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Why are politicians able to form electoral coalitions that bridge ethnic divisions in some countries and not others? This book answers this question by presenting a theory of pecuniary coalition building in multi-ethnic countries governed through patronage. Focusing on sub-Saharan Africa, the book explains how the relative autonomy of business from state-controlled capital affects political bargaining among opposition politicians in particular. While incumbents form coalitions by using state resources to secure cross-ethnic endorsements, opposition politicians must rely on the private resources of business to do the same. This book combines cross-national analyses of African countries with in-depth case studies of Cameroon and Kenya to show that incumbents actively manipulate financial controls to prevent business from supporting their opposition. It demonstrates that opposition politicians are more likely to coalesce across ethnic cleavages once incumbents have lost their ability to blackmail the business sector through financial reprisals. Summary reprinted by permission of Cambridge University Press

In the recent past, scholars have delved into the challenges African countries face in establishing Western-style democracy, often overlooking the insights provided by literary works. Most political and social science writers attribute these challenges to corruption, ethnic mobilization, and illiteracy (Forson et al. 2016). However, little attention has been given to the similarities between colonial structures and post-independent African autocracies as delineated in literary works. The pioneer modern states in Africa emerged during colonialism and were inherently authoritarian, with aims inconsistent with democratic principles. While early Black thinkers highlight colonial violence as a key aspect to mimic for Africa’s liberation, contemporary scholarship has paid little attention to imitation of other colonial elements such as negative ethnicity, autocracy, corruption, political assassinations, and murders in literary works. This study examines the nexus between poor governance and colonial heritage as represented in Ayi Kwei Armah’s The Beautiful One Are Not Yet Born (1968), Brian Chikwava’s Harare North (2009), and David Mulwa’s Inheritance (2005). This analytical study was carried out on the three African works of fiction and drama to interrogate the impact of colonial heritage on the sparse democratic gains and poor governance in sub-Saharan Africa today. The primary texts were purposively sampled because of the prevalence of the subject. Using qualitative inquiry, I deploy narrative research to analyze data from primary and secondary texts. The study was anchored in Homi Bhabha’s postcolonial concept of mimicry as a theoretical base for interpretation.

A number of developing countries have been experiencing high rates of ethnic fragmentation, corruption and political instability. The persistent poverty in many of these countries has led to an increased interest among both researchers and policy makers as to how these factors impact a country’s economic growth. Previous research has found mixed results as to whether ethnic fragmentation, corruption and political instability affect economic growth. However, this research has been focused on the direct impact of these variables on growth. This paper innovates by empirically modelling the impact of ethnic fractionalization and corruption on economic growth, both directly and indirectly through their role in affecting political stability. The analyses also add to the literature by testing a new data set with both fixed effects and GMM estimators. Results from a large panel data set of 157 countries from 1996–2014 finds that ethnic fractionalization and corruption negatively impact economic growth indirectly by increasing political instability, which has a negative direct effect on economic growth. Once the indirect effects are accounted for, ethnic fractionalization has no significant direct effect on growth. There is weak evidence to suggest that corruption may, in some countries, actually have a positive direct effect on growth by enabling firms to circumvent bureaucratic red tape, consistent with the “greasing the wheels” hypothesis. These results emphasize the importance of establishing strong institutions which are able to accommodate diverse groups and maintain political stability. Additional results find these implications to be particularly relevant for low-income and/or sub-Saharan African countries. The results also suggest that a country having a wide diversity of languages and religions need not be a hindrance to economic growth if a robust political system is in place.

This edited collection of essays answers a basic question posed by contemporary discourse on state building: How might people's identification with a particular ethnic group matter?.

Ethnic differences in demographic behavior tend to be disguised behind analytically opaque labels like \"district\" or \"region,\" or else subjected to simplistic cultural explanations. Drawing on new political economy, sociological theory and the political science literature on sub-Saharan Africa, this article proposes an alternative explanatory model and tests it empirically with reference to Kenya. Access to political power and, through power, access to a state's resources-including resources devoted to clinics, schools, labor opportunities, and other determinants of demographic behavior-are advanced as the key factors underlying ethnic differences. District-level estimates of \"political capital\" are introduced and merged with two waves of Demographic and Health Survey data. The effects on models of contraceptive use are explored. Results confirm that measures of political capital explain residual ethnic differences in use, providing strong support for a political approach to the analysis of demographic behavior.