes, we examined the EIS alumni representation in five select leadership positions. These positions were staffed by 353 individuals, of which 185 (52%) were EIS alumni. Among 12 CDC directors, four (33%) were EIS alumni. EIS alumni accounted for 29 (58%) of the 50 CDC center directors, 61 (35%) of the 175 state epidemiologists, 27 (56%) of the 48 Field Epidemiology Training Program resident advisors, and 70 (90%) of the 78 Career Epidemiology Field Officers. Of the 185 EIS alumni in leadership positions, 136 (74%) were physicians, 22 (12%) were scientists, 21 (11%) were veterinarians, 6 (3%) were nurses, and 94 (51%) were assigned to a state or local health department. Among the 61 EIS alumni who served as state epidemiologists, 40 (66%) of them were assigned to a state or local health department during EIS. Our evaluation suggests that epidemiology training programs can serve as a vital resource for the public health workforce, particularly given the capacity strains brought to light by the COVID-19 pandemic.