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Objective: The objective of this study is to investigate the applicability and enforceability of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in the context of arbitration before the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), with the aim of assessing whether CAS proceedings comply with the procedural guarantees of a fair trial, particularly in light of their quasi-mandatory nature for professional athletes.   Theoretical Framework: This research is grounded in the legal theory of human rights enforcement, international arbitration law, and the principle of procedural fairness. The work draws upon jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Swiss arbitration doctrine, and scholarly contributions regarding binding arbitration and access to justice. Jan Paulsson’s theory on the state’s role in legitimizing arbitral authority, as well as the European Court’s evolving interpretation of Article 6, provides a foundation for analyzing the legal status of CAS.   Method: The methodology adopted for this research comprises a qualitative, doctrinal legal analysis of primary legal sources (e.g., ECHR, CAS Code, Swiss arbitration laws) and case law (ECtHR and Swiss Federal Tribunal rulings). Data collection was conducted through legal document review, including academic commentary, international arbitration jurisprudence, and comparative legal frameworks. The approach is analytical and interpretive, aiming to identify how procedural rights are conceptualized and applied within CAS proceedings.   Results and Discussion: The results revealed that CAS, although structured as a private arbitral body, performs a quasi-judicial function and is bound to uphold the guarantees of Article 6 of the ECHR. The discussion contextualizes this finding by comparing sports arbitration with traditional voluntary arbitration, highlighting the structural imbalance between athletes and sports federations. The Mutu and Pechstein judgment is examined as a turning point in recognizing CAS’s obligations under human rights law. The study also acknowledges limitations related to the limited scope of judicial review available under Swiss law.   Research Implication: The practical and theoretical implications of this research suggest that procedural safeguards in sports arbitration must be reinforced through further reforms of CAS rules and closer judicial scrutiny by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. These insights are relevant for international sports law, human rights compliance in private legal orders, and institutional governance of dispute resolution in global athletics.   Originality/Value: This study contributes to the literature by offering a focused legal analysis of CAS’s compatibility with Article 6 ECHR, emphasizing its unique status as a de facto mandatory arbitral body. The originality lies in synthesizing ECtHR and Swiss jurisprudence to assess how fundamental rights operate within a specialized, non-state adjudicative mechanism. The relevance of this research is demonstrated by its implications for athlete protections and the legitimacy of international sports governance.

Abstract The article deals with the recent decisions of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases of two Swedish midwives who claimed a right to conscientious objection to abortion under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). After giving an overview of the relevant previous case-law of the Court, I argue that the decisions of inadmissibility in the midwives' cases are a step backwards in the promising evolution of the Court's jurisprudence that began with the judgments in the cases of Eweida and others v. the United Kingdom and Bayatyan v. Armenia. In particular, the Court's reasoning in Grimmark v. Sweden and Steen v. Sweden failed to take into consideration the existence of a European consensus and the fact that less restrictive alternatives could have reasonably accommodated the conscientious claims of the two applicants.

Abstract This contribution examines deprivation of liberty in Belgian healthcare within the frameworks of the ECHR and CRPD. We develop and apply an ECHR-based framework to demonstrate that it is not the admissions to care facilities based on Belgium's involuntary commitment law that give rise to the unjustified deprivation of liberty, but those based on representation regimes. This can be remedied by broadening Belgium's involuntary commitment law. However, doing so would go against a CRPD-based framework, which is incompatible with the ECHR; the former opposes disability-based laws. Building on the right to legal capacity and to liberty, the scope of the CRPD's approach is uncovered. It is suggested that to reconcile the two frameworks, Belgium's involuntary commitment law should be abolished, and representation regimes should be changed to avoid (rather than to justify) deprivation of liberty. Although its desirability is open for discussion, this could solve a problem that occurs worldwide.

How should one balance the freedom of expression and the prevention of violence? This article delves into the grey zone between hate speech and incitement to violence by assessing the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights in cases of allegedly dangerous speech. Rather than labelling this case law as simplistic, as some critics even within the Court have done, it is shown that the jurisprudence reveals cleavages within the Court on whether to adopt a more or less consequentialist approach on the links between speech and violence. Freedom of expression cases should preferably be assessed on the merits under Article 10 ECHR since this allows for a balancing of the various interests involved. The application of the abuse of rights clause of Article 17 ECHR is for that very reason undesirable, in addition to its inconsistent use by the Court.

