Explore the vast range of titles available.

This book examines the international regulation of crisis bailouts and buy national policies from a competition perspective. It undertakes this research with specific reference to the crisis years 2008–2012. The book includes a comparative analysis of the regulation of public procurement and subsidies aid at both multilateral and regional levels, identifying the strengths and weakness in the WTO legal framework and selected regional trade agreements (RTAs). Ultimately, the aim of this work is to provide options for improving the consistency of these laws and the regulation of these markets. This is of immediate relevance for good economic governance, as well as for managing future systemic financial crises in the interests of citizens: as tax payers and consumers. Volume 17 in the series Hart Studies in Competition Law

We develop a three-stage lobbying game to explain why the WTO prohibits export subsidies but not import tariffs. In this model, the government chooses trade policies (i.e., import tariffs or export subsidies) to maximize a weighted sum of social welfare and lobbying contributions. We argue that the economic rents from export subsidies cannot be contained exclusively within lobby groups, because new capitalists, who will enter the growing export sector, freely benefit from export subsidies without paying political contributions at the time of lobbying. In the contracting import-competing industries, no new entrants erode the protection rents from tariffs. Therefore, the government receives large political contributions by protecting these import-competing industries. We show that, given that capital reallocation is costly, when the free-rider problem is severe, the government will sign a trade agreement that prohibits only export subsidies. In the extended model in which the government has a continous policy space, we show that there is a non-empty set of parameter values such that the government would prohibit export subsidies while allowing for positive tariffs.

During the eighties, industrialized countries increasingly used tied aid to circumvent international agreements restricting export subsidies for capital goods. The 1991 Helsinki Disciplines restricted the use of tied aid as a tool of export promotion. In export subsidy competition, donor states have a collective interest in avoiding spiraling escalation of spending; but, reaching international agreements is difficult when preferences over levels of expenditure vary between them. States that favor greater restraint on export subsidies can make subsidy competition prohibitively expensive by increasing their expenditures. However, this requires them to threaten substantial increases in spending when they have a demonstrated preference against doing so. Successful cooperation can only occur when governments with sufficient budgetary resources prefer subsidy reduction, but can mobilize domestic constituencies to make subsidy retaliation credible. Despite an apparent decline in international influence, the U.S. was able to compel accession to the Helsinki agreement by threatening substantial increases in its spending. This article uses a process-tracing approach to demonstrate the role of domestic politics in making that threat credible.

A duty drawback is an export subsidy determined as a percentage of the tariffs paid on the imported inputs used in its production. This paper examines the revenue-constrained optimal tariff structure in a small open economy including a duty drawback as a trade policy tool. This paper has two main aims. First, we show that the revenue-constrained optimal combination of tariff and duty drawback for a given revenue level is not unique. Second, we show that if the optimal import tariff rates are all positive when the duty drawback rate is zero, then the optimal import tariff rates are always positive when the duty drawback is positive.

The empirical observation that “large firms tend to export, whereas small firms do not” has transformed the way economists think about the determinants of international trade. Yet, it has had surprisingly little impact on how economists think about trade policy. Under very general conditions, we show that from the point of view of a country that unilaterally imposes trade taxes to maximize domestic welfare, the self-selection of heterogeneous firms into exports calls for import subsidies on the least profitable foreign firms. In contrast, our analysis does not provide any rationale for export subsidies or taxes on the least profitable domestic firms.

The theory of comparative advantage is at the core of neoclassical trade theory. Yet we know little about its implications for how nations should conduct their trade policy. For example, should import sectors with weaker comparative advantage be protected more? Conversely, should export sectors with stronger comparative advantage be subsidized less? In this article we take a first stab at exploring these issues. Our main results imply that in the context of a canonical Ricardian model, optimal import tariffs should be uniform, whereas optimal export subsidies should be weakly decreasing with respect to comparative advantage, reflecting the fact that countries have more room to manipulate prices in their comparative-advantage sectors. Quantitative exercises suggest substantial gains from such policies relative to simpler tax schedules.

As the exchange rate, foreign demand, and production costs evolve, domestic producers are continually faced with two choices: whether to be an exporter and, if so, how much to export. We develop a dynamic structural model of export supply that characterizes these two decisions. The model embodies plant-level heterogeneity in export profits, uncertainty about the determinants of future profits, and market entry costs for new exporters. Using a Bayesian Monte Carlo Markov chain estimator, we fit this model to plant-level panel data on three Colombian manufacturing industries. We obtain profit function and sunk entry cost coefficients, and use them to simulate export responses to shifts in the exchange-rate process and several types of export subsidies. In each case, the aggregate export response depends on entry costs, expectations about the exchange rate process, prior exporting experience, and producer heterogeneity. Export revenue subsidies are far more effective at stimulating exports than policies that subsidize entry costs.

In a Cournot duopoly model in which exporters compete in a third market, this paper revisits the classical issue (dating back to the pioneering work of Brander and Spencer, Export Share and International Market Share Rivalry, 1985) of the strategic trade policy choice in the presence of the passive participation of one firm in the rival. Passive cross-ownership dramatically alters the participating and participated firms' governments' choice to apply the strategic trade policy instrument, the equilibria typology and their efficiency properties. In fact, if the share of cross-ownership is sufficiently large, the participated firm's government finds optimal to tax export. Moreover, beyond an adequately high threshold, cross-ownership modifies the equilibrium from the activist regime for both countries to an asymmetric regime in which only the participating firm's government intervenes. In addition, in the case of the traditional common activist regime equilibrium, the classical prisoner's dilemma game structure may disappear.

In the global pursuit of sustainable development and climate change mitigation, reconciling export growth with environmental protection has emerged as a universal challenge. As the world’s largest developing economy, China has traditionally relied on a resource-intensive development model to fuel rapid foreign trade growth. However, this extensive growth pattern has not only led to environmental pollution domestically but has also encountered hurdles from international green trade barriers. Finance, as a key driver of stable economic growth, plays a pivotal role in achieving high-quality trade development. Against this backdrop, the Chinese government has introduced the green credit interest subsidies policy. This policy aims to coordinate government financial resources and guide capital toward green production, alleviating financing constraints and fostering the upgrading of export product quality. Utilizing data from the World Bank, China Customs statistics, and provincial panels from 2011 to 2020, this study employs a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) model to examine the causal impact of the green credit subsidies policy on efforts to upgrade the export quality of green products across China’s regions. The benchmark regression results indicate that the green credit interest subsidies policy has significantly improved the export quality of green products across China’s manufacturing industries. Heterogeneity analysis shows that this policy has had a more pronounced positive impact on green product quality in industries with quality-based competition strategies, in regions with well-coordinated local finance and financial policies, as well as in countries that have concluded environmental clauses with China. Mechanism analysis reveals that, on the export side, the policy enhances green product quality by easing financing constraints, increasing green credit, boosting productivity, and upgrading industrial structures. On the import side, the policy promotes green product quality by expanding the scale, variety, and quality of green intermediate goods. This research offers valuable insights for developing countries aiming to establish export-oriented green transformation and upgrading strategies.