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11,180
result(s) for
"European Central Bank."
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The European rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF lending to Central and Eastern European countries
2014
The global financial crisis has transformed the relationship between the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU). Until the crisis, the IMF had not lent to EU member states in decades, but now the two organisations closely coordinate their lending policies. In the Latvian and Romanian programmes, the IMF and the EU advocated different loan terms. Surprisingly, the EU embraced 'Washington Consensus'-style measures more willingly than did the IMF, which much of the contemporary literature still portrays as an across-the-board promoter of orthodox macroeconomic policies. We qualify this stereotypical characterisation by arguing from a constructivist perspective that the degree of an organisation's autonomy from its members depends on the interpretation of its mandate. IMF staff viewed the Fund's technical mandate as an opportunity to react rather flexibly to the challenges of the latest crisis. By contrast, European Commission, as well as European Central Bank (ECB), staff interpreted the vast body of supranational rules as necessitating stricter adherence to economic orthodoxy. Thus, IMF lending policies were more flexible and, at least on fiscal issues, also less contractionary.
Journal Article
ECB banking supervision and beyond : report of a CEPS Task Force
With publication of the results of its Comprehensive Assessment at the end of October 2014, the European Central Bank has set the standard for its new mandate as supervisor. But this was only the beginning. The heavy work started in early November, with the day-to-day supervision of the 120 most significant banks in the eurozone under the Single Supervisory Mechanism. The centralisation of the supervision in the eurozone will pose a number of challenges for the ECB in the coming months and years ahead. This report analyses these challenges in detail, drawing on the discussions and presentations in the CEPS Task Force on ECB Banking Supervision, and reinforced by extensive research undertaken by the rapporteur.
Intensity of Judicial Review of the European Central Banks’s Supervisory Decisions
by
Magliari, Andrea
in
complex economic assessment, Court of Justice of the EU, European Central Bank, supervisory decisions, intensity of judicial review, leverage ratio, margin of discretion
2019
A few years after the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the General Court of the European Union, in its new supervisory role, annulled for the first time the decisions adopted by the European Central Bank (ECB). These judgments are of particular interest because they allow a preliminary investigation of the intensity of judicial review of the ECB’s discretionary choices in the field of banking supervision. This article claims that the first case law of the General Court points to several interesting developments and indicates the resolve to carry out a judicial review which, although adhering strictly to the “limited review” standard, does not shy away from developing judicial techniques to ensure a more incisive scrutiny of the discretion enjoyed by the ECB. Despite the novelty of the issues brought to the attention of the EU judges, it seems possible as a result of this study to envisage, on the one hand, a gradual alignment of the scrutiny of supervisory decisions with those emerged in relation to the Commission’s decisions on competition matters. On the other hand, a differentiation from the “light touch” approach adopted in the field of monetary policy can be observed.
Journal Article
The alchemists : inside the secret world of central bankers
2013
\"When the first rumblings of the coming financial crisis were heard in August 2007, three men who were never elected to public office suddenly became the most powerful men in the world. They were the leaders of the world's three most important central banks: Ben Bernanke of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Mervyn King of the Bank of England, and Jean-Claude Trichet of the European Central Bank. Over the next five years, they and their fellow central bankers deployed trillions of dollars, pounds and euros to try and contain the waves of panic that threatened to bring down the global financial system. Neil Irwin's The Alchemists is both a gripping account of the most intense exercise in economic crisis management we've ever seen, and an insightful examination of the role and power of the central bank. It begins in Stockholm, Sweden, in the seventeenth century, where central banking had its rocky birth, and then progresses through a brisk but dazzling tutorial on how the central banker came to exert such vast influence over our world. It is the story of how these figures and institutions became what they are - the possessors of extraordinary power over our collective fate. What they chose to do with those powers is the heart of the story Irwin tells. Irwin covered the financial crisis for the Washington Post, enjoying privileged access to leading central bankers and the people close to them. His account, based on reporting that took place in 27 cities in 11 countries, is the holistic, truly global story of the central bankers' role in the world economy we have been missing. It is a landmark reckoning with central bankers and their power, with the great financial crisis of our time, and with the history of the relationship between capitalism and the state. Definitive, revelatory, and riveting, The Alchemists shows us where money comes from--and where it may well be going.\"--Publisher's description.
Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?
2016
We analyze lender of last resort (LOLR) lending during the European sovereign debt crisis. Using a novel data set on all central bank lending and collateral, we show that weakly capitalized banks took out more LOLR loans and used riskier collateral than strongly capitalized banks. We also find that weakly capitalized banks used LOLR loans to buy risky assets such as distressed sovereign debt. This resulted in a reallocation of risky assets from strongly to weakly capitalized banks. Our findings cannot be explained by classical LOLR theory. Rather, they point to risk taking by banks, both independently and with the encouragement of governments, and highlight the benefit of unifying LOLR lending and bank supervision.
Journal Article
Quantitative Easing and Unconventional Monetary Policy - an Introduction
2012
This article assesses the impact of Quantitative Easing and other unconventional monetary policies followed by central banks in the wake of the financial crisis that began in 2007. We consider the implications of theoretical models for the effectiveness of asset purchases and look at the evidence from a range of empirical studies. We also provide an overview of the contributions of the other articles in this Feature.
Journal Article
Making the European monetary union : the role of the Committee of Central Bank Governors and the origins of the European Central Bank
by
European Central Bank
,
Draghi, Mario
,
James, Harold
in
Banking system
,
Economic and Monetary Union
,
Economic integration
2012
Intro -- Contents -- List of Figures -- Foreword by Mario Draghi and Jaime Caruana -- Abbreviations Used in Text -- Introduction: The Making of a Non-National Currency -- 1. A Napoleonic Prelude -- 2. The Origins of the Committee of Governors -- 3. The Response to Global Monetary Turbulence -- 4. The Snake and Other Animals -- 5. Negotiating the European Monetary System -- 6. The Malaise of the 1980s -- 7. The Delors Committee and the Relaunching of Europe -- 8. Designing a Central Bank -- 9. The EMS Crises -- Conclusion: The Euro and the Legacy of the Committee of Governors -- Appendix A: Maastricht Treaty Text and Committee of Governors' Draft of the Statute of the European Monetary Institute -- Appendix B: Maastricht Treaty Text and Committee of Governors' Draft of the Statute of the European Central Bank -- Appendix C: Dramatis Personae -- Appendix D: Members of the Committee of Governors -- Appendix E: Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union (Delors Committee), 1988- 1989 -- Appendix F: Chairmen of the Monetary Committee of the European Community, 1958- 1998 -- Appendix G: European Commission Presidents and Commissioners for Economics and Finance, 1958- -- Appendix H: Chronology -- Appendix I: Interest Rates and Fiscal Balance -- Notes -- Acknowledgments -- Index.
The Euro Interbank Repo Market
by
Mancini, Loriano
,
Ranaldo, Angelo
,
Wrampelmeyer, Jan
in
2006-2013
,
Bank collateral
,
Bank liquidity
2016
The search for a market design that ensures stable bank funding is at the top of regulators' policy agenda. This paper empirically shows that the central counterparty (CCP)-based euro interbank repo market features this stability. Using a unique and comprehensive data set, we show that the market is resilient during crisis episodes and may even act as a shock absorber, in the sense that repo lending increases with risk, while spreads, maturities, and haircuts remain stable. Our comparison across different repo markets shows that anonymous CCP-based trading, safe collateral, and the absence of an unwind mechanism are the key characteristics to ensure market resilience.
Journal Article
Writing Clearly: ECB's Monetary Policy Communication
by
Ales Bulir
,
Martin Cihák
,
Katerina Smídková
in
Banks and banking, Central
,
Central Bank Policy
,
Communication
2008
The paper presents a methodology for measuring the clarity of central bank communication, illustrating it with the case of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 1999-2007. The analysis identifies the ECB's written communication as clear about 95 percent of instances, which is comparable to, or even better than, other central banks for which a similar analysis is available. We also find that the additional information contained in the ECB's Monthly Bulletins helps to improve communication clarity compared to ECB's press releases. In particular, the Bulletins contain useful clarifying information on individual inflation factors and the overall forecast risk; in contrast, the bulletin's communication on monetary shocks has a negative, albeit small, impact on clarity.