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Abstract The Deci-hertz Interferometer Gravitational Wave Observatory (DECIGO) is a future Japanese space mission with a frequency band of 0.1 Hz to 10 Hz. DECIGO aims at the detection of primordial gravitational waves, which could have been produced during the inflationary period right after the birth of the Universe. There are many other scientific objectives of DECIGO, including the direct measurement of the acceleration of the expansion of the Universe, and reliable and accurate predictions of the timing and locations of neutron star/black hole binary coalescences. DECIGO consists of four clusters of observatories placed in heliocentric orbit. Each cluster consists of three spacecraft, which form three Fabry–Pérot Michelson interferometers with an arm length of 1000 km. Three DECIGO clusters will be placed far from each other, and the fourth will be placed in the same position as one of the other three to obtain correlation signals for the detection of primordial gravitational waves. We plan to launch B-DECIGO, which is a scientific pathfinder for DECIGO, before DECIGO in the 2030s to demonstrate the technologies required for DECIGO, as well as to obtain fruitful scientific results to further expand multi-messenger astronomy.

This article studies how the monetary policy regime affects the relative importance of nominal exchange rates and inflation rates in shaping the response of real exchange rates to shocks. We document two facts about inflation-targeting countries. First, the current real exchange rate predicts future changes in the nominal exchange rate. Second, the real exchange rate is a poor predictor of future inflation rates. We estimate a medium-size, open-economy DSGE model that accounts quantitatively for these facts as well as other empirical properties of real and nominal exchange rates. The key estimated shocks that drive the dynamics of exchange rates and their covariance with inflation are disturbances to the foreign demand for dollar-denominated bonds.

Abstract TianQin is a planned space-based gravitational wave (GW) observatory consisting of three Earth-orbiting satellites with an orbital radius of about $10^5 \\, {\\rm km}$. The satellites will form an equilateral triangle constellation the plane of which is nearly perpendicular to the ecliptic plane. TianQin aims to detect GWs between $10^{-4} \\, {\\rm Hz}$ and $1 \\, {\\rm Hz}$ that can be generated by a wide variety of important astrophysical and cosmological sources, including the inspiral of Galactic ultra-compact binaries, the inspiral of stellar-mass black hole binaries, extreme mass ratio inspirals, the merger of massive black hole binaries, and possibly the energetic processes in the very early universe and exotic sources such as cosmic strings. In order to start science operations around 2035, a roadmap called the 0123 plan is being used to bring the key technologies of TianQin to maturity, supported by the construction of a series of research facilities on the ground. Two major projects of the 0123 plan are being carried out. In this process, the team has created a new-generation $17 \\, {\\rm cm}$ single-body hollow corner-cube retro-reflector which was launched with the QueQiao satellite on 21 May 2018; a new laser-ranging station equipped with a $1.2 \\, {\\rm m}$ telescope has been constructed and the station has successfully ranged to all five retro-reflectors on the Moon; and the TianQin-1 experimental satellite was launched on 20 December 2019—the first-round result shows that the satellite has exceeded all of its mission requirements.

We propose a “dominant currency paradigm” with three key features: dominant currency pricing, pricing complementarities, and imported inputs in production. We test this paradigm using a new dataset of bilateral price and volume indices for more than 2,500 country pairs that covers 91 percent of world trade, as well as detailed firm-product-country data for Colombian exports and imports. In strong support of the paradigm we find that (i) noncommodities terms-of-trade are uncorrelated with exchange rates; (ii) the dollar exchange rate quantitatively dominates the bilateral exchange rate in price pass-through and trade elasticity regressions, and this effect is increasing in the share of imports invoiced in dollars; (iii) US import volumes are significantly less sensitive to bilateral exchange rates, compared to other countries’ imports; (iv) a 1 percent US dollar appreciation against all other currencies predicts a 0.6 percent decline within a year in the volume of total trade between countries in the rest of the world, controlling for the global business cycle. We characterize the transmission of, and spillovers from, monetary policy shocks in this environment.

