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Research consistently shows that individuals with higher levels of education express lower levels of Euroskepticism. This relationship has been explained by values and skills acquired in education and by higher labor-market competitiveness. While these explanations assume a causal impact of education, previous research uses cross-sectional data. This is problematic, as students self-select into education. The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it provides a better test of the causal effect of education on Euroskepticism by using data from the Swiss Household Panel (1999-2011) that allow analyzing how Euroskepticism changes as students move through education from the age of 13 years onwards. Second, it advances theory by highlighting the role of parental socialization in explaining Euroskepticism. We argue that children of higher educated parents select into higher education and take over the pro-European attitudes of their parents. We find a strong educational divide in Euroskepticism. However, longitudinal analyses show no change in Euroskepticism as individuals pass through education. Supporting the parental-socialization hypothesis, parental Euroskeptic attitudes and education explain changes in youngsters' Euroskepticism. The results suggest that, rather than a genuine education effect, differences between educational groups are mostly a result of self selection due to family background.

Why do voters in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) vote for Euroskeptic political parties? Existing explanations of Euroskepticism suggest that those benefiting economically due to the European Union (EU) are less likely to be Euroskeptic. These approaches fail to take into account the social purpose of EU economic transfers. I argue that the minority advancement realized through EU funding drives voters toward Euroskeptic electoral options. I provide evidence of this relationship through two methods: a large-N statistical analysis and a survey experiment. The large-N analysis employs time-series, regional data from ten CEE member states. The survey experiment tests the hypothesis with a nationally representative sample of the Slovak population. Results from both methods corroborate the hypothesized relationship. Importantly, results suggest that reactionary voters may undermine the long-term institutional goals of the EU due to the short-term consequences of EU policies.

This article addresses the relationship between the salience of anti-elite/establishment rhetoric for political parties and party positions on European integration. Anti-establishment rhetoric is a feature of populism, which is increasingly influential in contemporary European politics. For populist parties across the continent, in several ways the European Union (EU) represents the pinnacle of elite-driven, establishment-based politics. Previous research has demonstrated that party EU positions are systematically related to their positions on the left–right ideological scale but that this varies from Western to Eastern Europe. Here, we show that parties that place more emphasis on anti-elite/establishment rhetoric are more likely to oppose European integration, and that this holds across the East/West geographical divide and controlling for a variety of other party characteristics.

This Article analyzes the state of democracy in the EU through the study of the European Citizens’ Initiative . The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) represents one of the main ways the European institutions chose during the making of the European Convention, and then reproduced in the Lisbon Treaty, to beat populism by bringing decision-making closer to the citizens and promoting a new legitimization of Europe’s political unity. This Article starts by arguing that if one wants to understand European versions of populism it is necessary to pay attention to the reason why “democratic deficit” and “Euroscepticism” are predominant problems that the European Union is facing. It then analyzes the implementation of the ECI and the main issues of this instrument of democratization pointing at three flaws: a) the problem of e -democracy; b) the difficulty of stimulating large participation of civil society and people for the purposes of the ECIs; c) the cumbersome role of the EU Commission and the difficulties to ensure a real participatory instrument for the European citizens. From the analysis of the ECI this Article first advocates for a more robust public sphere in Europe as indispensable ground for a supranational democracy; second, it supports the revision of the ECI procedural aspects to transform it into a viable channel for amending EU policies in a more democratic way; third, this Article participates in the debate over the brand of democracy most suited to EU governance and polity.

Do public attitudes concerning the European Union affect the speed with which member states transpose European directives? It is posited in this article that member state governments do respond to public attitudes regarding the EU when transposing European directives. Specifically, it is hypothesized that member state governments slow transposition of directives when aggregate public Euroskepticism is greater. This expectation is tested using extended Cox proportional hazard modeling and data derived from the EU’s legislative archives, the official journals of EU member states, and the Eurobarometer survey series. It is found that member state governments do slow transposition in response to higher aggregate public Euroskepticism. These findings have important implications for the study of European policy implementation, as well as for our understanding of political responsiveness in the EU.

