Explore the vast range of titles available.

To be called a relativist, especially a moral relativist, is to be condemned as someone who holds that “anything goes”. Frequently the term is part of a dichotomy: either accept relativism or accept universalism: the view that only one true morality exists. This book defends a new version of relativism that is both an alternative to, and fits between, universalism and relativism as usually defined. Pluralistic relativism does accord with one aspect of relativism as usually defined: there is no single true morality. Beyond that, it is argued that there can be a plurality of true moralities, moralities that exist across different traditions and cultures, all of which address facets of the same problem: how we are to live well together. A comparative and naturalistic approach is applied to the understanding of moralities, with discussion of a wide array of positions and texts within the Western canon as well as in Chinese philosophy, and drawing on not only philosophy, but also psychology, evolutionary theory, history, and literature in making a case for the importance of pluralism in moral life and in establishing the virtues of acceptance and accommodation. A central theme is that there is no single value or principle or ordering of values and principles that offers a uniquely true path for human living, but variations according to different contexts that carry within them a common core of human values. We should thus be modest about our own morality, learn from other approaches, and accommodate different practices in our pluralistic society.

In this book, William Talbott builds on the work of J.S. Mill, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas to develop a new equilibrium model for moral reasoning, in which moral reasoning is primarily bottom-up, from judgments about particular actual and hypothetical cases to norms or principles that best explain the particular judgments. Employing the equilibrium model, Talbott builds on the work of John Rawls, Amartya Sen, and Henry Shue to explain how, over the course of history, human beings have learned to adopt a distinctively moral standpoint from which it is possible to make reliable, though not infallible, universal judgments of right and wrong. He explains how this distinctively moral standpoint has led to the discovery of the moral importance of nine basic human rights. The book is constructed around pivotal examples. Talbott uses the example of Bartolomé de Las Casas and his opposition to the Spanish colonists’ treatment of the American natives in the 16th century to illustrate the possibility of attaining a universal moral standpoint. He uses the example of the development of women's rights as a microcosm of the development of basic human rights. He argues that assertions of basic human rights are almost always a response to oppressive norms justified by self-reinforcing paternalism. Talbott uses examples from Marxist dictatorships to show the importance of basic human rights in solving what he refers to as the reliable feedback problem and the appropriate responsiveness problem for governments. He uses Sen’s research on famines and psychological research on the ultimatum game and other related games to explain how individual fairness judgments from the moral standpoint make rights-respecting democracies self-improving self-regulating systems that become more just over time. Undoubtedly, the most controversial issue raised by the claim of universal human rights is the issue of moral relativism. How can the advocate of universal rights avoid being a moral imperialist? In this book, Talbott shows how to defend basic individual rights from a universal moral point of view that is not imperialistic. Talbott avoids moral imperialism, first, by insisting that all of us, himself included, have moral blindspots and that we usually depend on others to help us to identify those blindspots; second, by emphasizing the importance of avoiding moral paternalism. In the book, Talbott develops a new consequentialist account of the importance of the basic human rights, which he employs to augment the more familiar nonconsequentialist accounts.

Drawing on moral disengagement theory, this study examined the interplay of perceived market competition threat, fear of failure, moral relativism, and moral disengagement. Perceived competitive threat was proposed to be positively related to moral disengagement, and fear of failure was proposed to mediate the relationship between perceived competitive threat and moral disengagement. Furthermore, moral relativism was anticipated to have a moderating effect on the direct and indirect relationships (via fear of failure) between perceived competitive threat and moral disengagement. The hypothesized relationships were examined using self-report survey data collected from 393 employees in the financial sector in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan. Structural equation modeling and bootstrap analysis techniques were used to test the articulated hypotheses. The results were consistent with our proposed hypotheses. The findings offer theoretical and practical implications that are discussed at the end.

What role does reason play in determining what, if anything, is morally right? What role does morality play in law? Perhaps the most controversial answer to these fundamental questions is that reason supports a supreme principle of both morality and legality. The contributors to this book cast a fresh critical eye over the coherence of modern approaches to ethical rationalism within law and reflect on the intellectual history on which it builds. The contributors then take the debate beyond the traditional concerns of legal theory into areas such as the relationship between morality and international law, and the impact of ethically controversial medical and technological innovations on legal understanding.

The idea of moral progress played a central role in liberal political thought from the Enlightenment through the nineteenth century but is rarely encountered in moral and political philosophical discourse today. One reason for this is that traditional liberal theorists of moral progress, like their conservative detractors, tended to rely on underevidenced assumptions about human psychology and society. For the first time in history, we are developing robust scientific knowledge about human nature, especially through empirical psychological theories of morality and culture that are informed by evolutionary theory. In addition, the social sciences now provide better information about which social arrangements are feasible and sustainable and about how social norms arise, change, and come to shape moral thought and behavior. Accordingly, it is time to revisit the question of moral progress. On the surface, evolutionary accounts of morality paint a pessimistic picture, suggesting that certain types of moral progress are unrealistic or inappropriate for beings like us. In brief, humans are said to be “hard-wired” for rather limited moral capacities. However, such a view overlooks the great plasticity of human morality as evidenced by our history of social and political moral achievements. To account for these changes while giving evolved moral psychology its due, we develop a dynamic, biocultural theory of moral progress that highlights the interaction between adaptive components of moral psychology and the cultural construction of moral norms and beliefs; and we explore how this interaction can advance, impede, and reverse moral progress.

The role of affective ties and informal social networks in management practices is recognised across many parts of the world; guanxi in China, yongo in Korea, blat in Russia and wasta in the Arab World are some manifestations. This paper explores the role of such informal networks in Pakistan by studying the role of sifarish—the act of achieving ends on the basis of network connections—in hiring in Pakistan using thematic analysis of inductively collected qualitative data from 104 individuals from four large organisations. Using social network and social capital theory, the paper highlights the key characteristics of affective networks in Pakistan, comparing them to social networks in other cultural settings. Further, the concept of ethical relativism is used to create a distinction between ethical and unethical sifarish. Thus, the paper enhances understanding of HRM in Pakistan, and contributes towards the literature on cross-cultural HRM, social networks and ethical relativism.

Universities continue to offer international students opportunities to study abroad and gain an education in a highly ranked, world-recognised system, providing exposure to a broad cultural experience. While students cite that gaining exposure to a culturally different experience enhances study opportunities, there are also deeper considerations in globalised education. It is important to recognise that diverse classrooms may experience philosophical dichotomies. As business education across the world is increasingly using the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to underpin programmes that also address sustainability, these dichotomies cannot be ignored. This paper explores how educators must be aware of how complex culturally referenced norms are questioned when SDGs are incorporated into programmes. Using an action learning cycle of observation, action, and results, and drawing upon the example of teaching ethics and SDGs to large cohorts of international university students, we explain how transformative learning can occur without students feeling judged for past practices and experiences that are situated in culturally accepted norms that breach the SDGs. This paper thus provides practical ideas for teaching SDGs and includes the importance of understanding culturally referenced norms in light of the SDGs when teaching international students.

For most of the church's history, people have seen Christian ethics as normative and universally applicable. Recently, however, this view has been lost, thanks to naturalism and relativism. R. Scott Smith argues that Christians need to overcome Kant's fact-value dichotomy and recover the possibility of genuine moral and theological knowledge.