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Evil empire : a reckoning with power
\"\"All history,\" writes Maximillian Alvarez in his contribution, \"is the history of empire--a bid for control of that greatest expanse of territory, the past.\" Evil Empire confronts these histories head-on, exploring the motivations, consequences, and surprising resiliency of empire and its narratives. Contributors grapple with the economic, technological, racial, and rhetorical elements of U.S. power and show how the effects are far-reaching and, in many ways, self-defeating. Drawing on a range of disciplines--from political science to science fiction--our authors approach the theme with imagination and urgency, animated by the desire to strengthen the fight for a better future.\"--Page 4 of cover.
Book
Logic and science
According to Ole Hjortland, Timothy Williamson, Graham Priest, and others, antiexceptionalism about logic is the view that logic “isn’t special”, but is continuous with the sciences. Logic is revisable, and its truths are neither analytic nor a priori. And logical theories are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories are. What isn’t special, we argue, is anti-exceptionalism about logic. Anti-exceptionalists disagree with one another regarding what logic and, indeed, anti-exceptionalism are, and they are at odds with naturalist philosophers of logic, who may have seemed like natural allies. Moreover, those internal battles concern well-trodden philosophical issues, and there is no hint as to how they are to be resolved on broadly scientific grounds. We close by looking at three of the founders of logic who may have seemed like obvious enemies of anti-exceptionalism—Aristotle, Frege, and Carnap—and conclude that none of their positions is clearly at odds with at least some of the main themes of antiexceptionalism. We submit that, at least at present, anti-exceptionalism is too vague or underspecified to characterize a coherent conception of logic, one that stands opposed to more traditional approaches.
Journal Article
Anti-exceptionalism about logic
Logic isn't special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn't a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy (Proc Address Am Philos Assoc 76:61–90, 2002), Priest (Doubt truth to be a liar, OUP, Oxford, 2006a, The metaphysics of logic, CUP, Cambridge, 2014, Log et Anal, 2016), Russell (Philos Stud 171:161–175, 2014, J Philos Log 0:1–11, 2015), and Williamson (Modal logic as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013b, The relevance of the liar, OUP, Oxford, 2015). Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, they disagree about which logic anti-exceptionalism supports. Williamson uses an anti-exceptionalist argument to defend classical logic, while Priest claims that his anti-exceptionalism supports nonclassical logic. This paper argues that the disagreement is due to a difference in how the parties understand logical theories. Once we reject Williamson's deflationary account of logical theories, the argument for classical logic is undercut. Instead an alternative account of logical theories is offered, on which logical pluralism is a plausible supplement to anti-exceptionalism.
Journal Article
Logical epistemology, social evidence, and the a priori
The ongoing debate in logical epistemology, particularly influenced by neo-Quinean perspectives such as logical anti-exceptionalism, has greatly advanced our understanding of logical knowledge. Recently, Martin and Hjortland introduced a refined taxonomy of logical anti-exceptionalism, distinguishing between two key approaches: methodological anti-exceptionalism and Quine’s evidential naturalism, which they term “evidential anti-exceptionalism”. This article critically examines their taxonomy, with a particular focus on their preferred account of methodological anti-exceptionalism, known as logical predictivism. Martin and Hjortland argue that methodological anti-exceptionalist accounts can preserve the apriority of logic while avoiding the exceptionalist commitments traditionally associated with logical epistemology. However, this article challenges that claim, arguing that predictivism’s reliance on empirical methods for developing and testing logical theories introduces a new methodological assumption – the practice-based approach – which ultimately undermines predictivism’s ability to account for the apriority of logic. Moreover, this critique extends to other accounts within the methodological anti-exceptionalist framework, showing that they, too, fail to account for the apriority of logic adequately.
Journal Article
A post-exceptionalist perspective on early American history : American Wests, global Wests, and Indian Wars
Challenging the still widely held notion that Ametrican history is somehow exceptional or unique, this book argues that early America is best understood as a settler-colonial supplanting society. As Kakel shows, this society undertook the violent theft of Indigenous land and resources on a massive scale, and was driven by a logic of elimination and a genocidal imperative to rid the new white settler living space of its existing Indigenous inhabitants.
Book
Anti-exceptionalism and the justification of basic logical principles
Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the thesis that logic is not special. In this paper, I consider, and reject, a challenge to this thesis. According to this challenge, there are basic logical principles, and part of what makes such principles basic is that they are epistemically exceptional. Thus, according to this challenge, the existence of basic logical principles provides reason to reject anti-exceptionalism about logic. I argue that this challenge fails, and that the exceptionalist positions motivated by it are thus unfounded. Imake this case by disambiguating two senses of ‘basic’ and showing that, once this disambiguation is taken into account, the best reason we have for thinking that there are basic principles actually implies that those principles do not require a special epistemology. Consequently, the existence of basic logical principles provides reason to accept, rather than reject, anti-exceptionalism concerning the epistemology of logic. I conclude by explaining how an abductivist, anti-exceptionalist approach to the epistemology of logic can accommodate the notion of basic logical principles.
Journal Article