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45,050 result(s) for "Export controls"
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GLOBAL EXPORT CONTROLS OF CYBER SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY AND THE DISRUPTED TRIANGULAR DIALOGUE
The proliferation and abuse of cyber surveillance technology is a global policy problem. The Wassenaar Arrangement is a central platform of international cooperation for regulating dual-use goods and technologies and the so-called ‘cyber’ amendments to Wassenaar have created a multilateral control mechanism for the export of cyber surveillance technology. Following criticism of the repressive use of ICT-powered surveillance tools supplied by private companies in the early 2010s, Wassenaar States revised the Arrangement to regulate certain types of surveillance. This article begins by examining key features of the cyber amendments. Based on the analysis of recent export control law reforms in the three leading State actors in the production, sales and governance of cyber surveillance technology—namely the United States, China, and the European Union—the article identifies the diminishing importance of the Wassenaar Arrangement. It also shows how approaches in the three jurisdictions diverge not only from the terms of equivalent Wassenaar controls, but also from one another. They all aim to become a stronger and more autonomous entity in the regulation of cyber surveillance technology. In the face of escalating confrontation between the G2 concerning emerging technologies, it will be interesting to see how the EU's turn to a more human rights-centred approach to governing the export of cyber surveillance technology will be received by the US and Chinese governments in the long run and how it will interact with export control reforms designed with competing geopolitical, commercial and security agendas.
Export restrictions on critical minerals and metals : testing the adequacy of WTO disciplines
\"Today international commodity markets are being affected by the longest and most pervasive 'wave' of export restrictions on raw materials since the Second World War. The origin of this phenomenon can be traced back to the 2000s commodities boom , and its endurance to an exceptional mix of concurring factors affecting patterns of world supply and demand for raw materials. The explosion of attention towards export restraints directly stems from the unique scope and length of the present wave\"-- Provided by publisher.
China's semiconductor conundrum: understanding US export controls and their efficacy
This article discusses the evolution of the US-China tech rivalry from Trump's first term to the Biden administration and examines the efficacy of US export control measures. To highlight the changing relevance of traditional economic statecraft tools such as export controls, the article explores the tech rivalry through three key objectives. First, it analyzes how the dynamics of hegemonic competition between the US and China have evolved, particularly in light of their economic and military dependence on Taiwan's semiconductor industry. Second, it reviews the state of China's semiconductor sector and assesses how American export control policies are reshaping the Chinese chip industry. Third, the article evaluates the effectiveness of US sanctions on China, identifying four key ways in which Chinese chipmakers have managed to circumvent these measures. The paper argues that America's chokepoint strategy is increasingly proving to be a fallacy, as US policies have inadvertently accelerated China's push for domestic innovation in high-tech sectors. This trend exposes a structural flaw in the conventional geoeconomic strategy of export controls, as global supply chains appear to be less controllable by US-led policies. It reflects a broader strategic realignment with deeper implications for global power dynamics.
EU and US Export Control Regimes for Dual Use Goods: an Overview of Existing Frameworks
The systems of EU and US export controls of dual-use items have periods of shared history, where the regulatory efforts were directed at a common adversary and with regard to a common array of critical goods and technologies. Despite certain similarities, the current export control regimes warrant awareness of the mutual policies and procedures for EU and US companies engaged in export and re-export of sensitive items. The differing approaches EU Member States take in implementing export controls and the overall complexity of the US system, now bearing the results of the Export Control Reform, make it difficult to navigate one's way and not lose one's sight of the forest for the trees. The article seeks to draw the changing export control frameworks in both jurisdictions and evaluate their interactions from a business perspective.
The Creation of National Treasures in the United Kingdom and the National Treasure Space
This article examines the determination of cultural objects as “national treasures” in the United Kingdom and proposes a heretofore unidentified theoretical space in which such designations are made. Utilizing Foucauldian genealogies of the museum posited by both Tony Bennett and Eilean Hooper-Greenhill as a frame for spaces in which cultural and national identities are curated (which some commentators suggest are outdated, but prove very helpful in the current enterprise), this article develops the argument that designations of items as “national treasures” are made within a specific institutional space – hereinafter termed the “National Treasure Space.” Through the interpretation of the object in this institutional space, it is possible to characterize it as other than the sum of its parts; certain aspects of the object that exist when it is outside of this space are suspended once it is within. As a result, the problematic determination of the object as a national treasure is exacerbated, impacting important relational elements of the object to its owner(s) (both private and public) and the understanding of the object as significant in its representation of the nation.
Export Control Challenges Associated with Securing the Homeland
The \"homeland\" security mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is paradoxical: Its mission space is uniquely focused on the domestic consequences of security threats, but these threats may be international in origin, organization, and implementation. The DHS is responsible for the domestic security implications of threats to the United States posed, in part, through the global networks of which the United States is a part. While the security of the U.S. air transportation network could be increased if it were isolated from connections to the larger international network, doing so would be a highly destructive step for the entire fabric of global commerce and the free movement of people. Instead, the U.S. government, led by DHS, is taking a leadership role in the process of protecting the global networks in which the United States participates. These numerous networks are both real (e.g., civil air transport, international ocean shipping, postal services, international air freight) and virtual (the Internet, international financial payments system), and they have become vital elements of the U.S. economy and civil society. Export Control Challenges Associated with Securing the Homeland found that outdated regulations are not uniquely responsible for the problems that export controls post to DHS, although they are certainly an integral part of the picture. This report also explains that the source of these problems lies within a policy process that has yet to take into account the unique mission of DHS relative to export controls. Export Control Challenges Associated with Securing the Homeland explains the need by the Department of Defense and State to recognize the international nature of DHS's vital statutory mission, the need to further develop internal processes at DHS to meet export control requirements and implement export control policies, as well as the need to reform the export control interagency process in ways that enable DHS to work through the U.S. export control process to cooperate with its foreign counterparts.
Export Controls and International Business: A Study with Special Emphasis on Dual-Use Export Controls and Their Impact on Firms in the US
The production of hazardous materials that can be used for civilian and military purposes (dual-use items) has led the U.S. government to impose export controls in order to prevent the proliferation of risky materials falling into the wrong hands - a concern in this age of international terrorism. Export controls are prudent government responses to the emergence of a new and widely perceived threat to national security. However, existing controls have failed to keep up with rapid global economic and technological changes, and are likely to have adverse effects on firms' economic performance. This article suggests regulatory and policy reforms, as well as corporate strategies for dealing with U.S. export controls in order to make such controls effective and relevant to changing technological developments. Among the problems the article identifies are the negative effects of these export controls on firm innovation, market competitiveness, investment, and trade flows. These issues point to a pressing agenda for regulatory reform. Reforms can focus on limiting control lists, enhancing the bilateral or multilateral cooperation in export controls, improving the efficiency and transparency of the licensing system, improving resources and the outreach to small and medium-size exporters, and compensation for the loss of market share.