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In many real-life house allocation problems, rents are bounded from above by price ceilings imposed by a government or a local administration. This is known as rent control. Because some price equilibria may be disqualified given such restrictions, this paper proposes an alternative equilibrium concept, called rationing price equilibrium, tailored to capture the specific features of housing markets with rent control. An allocation rule that always selects a rationing price equilibrium is defined, and it is demonstrated to be constrained efficient and (group) non-manipulable for \"almost all\" preference profiles. In its bounding cases, the rule reduces to a number of well-known mechanisms from the matching literature. In this sense, the housing market with rent control investigated in this paper integrates several of the predominant matching models into a more general framework.

We study dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and arrival of exogenous events, which represent arrival of traders or information. We characterize the unique limit of stationary equilibria with frequent offers. The possibility of arrivals changes equilibrium dynamics. There is delay in equilibrium, and the seller slowly screens out buyers with higher valuations. The seller payoff equals what he can achieve by simply awaiting an arrival. In applications, when buyer valuations fall, average prices drop and delay increases. Surplus division depends on relative arrival rates of buyers/sellers and expected time to trade is a nonmonotonic function of the arrival rate.

In the theoretical literature on consumer search, one conclusion is nearly universal: as buyers become better able to observe and compare prices ex ante, sellers will set lower prices in equilibrium. In this paper, I examine a standard consumer search model with one small -- yet often relevant -- additional restriction: I assume that sellers are capacity constrained. In this environment, I illustrate that the conventional wisdom regarding information and prices does not necessarily hold: having more informed consumers can lead to a decrease in prices, have no effect at all, or even lead to an increase in prices.

Carbon pricing, such as a carbon tax, is an invisible hand that leads to the construction of a sustainable low-carbon society, and precise analysis of the impact of carbon pricing on each sector of the economy is indispensable for its design. In this study, an equilibrium price model based on the 2015 input-output table was used for the analysis of next-generation energy systems (2015 IONGES) and the effect of the introduction of a carbon tax on the price of the industrial sector was assessed. Based on the existing energy-related tax system in Japan, the introduction of a carbon tax is regarded as an increase in the tax for global-warming countermeasures (TGWC) in the petroleum and coal tax (PCT). While existing energy-related taxes are designed to place a relatively heavy burden on the transportation sector, tax reform of the petroleum and coal tax has a relatively large effect on raising prices in energy-conversion and energy-intensive sectors. As a result, the reform of the energy-related tax may promote the introduction of energy-saving technology and decarbonization technology, both in the transportation sector and in a wider range of sectors, and may work to correct the unfairness of the tax burden between sectors.

I present an ordered-search model that, in contrast with random-search models, yields an intuitively appealing equilibrium in which there is price dispersion, prices and profits decline in the order of search and consumers with lower search costs search longer and obtain better deals. These features of the search equilibrium hold regardless of whether consumers are informed of prices prior to searching.

We examine an oligopoly model where some consumers engage in costly non-sequential search to discover prices. There are three distinct price-dispersed equilibria characterized by low, moderate and high search intensity. The effects of an increase in the number of firms on search behaviour, expected prices, price dispersion and welfare are sensitive (i) to the equilibrium consumers' search intensity, and (ii) to the status quo number of firms. For instance, when consumers search with low intensity, an increase in the number of firms reduces search, does not affect expected price, leads to greater price dispersion and reduces welfare. In contrast, when consumers search with high intensity, increased competition results in more search and lower prices when the number of competitors in the market is low to begin with, but in less search and higher prices when the number of competitors is large. Duopoly yields identical expected price and price dispersion but higher welfare than an infinite number of firms.

A large number of empirical studies find that trading volume contains information about the distribution of future returns. While these studies indicate that observing volume is helpful to an outside observer of the economy it is not clear how investors within the economy can learn from trading volume. In this paper, I show how trading volume helps investors to evaluate the precision of the aggregate information in the price. I construct a model that offers a closed-form solution of a rational expectations equilibrium where all investors learn from (1) private signals, (2) the market price, and (3) aggregate trading volume.

We show that there is no discrete-time price-adjustment mechanism (any process that at each period looks at the history of prices and excess demands and updates the prices) such that for any market (a set of goods and consumers with endowments and strictly concave utilities) the price-adjustment mechanism will achieve excess demands that are at most an ε fraction of the total supply within a number of periods that is polynomial in the number of goods and Formula . This holds even if one restricts markets so that excess demand functions are differentiable with derivatives bounded by a small constant. For the convergence time to the actual price equilibrium, we show by a different method a stronger result: Even in the case of three goods with a unique price equilibrium, there is no function of ε that bounds the number of periods needed by a price-adjustment mechanism to arrive at a set of prices that is ε-close to the equilibrium.

We model a dynamic, competitive market, where in every period, risk-neutral traders trade a one-period bond against an infinitely lived asset, with limited short-selling of the long-term asset. Traders lack structural knowledge and use different \"incomplete theories,\" all of which give statistically correct beliefs about next period's market price of the long-term asset. The more theories there are in the market, the higher is the equilibrium price of the long-term asset. Investors with more complete theories do not necessarily earn higher returns than those with less complete ones, who can earn above the risk-free rate. We provide two necessary conditions for a trader to earn above the risk-free rate.