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We provide new evidence that the subjective “look of competence” rather than beauty is important for CEO selection and compensation. Our experiments, studying the facial traits of CEOs using nearly 2,000 subjects, link facial characteristics to both CEO compensation and performance. In one experiment, we use pairs of photographs and find that subjects rate CEO faces as appearing more “competent” than non-CEO faces. Another experiment matches CEOs from large firms against CEOs from smaller firms and finds large-firm CEOs look more competent. In a third experiment, subjects numerically score the facial traits of CEOs. We find competent looks are priced into CEO compensation, more so than attractiveness. Our evidence suggests this premium has a behavioral origin. First, we find no evidence that the premium is associated with superior performance. Second, we separately analyze inside and outside CEO hires and find that the competence compensation premium is driven by outside hires—the situation where first impressions are likely to be more important. This paper was accepted by Lauren Cohen, finance .

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general-interest reader. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral-hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We make two broad points. First, traditional theories find it difficult to explain the data, suggesting that compensation results from \"rent extraction\" by CEOs. However, more modern \"shareholder value\" theories, that arguably better capture the CEO setting, do deliver predictions consistent with observed practices, suggesting that these practices need not be inefficient. Second, seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup, often made for tractability or convenience, can lead to significant differences in the model's implications and conclusions on the efficiency of observed practices. We close by highlighting apparent inefficiencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research.

This study examines how the CSR committee and CSR-linked executive compensation jointly affect CSR performance as governance mechanisms. Prior studies provided mixed results on the CSR committee’s effect on CSR performance. We posit that a CSR committee has both a direct and an indirect positive effect on CSR performance, with CSR-linked compensation playing the role of mediator in the relationship. We base our analysis on a sample of 164 Canadian firms covering the period 2012–2018, for a total of 952 firm-year observations. We propose a regression-based approach for our mediation research design. Our findings reveal that CSR-linked compensation mediates the CSR committee’s positive effect on performance, but the type of mediation depends on whether the performance is social or environmental. We provide evidence of both direct and indirect effects on environmental performance but only a positive indirect effect on social performance. These results suggest that demands from the firm’s internal and external stakeholders are treated differently, with the former receiving priority.

This paper examines the effectiveness of the use of executive compensation linked to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) goals across US firms. Empirical analysis of a cross-industry sample of 746 listed companies for the period 2002-2013 showed that the use of CSR-linked compensation contracts for Named Executive Officers (NEOs) promotes CSR performance. More specifically, we found that linking NEOs' compensation to CSR goals produces positive effects in the 3rd year after adoption. As firms accumulate experience and learn how to use the system over the following eight periods, CSR performance increases monotonically. Furthermore, experience accumulated over time affects the different specifications of CSR performance asymmetrically, by reducing both environmental and social CSR concerns and increasing only environmental CSR strengths. Interestingly, we also found that the simultaneous use of other CSR-focused governance systems moderates the effect of a firm's accumulated experience in using CSR-linked executive compensation on CSR performance: the existence of a CSR committee at the board level and the public release of a CSR report are likely to have a positive moderating effect, while the purchase of a CSR audit has no moderating effect.

We establish that CEOs of companies experiencing volatile industry conditions are more likely to be dismissed. At the same time, accounting for various other factors, industry risk is unlikely to be associated with CEO compensation other than through dismissal risk. Using this identification strategy, we document that CEO turnover risk is significantly positively associated with compensation. This finding is important because job-risk-compensating wage differentials arise naturally in competitive labor markets. By contrast, the evidence rejects an entrenchment model according to which powerful CEOs have lower job risk and at the same time secure higher compensation.

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation can be used as a commitment device to pay CEOs for their revealed relative talent. We find evidence consistent with the talent-retention hypothesis, using two different approaches. First, we examine the RPE terms in compensation contracts and document features that are consistent with retention motives. Second, using a novel empirical specification for detecting RPE, we find RPE is less prevalent when CEO talent is less transferrable: Among specialist CEOs, founder CEOs, and retirement-age CEOs, as well as in industries and states where the market for CEO talent is more restrictive.

We investigate the impact of a firm’s compensation consultant choice on executive compensation by examining shifts in consultant choice stemming from a 2009 U.S. Securities Exchange Commission requirement that firms disclose fees paid to compensation consultants for both consulting and other services. We show that the disclosure rule change acted as a separating device distinguishing firms likely to have used compensation consultants to extract rents from shareholders from firms that were likely to have used consultants to optimally set pay. We conclude that not all multiservice consultants are conflicted, while not all specialist consultants are guardians of shareholder value. Our study provides a more nuanced view of the association between compensation consultant choices and executive pay. This paper was accepted by Shiva Rajgopal, accounting.

Extensive discussions on the inefficiencies of \"short-termism\" in executive compensation notwithstanding, little is known empirically about the extent of such shorttermism. We develop a novel measure of executive pay duration that reflects the vesting periods of different pay components, thereby quantifying the extent to which compensation is short-term. We calculate pay duration in various industries and document its correlation with firm characteristics. Pay duration is longer in firms with more growth opportunities, more long-term assets, greater R&D intensity, lower risk, and better recent stock performance. Longer CEO pay duration is negatively related to the extent of earnings-increasing accruals.

We investigate the economic role of proxy advisors (PAs) in the context of mandatory \"say on pay\" votes, a novel and complex item requiring significant firm-specific analysis. PAs are more likely to issue an Against recommendation at firms with poor performance and higher levels of CEO pay and do not appear to follow a \"one-size-fits-all\" approach. PAs' recommendations are the key determinant of voting outcome but the sensitivity of shareholder votes to these recommendations varies with the institutional ownership structure, and the rationale behind the recommendation, suggesting that at least some shareholders do not blindly follow these recommendations. More than half of the firms respond to the adverse shareholder vote triggered by a negative recommendation by engaging with investors and making changes to their compensation plan. However, we find no market reaction to the announcement of such changes, even when material enough to result in a favorable recommendation and vote the following year. Our findings suggest that, rather than identifying and promoting superior compensation practices, PAs' key economic role is processing a substantial amount of executive pay information on behalf of institutional investors, hence reducing their cost of making informed voting decisions. Our findings contribute to the literature on shareholder voting and the related policy debate.

Psychology research identifies extraversion as the personality trait most closely associated with leadership emergence. We examine executive extraversion, as measured by speech patterns during conference calls, and find extraverts experience significant career benefits. Controlling for executive and firm characteristics, including firm fixed effects, we find that extraverted CEOs and CFOs earn 6–9 percent higher salaries. Moreover, extraverted CEOs are less likely to experience job turnover, have longer tenures, serve on more outside boards, and hold directorships at larger firms, and extraverted CFOs are more likely to be promoted to CEO. Executive extraversion is also linked with firm outcomes. Analyzing a sample of manager transitions, we find that increases in CEO extraversion are associated with improvements in investor recognition and sales growth. Further, extraverted CEOs are associated with higher acquisition announcement returns. Our findings highlight the role of personality traits in explaining executive career and firm outcomes.