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"Exceptionalism"
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Evil empire : a reckoning with power
\"\"All history,\" writes Maximillian Alvarez in his contribution, \"is the history of empire--a bid for control of that greatest expanse of territory, the past.\" Evil Empire confronts these histories head-on, exploring the motivations, consequences, and surprising resiliency of empire and its narratives. Contributors grapple with the economic, technological, racial, and rhetorical elements of U.S. power and show how the effects are far-reaching and, in many ways, self-defeating. Drawing on a range of disciplines--from political science to science fiction--our authors approach the theme with imagination and urgency, animated by the desire to strengthen the fight for a better future.\"--Page 4 of cover.
Book
Reforming the World
Reforming the World offers a sophisticated account of how and why, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, American missionaries and moral reformers undertook work abroad at an unprecedented rate and scale. Looking at various organizations such as the Young Men's Christian Association and the Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, Ian Tyrrell describes the influence that the export of American values had back home, and explores the methods and networks used by reformers to fashion a global and nonterritorial empire. He follows the transnational American response to internal pressures, the European colonies, and dynamic changes in global society. Examining the cultural context of American expansionism from the 1870s to the 1920s, Tyrrell provides a new interpretation of Christian and evangelical missionary work, and he addresses America's use of \"soft power.\" He describes evangelical reform's influence on American colonial and diplomatic policy, emphasizes the limits of that impact, and documents the often idiosyncratic personal histories, aspirations, and cultural heritage of moral reformers such as Margaret and Mary Leitch, Louis Klopsch, Clara Barton, and Ida Wells. The book illustrates that moral reform influenced the United States as much as it did the colonial and quasi-colonial peoples Americans came in contact with, and shaped the architecture of American dealings with the larger world of empires through to the era of Woodrow Wilson. Investigating the wide-reaching and diverse influence of evangelical reform movements, Reforming the World establishes how transnational organizing played a vital role in America's political and economic expansion.
eBook
Logic and science
According to Ole Hjortland, Timothy Williamson, Graham Priest, and others, antiexceptionalism about logic is the view that logic “isn’t special”, but is continuous with the sciences. Logic is revisable, and its truths are neither analytic nor a priori. And logical theories are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories are. What isn’t special, we argue, is anti-exceptionalism about logic. Anti-exceptionalists disagree with one another regarding what logic and, indeed, anti-exceptionalism are, and they are at odds with naturalist philosophers of logic, who may have seemed like natural allies. Moreover, those internal battles concern well-trodden philosophical issues, and there is no hint as to how they are to be resolved on broadly scientific grounds. We close by looking at three of the founders of logic who may have seemed like obvious enemies of anti-exceptionalism—Aristotle, Frege, and Carnap—and conclude that none of their positions is clearly at odds with at least some of the main themes of antiexceptionalism. We submit that, at least at present, anti-exceptionalism is too vague or underspecified to characterize a coherent conception of logic, one that stands opposed to more traditional approaches.
Journal Article
Anti-exceptionalism about logic
Logic isn't special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn't a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy (Proc Address Am Philos Assoc 76:61–90, 2002), Priest (Doubt truth to be a liar, OUP, Oxford, 2006a, The metaphysics of logic, CUP, Cambridge, 2014, Log et Anal, 2016), Russell (Philos Stud 171:161–175, 2014, J Philos Log 0:1–11, 2015), and Williamson (Modal logic as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013b, The relevance of the liar, OUP, Oxford, 2015). Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, they disagree about which logic anti-exceptionalism supports. Williamson uses an anti-exceptionalist argument to defend classical logic, while Priest claims that his anti-exceptionalism supports nonclassical logic. This paper argues that the disagreement is due to a difference in how the parties understand logical theories. Once we reject Williamson's deflationary account of logical theories, the argument for classical logic is undercut. Instead an alternative account of logical theories is offered, on which logical pluralism is a plausible supplement to anti-exceptionalism.
Journal Article
A post-exceptionalist perspective on early American history : American Wests, global Wests, and Indian Wars
Challenging the still widely held notion that Ametrican history is somehow exceptional or unique, this book argues that early America is best understood as a settler-colonial supplanting society. As Kakel shows, this society undertook the violent theft of Indigenous land and resources on a massive scale, and was driven by a logic of elimination and a genocidal imperative to rid the new white settler living space of its existing Indigenous inhabitants.
Book
Logical epistemology, social evidence, and the a priori
The ongoing debate in logical epistemology, particularly influenced by neo-Quinean perspectives such as logical anti-exceptionalism, has greatly advanced our understanding of logical knowledge. Recently, Martin and Hjortland introduced a refined taxonomy of logical anti-exceptionalism, distinguishing between two key approaches: methodological anti-exceptionalism and Quine’s evidential naturalism, which they term “evidential anti-exceptionalism”. This article critically examines their taxonomy, with a particular focus on their preferred account of methodological anti-exceptionalism, known as logical predictivism. Martin and Hjortland argue that methodological anti-exceptionalist accounts can preserve the apriority of logic while avoiding the exceptionalist commitments traditionally associated with logical epistemology. However, this article challenges that claim, arguing that predictivism’s reliance on empirical methods for developing and testing logical theories introduces a new methodological assumption – the practice-based approach – which ultimately undermines predictivism’s ability to account for the apriority of logic. Moreover, this critique extends to other accounts within the methodological anti-exceptionalist framework, showing that they, too, fail to account for the apriority of logic adequately.
Journal Article