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The aim of this article is to look in a new light at the writings of Emil Cioran in which he deals with the question of faith and religion. [...]bearing in mind the fragility/difficulty/sensitivity of any interpretation, it emerges that any passage to another level of understanding is by no means a purely intellectual effort, but rather implies the assumption of the existential transformation that each text produces. Secondo me, tali interpretazioni non solo ci allontanano dalla verità, o dall'onestà che dovrebbe caratterizzare ogni testo, ma essi hanno anche un grande potenziale di (auto)rovescio. Kant teorizzerà questo concetto dicendo che l'equità (Billigkeit) non può essere contenuta nel diritto positivo, ma che appartiene all'attenta valutazione che solo il tribunale interiore dell'uomo è in grado di fare.

In this article, I investigate key features of the literary logic and function of Jeremiah’s sign acts that have remained widely overlooked by modern biblical scholarship. What has gone unnoticed is the densely allusive texture of the central elements and activities of the sign acts examined (Jer 13:1–11; 16:1–9; 18:1–11; 19; 25:15–29; 27; 32:1–15; 35; 43:8–13; 51:59–64). My argument is that the sign acts are best construed as an ancient exegetical enterprise; they are an expression of the enormously creative literary imagination in ancient Israel. They are exegetical in nature, I suggest, both genetically and functionally. Stated otherwise, the sign acts are products of inner-biblical exegesis, and they are deployed within the Jeremianic corpus in service of exegetical ends. By attending to the creative exegetical transformations that the sign acts effect vis-à-vis their antecedent literary materials, it is possible to detect a concerted effort to disclose, explicate, adjust, and amplify the representation of divine action found in the earlier Jeremianic traditions. Jeremiah’s exegetical sign acts emerge as a sophisticated exegetical discourse about YHWH’s workings behind the events of the Babylonian exile, expressed in the medium of imagined and imaginative prophetic performance.

The Qur’ān’s assertion of its divine preservation naturally raises questions about the status of earlier revelations like the Torah and Gospel, which it recognises as authentic divine guidance (āl-ʿImrān 3:3). This study examines why the Qur’ān would affirm these scriptures while certain verses appear to critique their transmission. Through analysis of shared narratives and theological concepts, it explores whether references to ‘distortion’ [taḥrīf] concern textual corruption or interpretive deviation. The findings suggest that critical verses target specific interpretations within Jewish and Christian traditions rather than the biblical text’s integrity. This is evident in the Qur’ān’s engagement with biblical stories – affirming core messages while providing complementary perspectives. Frequent references to biblical figures and events, along with explicit validation of earlier scriptures, reveal a theological framework that honours their divine origin. By separating textual preservation from interpretive history, the study presents a nuanced view of inter-scriptural relations, showing how the Qur’ān respects earlier revelations while advancing its own theological message and encouraging integrative over polemical approaches.ContributionThis study clarifies Qur’ānic teachings on earlier scriptures and promotes constructive interfaith dialogue rooted in shared Abrahamic traditions. It proposes an integrative framework combining: (1) intertextual analysis of Qurʾānic-biblical parallels, showing how shared stories serve distinct theological aims; (2) historical-critical study of these variations within Late Antique debates on prophecy and identity; and (3) reception history tracing classical and modern interpretations. This model sees Qurʾānic adaptations as purposeful theological recontextualisations rather than claims of textual corruption.

According to Keown, chapter 6, \"The Spirit and Christoformity,\" is the heart of the book's purpose (p. 206). Keown relegates most of his interaction with secondary literature to footnotes, leaving the bulk of the main text to his exegetical analysis. [...]the exegetical value of the neologism is somewhat unclear.

More often than not, when it comes to literary criticism, form explains everything; where form refers \"to elements of a verbal composition;\" including \"rhythm, meter, structure, diction, imagery;\" it distinguishes ordinary from figurative utterance and thereby defines the literary per se. Contemporary partisans of form maintain that their high opinion of its exegetical power is at once something new in the field and the field's own core--a kind of going back to basics, as if form ever enjoyed the authority of an uncontested term. Here, Kramnick and Nersessian propose to take something different from the sciences--namely, the conviction that explanations are inquiry relative--in order to argue two points: (1) There is no reason to maintain or to desire a consistent use of the term form across the disciplines or even, perhaps, within a single discipline; and (2) Such a generous view of form may only be secured by a more careful and constrained understanding of what form is for any particular discipline or, more specifically, of what kinds of explanation it can provide for that discipline or others.

Abstract Academia has some misconceptions about the Epistle of the Creation of Animals of Rasa'il Ikhwan al-afa'. This article addresses these misconceptions by offering a new hermeneutic to interpret the denouement of its story. This hermeneutic is called tasattur, which incorporated the mechanics of Jacques Derrida's deconstruction a thousand years before this theory was proposed by him. The article also demonstrates how this interpretive framework of tassatur helps us glean from this epistle an archetypal code for the upcoming Fatimid Empire.