We study a real small open economy with two key ingredients (1) partial segmentation of home and foreign bond markets and (2) a pecuniary externality that makes the real exchange rate excessively volatile in response to capital flows. Partial segmentation implies that, by intervening in the bond markets, the central bank can affect the exchange rate and the spread between home- and foreign-bond yields. Such interventions allow the central bank to address the pecuniary externality, but they are also costly, as foreigners make carry trade profits. We analytically characterize the optimal intervention policy that solves this trade-off: (1) the optimal policy leans against the wind, stabilizing the exchange rate; (2) it involves smooth spreads but allows exchange rates to jump; (3) it partly relies on “forward guidance,” with non-zero interventions even after the shock has subsided; (4) it requires credibility, in that central banks do not intervene without commitment. Finally, we shed light on the global consequences of widespread interventions, using a multi-country extension of our model. We find that, left to themselves, countries over-accumulate reserves, reducing welfare and leading to inefficiently low world interest rates.

We study the problem of a monetary authority pursuing an exchange rate policy that is inconsistent with interest rate parity because of a binding zero lower bound constraint. The resulting violation in interest rate parity generates an inflow of capital that the monetary authority needs to absorb by accumulating foreign reserves. We show that these interventions by the monetary authority are costly, and we derive a simple measure of these costs: they are proportional to deviations from the covered interest parity (CIP) condition and the amount of accumulated foreign reserves. Our framework can account for the recent experiences of “safe-haven” currencies and the sign of their observed deviations from CIP.

This paper studies how changes in oil supply expectations affect the oil price and the macroeconomy. Using a novel identification design, exploiting institutional features of OPEC and high-frequency data, I identify an oil supply news shock. These shocks have statistically and economically significant effects. Negative news leads to an immediate increase in oil prices, a gradual fall in oil production, and an increase in inventories. This has consequences for the US economy: activity falls, prices and inflation expectations rise, and the dollar depreciates, providing evidence for a strong channel operating through supply expectations.

This article provides a comprehensive history of anchor or reference currencies, exchange rate arrangements, and a new measure of foreign exchange restrictions for 194 countries and territories over 1946–2016. We find that the often cited post–Bretton Woods transition from fixed to flexible arrangements is overstated; regimes with limited flexibility remain in the majority. Even if central bankers’ communications jargon has evolved considerably in recent decades, it is apparent that many still place a large implicit weight on the exchange rate. The U.S. dollar scores as the world’s dominant anchor currency by a very large margin. By some metrics, its use is far wider today than 70 years ago. In contrast, the global role of the euro appears to have stalled. We argue that in addition to the usual safe assets story, the record accumulation of reserves since 2002 may also have to do with many countries’ desire to stabilize exchange rates in an environment of markedly reduced exchange rate restrictions or, more broadly, capital controls: an important amendment to the conventional portrayal of the macroeconomic trilemma.

We find that deviations from the covered interest rate parity (CIP) condition imply large, persistent, and systematic arbitrage opportunities in one of the largest asset markets in the world. Contrary to the common view, these deviations for major currencies are not explained away by credit risk or transaction costs. They are particularly strong for forward contracts that appear on banks' balance sheets at the end of the quarter, pointing to a causal effect of banking regulation on asset prices. The CIP deviations also appear significantly correlated with other fixed income spreads and with nominal interest rates.

We develop a theory that links the U.S. dollar's valuation in FX markets to the convenience yield that foreign investors derive from holding U.S. safe assets. We show that this convenience yield can be inferred from the Treasury basis, the yield gap between U.S. government and currency-hedged foreign government bonds. Consistent with the theory, a widening of the basis coincides with an immediate appreciation and a subsequent depreciation of the dollar. Our results lend empirical support to models that impute a special role to the United States as the world's provider of safe assets and the dollar as the world's reserve currency.