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This article examines the link between the opportunity cost of money and time-varying liquidity premia of near-money assets. Higher interest rates imply higher opportunity costs of holding money and hence a higher premium for the liquidity service benefits of assets that are close substitutes for money. Consistent with this theory, short-term interest rates in the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada have a strong positive relationship with the liquidity premium of Treasury bills and other near-money assets over periods going back to the 1920s. Once the opportunity cost of money is taken into account, Treasury security supply variables lose their explanatory power for the liquidity premium, except for transitory short-run effects. These findings indicate a high elasticity of substitution between money and near-money assets. As a consequence, a central bank that follows an interest rate operating target not only elastically accommodates and neutralizes shocks to money demand, but effectively also shocks to near-money asset supply and demand.

In this article, we extend the streams of research on the capital structure of socially responsible firms by investigating the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on firm debt maturity. Using a large sample of US firms, we provide evidence that high CSR firms significantly reduce their debt maturity. In particular, our results suggest that diversity and community are the dimensions that matter the most in explaining debt maturity. In additional analyses that use a seemingly unrelated regression approach, our results show that CSR decreases the extent to which investments are financed with long-term debt and increases the extent to which investments are financed with short-term debt and shareholders' equity. Overall, these findings support the view that high CSR firms use debt maturity to manage CSR overinvestment problems and to signal their high quality and their access to the debt market.

This paper shows that short debt maturities commit equityholders to leverage reductions when refinancing expiring debt in low-profitability states. However, shorter maturities lead to higher transaction costs since larger amounts of expiring debt need to be refinanced. We show that this trade-off between higher expected transaction costs against the commitment to reduce leverage in low-profitability states motivates an optimal maturity structure of corporate debt. Since firms with high costs of financial distress and risky cash flows benefit most from committing to leverage reductions, they have a stronger motive to issue short-term debt. Evidence supports the model’s predictions.

We exploit a natural experiment in the largest online consumer lending platform to provide the first evidence that loan terms, in particular maturity choice, can be used to screen borrowers based on their private information. We compare two groups of observationally equivalent borrowers who took identical unsecured 36-month loans; for only one of the groups, a 60-month loan was also available. When a long-maturity option is available, fewer borrowers take the short-term loan, and those who do default less. Additional findings suggest borrowers self-select on private information about their future ability to repay.

We examine empirically how the supply and maturity structure of government debt affect bond yields and expected returns. We organize our investigation around a term-structure model in which risk-averse arbitrageurs absorb shocks to the demand and supply for bonds of different maturities. These shocks affect the term structure because they alter the price of duration risk. Consistent with the model, we find that the maturity-weighted-debt-to-GDP ratio is positively related to bond yields and future returns, controlling for the short rate. Moreover, these effects are stronger for longer-maturity bonds and following periods when arbitrageurs have lost money.

The largest commercial bank stocks, ranked by total size of the balance sheet, have significantly lower risk-adjusted returns than small- and medium-sized bank stocks, even though large banks are significantly more levered. We uncover a size factor in the component of bank returns that is orthogonal to the standard risk factors, including small minus big, which has the right covariance with bank returns to explain the average risk-adjusted returns. This factor measures size-dependent exposure to bankspecific tail risk. These findings are consistent with government guarantees that protect shareholders of large banks, but not small banks, in disaster states.

The article shows that time-consistent, imperfectly targeted support to distressed institutions makes private leverage choices strategic complements. When everyone engages in maturity mismatch, authorities have little choice but intervening, creating both current and deferred (sowing the seeds of the next crisis) social costs. In turn, it is profitable to adopt a risky balance sheet. These insights have important consequences, from banks choosing to correlate their risk exposures to the need for macro-prudential supervision.

This study examines how the institutional environment influences capital structure and debt maturity choices of firms in 39 developed and developing countries. We find that a country’s legal and tax system, corruption, and the preferences of capital suppliers explain a significant portion of the variation in leverage and debt maturity ratios. Specifically, firms in more corrupt countries and those with weaker laws tend to use more debt, especially short-term debt; explicit bankruptcy codes and deposit insurance are associated with higher leverage and more long-term debt. More debt is used in countries where there is a greater tax gain from leverage.

We estimate how households trade off immediate costs and uncertain future benefits that occur in the very long run, 100 or more years away. We exploit a unique feature of housing markets in the United Kingdom and Singapore, where residential property ownership takes the form of either leaseholds or freeholds. Leaseholds are temporary, prepaid, and tradable ownership contracts with maturities between 99 and 999 years, while freeholds are perpetual ownership contracts. The price difference between leaseholds and freeholds reflects the present value of perpetual rental income starting at leasehold expiration, and is thus informative about very long-run discount rates. We estimate the price discounts for varying leasehold maturities compared to freeholds and extremely long-run leaseholds via hedonic regressions using proprietary data sets of the universe of transactions in each country. Households discount very long-run cash flows at low rates, assigning high present value to cash flows hundreds of years in the future. For example, 100-year leaseholds are valued at more than 10% less than otherwise identical freeholds, implying discount rates below 2.6% for 100-year claims.

This article analyzes the dynamic coordination problem among creditors of a firm with a time-varying fundamental and a staggered debt structure. In deciding whether to roll over his debt, each maturing creditor is concerned about the rollover decisions of other creditors whose debt matures during his next contract period. We derive a unique threshold equilibrium and characterize the roles of fundamental volatility, credit lines, and debt maturity in driving runs. In particular, we show that when fundamental volatility is sufficiently high, commonly used measures such as temporarily keeping the firm alive under runs and increasing debt maturity can exacerbate rather than mitigate runs.