Although I will also refer to an influent analogy made by Francis Bacon and to R.G. Collingwood’s explanation concerning it, however, my article will mainly deal with John Dewey’s ideas in this regard. John Dewey developped a special logic, which he named the theory of inquiry. Dewey’s logic can be considered, actually, an integral hermeneutics, since it also examines the meanings which man creates when interpreting nature. According to Dewey, sciences are systems of related meanings obtained through inquiry. An inquiry follows a certain pattern, by transforming, in a controlled way, an indeterminate, confusing situation into a determinate one, which, thus, gets meaning. A problematic situation can be clarified only if it is transposed linguistically in our mind. How can we get, by means of inquiry, to the individual meaning of a concrete situation, by using the meanings already acquired in a certain field? Dewey states that individual meaning can be obtained as a result of articulating a judgment, which arises from a chain of logical propositions. They can be either (i) existential propositions (which extract the relevant data from concrete situations) or (ii) conceptual propositions (which direct inquiries towards the best way to solve the given situations). These propositions collaborate. The existential ones are similar to the workers who (selectively) excavate ancient objects from ruins. The conceptual ones are like the archeologists who establish the meaning of the objects found by the workers.

This article develops a new approach for theorizing about hermeneutical injustice. According to a dominant view, hermeneutical injustice results from a hermeneutical gap : one lacks the conceptual tools needed to make sense of, or to communicate, important social experiences, where this lack is a result of an injustice in the background social methods used to determine hermeneutical resources. I argue that this approach is incomplete. It fails to capture an important species of hermeneutical injustice which doesn't result from a lack of hermeneutical resources, but from the overabundance of distorting and oppressive concepts which function to crowd-out, defeat, or pre-empt the application of a more accurate hermeneutical resource. I propose a broader analysis that better respects the dynamic relationship between hermeneutical resources and the social and political contexts in which they are implemented.

Many promising technological innovations in health and social care are characterized by nonadoption or abandonment by individuals or by failed attempts to scale up locally, spread distantly, or sustain the innovation long term at the organization or system level. Our objective was to produce an evidence-based, theory-informed, and pragmatic framework to help predict and evaluate the success of a technology-supported health or social care program. The study had 2 parallel components: (1) secondary research (hermeneutic systematic review) to identify key domains, and (2) empirical case studies of technology implementation to explore, test, and refine these domains. We studied 6 technology-supported programs-video outpatient consultations, global positioning system tracking for cognitive impairment, pendant alarm services, remote biomarker monitoring for heart failure, care organizing software, and integrated case management via data sharing-using longitudinal ethnography and action research for up to 3 years across more than 20 organizations. Data were collected at micro level (individual technology users), meso level (organizational processes and systems), and macro level (national policy and wider context). Analysis and synthesis was aided by sociotechnically informed theories of individual, organizational, and system change. The draft framework was shared with colleagues who were introducing or evaluating other technology-supported health or care programs and refined in response to feedback. The literature review identified 28 previous technology implementation frameworks, of which 14 had taken a dynamic systems approach (including 2 integrative reviews of previous work). Our empirical dataset consisted of over 400 hours of ethnographic observation, 165 semistructured interviews, and 200 documents. The final nonadoption, abandonment, scale-up, spread, and sustainability (NASSS) framework included questions in 7 domains: the condition or illness, the technology, the value proposition, the adopter system (comprising professional staff, patient, and lay caregivers), the organization(s), the wider (institutional and societal) context, and the interaction and mutual adaptation between all these domains over time. Our empirical case studies raised a variety of challenges across all 7 domains, each classified as simple (straightforward, predictable, few components), complicated (multiple interacting components or issues), or complex (dynamic, unpredictable, not easily disaggregated into constituent components). Programs characterized by complicatedness proved difficult but not impossible to implement. Those characterized by complexity in multiple NASSS domains rarely, if ever, became mainstreamed. The framework showed promise when applied (both prospectively and retrospectively) to other programs. Subject to further empirical testing, NASSS could be applied across a range of technological innovations in health and social care. It has several potential uses: (1) to inform the design of a new technology; (2) to identify technological solutions that (perhaps despite policy or industry enthusiasm) have a limited chance of achieving large-scale, sustained adoption; (3) to plan the implementation, scale-up, or rollout of a technology program; and (4) to explain and learn from program failures.

Screen time has become a hot button issue in psychology with researchers fiercely debating its mental effects. If we want to understand the psychological dynamics of technology use, however, a numerical conceptualization of screen time will lead us to gloss over crucial distinctions. To make this point, the present article takes a hermeneutic approach to a negative form of screen time known as 'phubbing', which is the practice of snubbing conversational partners in favor of one's phone. Using interview data, it is demonstrated that whether or not phone use amounts to phubbing, that is, whether or not it tips over and becomes harmful, depends on a host of contextual factors such as relation (who), content (what), purpose (why), timing (when), and communication (how). These findings demonstrate that not all screen time is created equal: what is harmful and inappropriate in one context is benign in another, and vice versa. Simply put, screen time is not a numerical entity whose causal effects we can measure and explain, but a meaningful activity that we must try to understand.