Abstract Most studies analyze right-wing populism in the framework of the nation state, while its impact on foreign policy is understudied. This article focuses on the German Alternative for Germany (AfD) to highlight its foreign policy stance. How is the AfD deliberately operating not only nationally but also on the European level? What are their aims and goals? How has the surge in right-wing populism impacted international issues and what does the rise of the right mean for Germany's role in Europe and in world politics? In the first part of the paper, I contextualize the rise and significance of right-wing populism in Germany within the framework of social and political theory. Second, I address the AfD's position to European affairs more specifically, including its stance in the European Parliament elections in 2019. Third, I highlight key topoi of the AfD’ s position regarding the eu, the United States and nato by drawing on critical discourse analysis. The analysis shows that the AfD is aiming to redefine Germany's foreign policy consensus based on the special responsibility paradigm that has characterized Germany's foreign policy after World War II. The party is not only nationalistic in outlook but moreover aiming to revise key paradigms of Germany's foreign and European policies.

In A Community of Europeans? a thoughtful observer of the ongoing project of European integration evaluates the state of the art about European identity and European public spheres. Thomas Risse argues that integration has had profound and long-term effects on the citizens of EU countries, most of whom now have at least a secondary \"European identity\" to complement their national identities. Risse also claims that we can see the gradual emergence of transnational European communities of communication. Exploring the outlines of this European identity and of the communicative spaces, Risse sheds light on some pressing questions: What do \"Europe\" and \"the EU\" mean in the various public debates? How do European identities and transnational public spheres affect policymaking in the EU? And how do they matter in discussions about enlargement, particularly Turkish accession to the EU? What will be the consequences of the growing contestation and politicization of European affairs for European democracy? This focus on identity allows Risse to address the \"democratic deficit\" of the EU, the disparity between the level of decision making over increasingly relevant issues for peoples' lives (at the EU) and the level where politics plays itself out-in the member states. He argues that the EU's democratic deficit can only be tackled through politicization and that \"debating Europe\" might prove the only way to defend modern and cosmopolitan Europe against the increasingly forceful voices of Euroskepticism. In A Community of Europeans? , a thoughtful observer of the ongoing project of European integration evaluates the state of the art about European identity and European public spheres. Thomas Risse argues that integration has had profound and long-term effects on the citizens of EU countries, most of whom now have at least a secondary \"European identity\" to complement their national identities. Risse also claims that we can see the gradual emergence of transnational European communities of communication.Exploring the outlines of this European identity and of the communicative spaces, Risse sheds light on some pressing questions: What do \"Europe\" and \"the EU\" mean in the various public debates? How do European identities and transnational public spheres affect policymaking in the EU? And how do they matter in discussions about enlargement, particularly Turkish accession to the EU? What will be the consequences of the growing contestation and politicization of European affairs for European democracy?This focus on identity allows Risse to address the \"democratic deficit\" of the EU, the disparity between the level of decision making over increasingly relevant issues for peoples' lives (at the EU) and the level where politics plays itself out-in the member states. He argues that the EU's democratic deficit can only be tackled through politicization and that \"debating Europe\" might prove the only way to defend modern and cosmopolitan Europe against the increasingly forceful voices of Euroskepticism.

Since the 1980s, Britain’s Conservative Party has become increasingly critical of the European Union, and of the country’s membership of it. So contentious and controversial has this issue become that it was a significant factor in the downfall of three consecutive Conservative Prime Ministers, all of whom found it increasingly difficult to manage their Party in Parliament, and thereby maintain any semblance of Party unity. Initially, during the 1980s and 1990s, the intra-Party divisions were between Europhiles (pro-Europeans) and Eurosceptics, but this demarcation was subsequently superseded by a division between soft Eurosceptics and hard Eurosceptics. The development and deepening of these intra-Party divisions are attributable to a plethora of endogenous and exogenous factors, the combined and cumulative effect of which ultimately led to the ‘Brexit’ vote in the June 2016 referendum.