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Probably because of their interpretability and transparent nature, synthetic controls have become widely applied in empirical research in economics and the social sciences. This article aims to provide practical guidance to researchers employing synthetic control methods. The article starts with an overview and an introduction to synthetic control estimation. The main sections discuss the advantages of the synthetic control framework as a research design, and describe the settings where synthetic controls provide reliable estimates and those where they may fail. The article closes with a discussion of recent extensions, related methods, and avenues for future research.

This paper documents a significant association between the exposure of an individual or area to the UK government’s austerity-induced welfare reforms begun in 2010, and the following: the subsequent rise in support for the UK Independence Party, an important correlate of Leave support in the 2016 UK referendum on European Union membership; broader individual-level measures of political dissatisfaction; and direct measures of support for Leave. Leveraging data from all UK electoral contests since 2000, along with detailed, individual-level panel data, the findings suggest that the EU referendum could have resulted in a Remain victory had it not been for austerity.

We combine data on trade, production, and input use to document changes in the value-added content of trade between 1970 and 2009. The ratio of value-added to gross exports fell by roughly 10 percentage points worldwide. The ratio declined 20 percentage points in manufacturing, but rose in nonmanufacturing sectors. Declines also differ across countries and trade partners: they are larger for fast-growing countries, for nearby trade partners, and among partners that adopt regional trade agreements. Using a multisector structural gravity model with input-output linkages, we show that changes in trade frictions play a dominant role in explaining all these facts.

How big is the elasticity of substitution between goods from different countries—the Armington elasticity? Estimates of the macroelasticity between home and imported goods are often smaller than the microelasticity between foreign sources of imports. Using new, highly disaggregate U.S. production data matched to imports and simulated data from a Melitz-style model with nested CES preferences, we explore estimation techniques for the two elasticities. For between two-thirds and three-quarters of sample goods, there is no significant difference between the macro- and microelasticities, but for the rest, the microelasticity is significantly higher, even at the same level of disaggregation.

We show that support for the Leave option in the Brexit referendum was systematically higher in regions hit harder by economic globalization. We focus on the shock of surging imports from China over the past three decades as a structural driver of divergence in economic performance across U.K. regions. An IV approach supports a causal interpretation of our finding. We claim that the effect is driven by the displacement determined by globalization in the absence of effective compensation of its losers. Neither overall stocks nor inflows of immigrants in a region are associated with higher support for the Leave option. A positive association only emerges when focusing on immigrants from EU accession countries. The analysis of individual data suggests that voters respond to the import shock in a sociotropic way, as individuals tend to react to the general economic situation of their region, regardless of their specific condition.

This paper estimates the welfare effects of Brexit in the medium to long run, focusing on trade and fiscal transfers. We use a standard quantitative general equilibrium trade model with many countries and sectors and trade in intermediates. We simulate a range of counterfactuals reflecting alternative options for European Union (EU)–United Kingdom (UK) relations following Brexit. Welfare losses for the average UK household are 1.3% if the UK remains in the EU’s Single Market like Norway (a ‘soft Brexit’). Losses rise to 2.7% if the UK trades with the EU under World Trade Organization rules (a ‘hard Brexit’). A reduced-form approach that captures the dynamic effects of Brexit on productivity more than triples these losses and implies a decline in average income per capita of between 6.3% and 9.4%, partly via falls in foreign investment. The negative effects of Brexit are widely shared across the entire income distribution and are unlikely to be offset from new trade deals.

We build into a Ricardian model sectoral linkages, trade in intermediate goods, and sectoral heterogeneity in production to quantify the trade and welfare effects from tariff changes. We also propose a new method to estimate sectoral trade elasticities consistent with any trade model that delivers a multiplicative gravity equation. We apply our model and use our estimated elasticities to identify the impact of NAFTA's tariff reductions. We find that Mexico's welfare increases by 1.31%, U.S.'s welfare increases by 0.08%, and Canada's welfare declines by 0.06%. We find that intra-bloc trade increases by 118% for Mexico, 11% for Canada, and 41% for the U. S. We show that welfare effects from tariff reductions are reduced when the structure of production does not take into account intermediate goods or input-output linkages. Our results highlight the importance of sectoral heterogeneity, intermediate goods, and sectoral linkages for the quantification of the welfare gains from tariffs reductions.

Whereas scholars have typically modeled climate change as a global collective action challenge, we offer a dynamic theory of climate politics based on the present and future revaluation of assets. Climate politics can be understood as a contest between owners of assets that accelerate climate change, such as fossil fuel plants, and owners of assets vulnerable to climate change, such as coastal property. To date, obstruction by “climate-forcing” asset holders has been a large barrier to effective climate policy. But as climate change and decarbonization policies proceed, holders of both climate-forcing and “climate-vulnerable” assets stand to lose some or even all of their assets' value over time, and with them, the basis of their political power. This dynamic contest between opposing interests is likely to intensify in many sites of political contestation, from the subnational to transnational levels. As it does so, climate politics will become increasingly existential, potentially reshaping political alignments within and across countries. Such shifts may further undermine the Liberal International Order (LIO); as countries develop pro-climate policies at different speeds and magnitudes, they will have incentives to diverge from existing arrangements over trade and economic integration.

On 23 June 2016, the British electorate voted to leave the European Union (EU). We analyse vote and turnout shares across 380 local authority areas in the United Kingdom. We find that exposure to the EU in terms of immigration and trade provides relatively little explanatory power for the referendum vote. Instead, we find that fundamental characteristics of the voting population were key drivers of the Vote Leave share, in particular their education profiles, their historical dependence on manufacturing employment as well as low income and high unemployment. At the much finer level of wards within cities, we find that areas with deprivation in terms of education, income and employment were more likely to vote Leave. Our results indicate that a higher turnout of younger voters, who were more likely to vote Remain, would not have overturned the referendum result. We also compare our UK results to voting patterns for the far-right leader Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French presidential election. We find similar factors driving the French vote. An out-of-sample prediction of the French vote using UK estimates performs reasonably well.

This is the first paper that analyzes for a global sample of countries how trade agreements that include technology-related provisions impact exports of goods, and how this impact differs depending on the technology content of the goods. It includes estimations of a structural gravity model for a panel of 176 countries over the period 1995–2015. The model differentiates between provisions relating technology transfer, technical cooperation, research and development, and patents and intellectual property rights. It also estimates the differences in these effects depending on whether the trade flow in question is between countries with similar or different levels of development. The main results indicate that regional trade agreements (RTAs) that contain technology provisions generate a significantly higher volume of trade than RTAs that do not, after controlling for the depth of the RTAs. For countries that ratify RTAs that include such provisions, it is exports of technology-intensive goods that increase the most. Trade agreements including such provisions have a heterogeneous effect that varies by income level of the trading partners and depends on the extent to which the RTA incorporates other provisions.