The international human rights (ihr) and international minority rights (imr) regimes have very different origins. However, the two regimes converged in the 20th century, and imr are now understood to be a sub-regime of ihr. This article argues that the different historical origins of the two regimes impact how actors within each regime interpret their mission, and have resulted in institutional fragmentation within the Council of Europe. The mission of the European Court of Human Rights is the promotion and protection of democracy, whereas the Advisory Committee to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minority's mission is the preservation of minority identity. In practice, this has led to conflicting interpretations of multi-sourced equivalent norms. It is suggested that inter-institutional dialogue provides an avenue through which these conflicting interpretations can be mediated.

This article examines the relevant international law relating to informed consent to treatment for individuals with psychosocial disabilities and reflects on the protection offered in this respect by the European Convention on Human Rights (echr) and the Council of Europe Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. The article argues that while the un Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is beginning to influence case law of the European Court of Human Rights, only 'weak' protection has been afforded to people with psychosocial disabilities by the echr and the Court in relation to informed consent for medical treatment.

Calls for the adoption of an Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on National Minorities have persisted within the Council of Europe despite the adoption of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM). This article explores the potential implications of the adoption of an Additional Protocol on National Minorities to the ECHR for the FCNM. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) already has several tools that would allow it to extend protection to persons belonging to national minorities. However, as the ECtHR tends to allow States a wide margin of appreciation in cases concerning persons belonging to minorities, it is argued that the adoption of an Additional Protocol on National Minorities may not be desirable, as it has the potential to undermine the progress made by the Framework Convention Advisory Committee.

The use of proportionality and balancing by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is inconsistent and does not provide clear guidelines from which policies can be drafted that could strike a fair balance between individual rights and public interests while not impairing the essence of the rights at stake. While ad hoc and unprincipled balancing may be justified on the theoretical level, on the practical level a policymaker seeking to understand which infringements constitute clear violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is left confused. This article adds clarity to this state of bewilderment by breaking down several aspects of the ECHR rights to a fair trial into clear-cut ‘red lines’, or minimum thresholds of protection. Overstepping those could result in a violation of the right concerned. Identifying these red lines is intended to assist legislators and policymakers in drafting laws and policies that conform with the obligations of their states under the ECHR, and to instruct policymakers outside the member states of the Council of Europe. Because of its unique characteristics, as well as the volume and breadth of its case law, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR can be a lodestone for the consolidation of an international human rights community based on shared values. The unique contribution of this article is the assessment of ECtHR jurisprudence not only on its own merits, but also in comparison with the jurisprudence of other international courts.

Liberal debates on religious accommodation have so far focused on the nature of the interest upon which the right to freedom of religion is based. Liberals who oppose religious accommodation argue that there is nothing special about religious belief. Those who defend accommodation on the other hand seek to identify some property (such as conscience or deep commitments) that both religious and non-religious beliefs can share. The article seeks to develop an argument in favor of certain types of religious accommodation that is agnostic about the nature of religious belief and whether it is special in any sense. It argues that it is a mistake to think that the question of religious accommodation, as it arises in law, must necessarily turn on arguments about freedom of religion. The principle of fairness can justify legal duties to accommodate religious (and non-religious) practices, without the need to assess the character of the practice in question or the reasons for engaging in it. The article argues further that the principle of fairness can better explain why human rights courts uphold some claims for religious accommodation as reasonable, and not others.

The protection of ‘morals’ appears frequently as a limitation on the exercise of fundamental rights, both in international covenants and in constitutional charters. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights is not an exception, and ‘public morals’ may be called upon to justify the restriction of several important rights granted by the Convention, such as freedom of expression or the right to respect for private and family life. To avoid arbitrary restrictions of these rights it is important to understand the meaning of this general clause. This article aims to suggest a reading of the ‘public morals’ clause that singles out its scope and its boundaries.