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There is disagreement in the accounting community about what level of standardization would be efficient for accounting. Many of the known costs and benefits of standardization have gone unmeasured and, as a result, there have been no efforts to quantitatively identify an efficient level of accounting standardization. Without guidance from researchers, the level of accounting standardization is set according to the intuition of standard-setters. Using data on a large cross-section of occupations, I provide evidence that the level of standardization in financial reporting occupations is far higher than would be expected given their characteristics. I then show with time-series data that the breadth of professional accounting discourse declined during the late 20th century, coincident with increases in the output of standard-setters. A lower quality discourse is one of many possible consequences of inefficient standardization.

Recent accounting scandals have resulted in regulatory initiatives designed to strengthen audit committee oversight of corporate financial reporting and have led to a concern that U.S. GAAP has become too rules-based. We examine issues related to these initiatives using two experiments. CFOs in our experiments exhibit more agreement and are less likely to report aggressively under a less precise (more principles-based) standard than under a more precise (more rules-based) standard. Our results also indicate that CFOs applying a more precise standard are less likely to report aggressively in the presence of a strong audit committee than a weak audit committee. We find no effect of audit committee strength when the standard is less precise. Finally, we find support for a three-path mediating model examining mechanisms driving the effect of standard precision on aggressive reporting decisions. These results should be of interest to U.S. policymakers as they continue to contemplate a shift to more principles-based accounting standards (e.g., IFRS).

The increasing use of transnational standard-setting bodies to address quality uncertainties and coordination issues across the global economy raises questions about how these bodies establish and maintain their legitimacy and accountability outside the sovereignty of democratic states. Based on a discussion of the legitimacy challenge posed by global governance, we provide an overview of mechanisms by which such bodies can defend their legitimacy claims and examine the actual mechanisms used by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). While the IASB staked its initial credibility on technical competence and independence, it has increasingly emphasized due process norms in its claim for support. Our analysis evaluates the IASB due process against the cultural benchmarks established by domestic standard-setters in the USA and UK and against a normative model of procedural legitimacy. These comparisons help us to understand the modifications that were made in the hope of due process adding legitimacy to accounting standard-setting beyond the state. They also reveal the broader political context of competing legitimacy criteria that confronts transnational standard-setters.

Financial accounting standards increasingly require fair value measurements. I experimentally examine how uncertainty affects auditors' adjustment decisions when evaluating fair values. I manipulate two types of uncertainty, input subjectivity and outcome imprecision, and one reporting choice, supplemental disclosure. I find that auditors are most likely to require adjustments when fair values contain both more input subjectivity and more outcome imprecision, but that this likelihood diminishes when clients supplement recognized fair values with additional disclosure. Thus, consistent with moral licensing, I find that auditors tolerate greater potential misstatement in the financial statements when clients provide disclosure, suggesting that the SEC's preference for supplemental disclosure may have the unintended consequence of affecting fair values recognized in the body of the financial statements. I also provide evidence that auditors determine adjustment size by comparing recorded fair value to the nearest bound, rather than the midpoint, of the auditors' own range estimate, consistent with strict application of auditing standards.

Contingent considerations (earnouts) in acquisition agreements provide sellers with future payments conditional on meeting certain conditions. Prior research provides evidence that acquiring firms use earnouts to minimize agency costs associated with acquisitions. Using earnout fair value information, recently mandated by SFAS 141 (R), we provide new insights into the economic determinants to include earnout provisions in acquisition agreements, including motivations to resolve moral hazard and adverse selection problems, bridge valuation gaps, and retain target firm managers. We document variations in initial earnout fair value estimates and earnout fair value adjustments that correspond with these underlying motivations. We also provide evidence that target managers stay longer with the firm after the acquisition when earnouts are included primarily to retain target managers. Finally, we demonstrate that earnout fair value adjustments required by SFAS 141 (R) provide valuable information to market participants and are negatively associated with the likelihood of contemporaneous and future goodwill impairments.

Gains and losses reported as other comprehensive income (OCI) and as special items (SI) are often viewed as similar in nature: transitory items with little ability to predict future cash flows and minimal implications for company value. However, current accounting standards require SI gains and losses to be recognized in net income, while OCI gains and losses are deferred until realized. This study empirically compares OCI and SI gains and losses using a model that jointly estimates value relevance, predictive value, and persistence. Results show that both SI and OCI gains and losses are valuerelevant, but SI gains and losses exhibit zero persistence (i.e., are transitory), while OCI gains and losses exhibit negative persistence (i.e., partially reverse over time). Further, we find that SI gains and losses have strong predictive value for forecasting both future net income and future cash flows, while OCI gains and losses have weaker predictive value.

We develop a model to examine the effects of Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes (FIN 48), on the strategic interaction between publicly traded corporate taxpayers and the government. Several of our findings contradict conjectures voiced by members of the business community regarding the economic effects of implementing FIN 48. Specifically, taxpayers with strong facts obtain higher expected payoffs from uncertain tax benefits and some disclosed liabilities understate the expected tax liability. Consistent with the common conjectures, however, some taxpayers are more likely to be audited or are deterred from entering into transactions that generate uncertain tax benefits because of FIN 48.

This essay describes implications of the subprime crisis for accounting. First, I overview the institutional and market aspects of subprime lending with the greatest accounting relevance. Second, I discuss the critical aspects of FAS No. 157's fair value definition and measurement guidance and explain the practical difficulties that have arisen in applying this definition and guidance to subprime positions during the crisis. I also raise a potential issue regarding the application of FAS No. 159's fair value option. Third, I discuss issues that have arisen regarding sale accounting for subprime mortgage securitizations under FAS No. 140 and consolidation of securitization entities under FIN No. 46(R) associated with mortgage foreclosures and modifications. Fourth, I indicate ways that accounting academics can address the implications of the subprime crisis in their research and teaching.

Does the placement of a line item in the income statement matter to investors? The passage of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 145 (Financial Accounting Standards Board [FASB] 2002) affords a quasi-experimental setting to answer this question, because pre-SFAS No. 145, gains/losses from early debt extinguishments were reported below the line, while post-SFAS No. 145, they were reported above the line. After controlling for other identified changes that occur during our sample period, we find that, pre-SFAS No. 145, the market does not respond to these gains/losses, whereas post-SFAS No. 145, it does. This suggests that the market response to gains/losses is associated with their placement in the income statement. Our findings contribute to the literature on the importance of income statement presentation by demonstrating that a line-item position in the income statement has important valuation implications.

Relevance and reliability (now referred to as \"representational faithfulness\") are qualities of financial information that both the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board use in setting standards for financial reporting. Despite their importance, very little research has addressed how financial statement users apply these constructs. Via experiments set within the fair value context, we show that users do not view them as independent constructs. Instead, variations in properties that are associated with the reliability of a measurement influence users' assessments of the relevance of fair value. The relationship between assessed relevance and assessed reliability is unidirectional, in that factors underlying reliability influence judgments of relevance, but factors underlying relevance do not influence judgments of reliability. Our findings are important because inappropriate assessments of relevance can influence firm valuation. The results are particularly meaningful in the context of fair value because such measurements can vary widely in reliability.