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On July 12, 2018, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released the proposed 2019 Medicare physician fee schedule and quality payment program, combining these 2 rules for the first time. This occurred in a milieu of changing regulations that have been challenging for interventional pain management specialists. The Affordable Care Act (ACA) continuous to be amended by multiple administrative changes. This July 12th rule proposes substantial payment changes for evaluation and management (E&M) services, with documentation requirements, and blending of Level II to V CPT codes for E&M into a single payment. In addition, various changes in the quality payment program with liberalization of some metrics have been published. Recognizing that there are differing impacts based on specialty and practice type, as a whole interventional pain management specialists would likely see favorable reimbursement trends for E&M services as a result of this proposal. Moreover, in comparison with recent CMS final ruling, this proposed rule has relatively limited changes in procedural reimbursement performed in a facility or in-office setting. CMS, in the new rule, has proposed an overhaul of the E&M documentation and coding system ostensibly to reduce the amount of time physicians are required to spend inputting information into patients’ records. The new proposed rule blends Level II to V codes for E&M services into a single payment of$93 for office outpatient visits for established patients and $ 135 for new patient visits. This will also have an effect with blended payments for services provided in hospital outpatients. CMS also has provided additional codes to increase the reimbursement when prolonged services are provided with total reimbursement coming to Level V payments. Interventional pain managementcentered care has been identified as a specialty with complexity inherent to E&M associated with these services. Among the procedural payments, there exist significant discrepancies for the services performed in hospitals, ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs), and offices. A particularly egregious example is peripheral neurolytic blocks, which is reimbursed at 1,800% higher in hospital outpatient department (HOPD) settings as compared with procedures done in the office. The majority of hospital based procedures have faced relatively small cuts as compared with office based practice. The only significant change noted is for spinal cord stimulator implant leads when performed in office setting with 19.2% increase. However, epidural codes, which have been initiated with a lower payment, continue to face small reductions for physician portion. This review describes the effects of the proposed policy on interventional pain management reimbursement for E&M services, procedural services by physicians and procedures performed in office settings. Key words: Physician payment policy, physician fee schedule, Medicare, Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, interventional pain management, regulatory tsunami, Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015

The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) released the proposed 2017 Medicare physician fee schedule on July 7, 2016, addressing Medicare payments for physicians providing services either in an office or facility setting, which also includes payments for office expenses and quality provisions for physicians. This proposed rule occurs in the context of numerous policy changes, most notably related to the Medicare Access & CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015 (MACRA) and its Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS). The proposed rule affects interventional pain management specialists in reimbursement for evaluation and management services, as well as procedures performed in a facility or in-office setting. Changes in the proposed fee schedule impacting interventional pain management practices include adjustments to the meaningful use (MU) program, care management in patientcentered services, identification and review of potentially misvalued services, evaluation of moderate sedation services, Medicare telehealth services, updated geographic practice cost index, data collection on resources used in furnishing global services, reporting of modifier 25 for zero day global services, Medicare Advantage Part C provider and supplier enrollment, appropriate use criteria (AUC) for advanced imaging services, and Medicare shared savings programs. The proposed schedule has provided rates for new epidural codes with or without imaging (fluoroscopy or computed tomography [CT]) and a fee schedule for a new code covering endoscopic spinal decompression. Review of payment rates show major discrepancies in payment schedules with high payments for hospitals, 2,156% higher than in-office procedures. Some procedures which were converted from in-office settings to ambulatory surgery centers (ASCs) are being reimbursed at 1,366% higher than ASCs. The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) recommendation on avoiding the discrepancies and site-of-service differentials in in-office settings, hospital outpatient settings, and ASCs has not been agreed to by CMS. Thus, even though the changes appear to be minor in physician services and in-office service payment, these changes cumulatively have been reducing payments for interventional procedures. Further, in-office reimbursement is overall significantly lower than ASCs and hospital outpatient departments (HOPDs) specifically for intraarticular injections, peripheral nerve blocks, and peripheral neurolytic injections. The significant advantage also continues for hospitals in their reimbursement for facility fee for evaluation and management services. This health policy review describes various issues related to health care expenses, health care reform, and finally its effects on physician payments for all services and also for the services provided in an office setting. Key words: Physician payment policy, physician fee schedule, Medicare, Merit-Based Incentive Payment System, interventional pain management, regulatory tsunami, Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015

Since 1992 Medicare has reimbursed physicians on a fee-for-service basis that weights physician services according to the effort and expense of providing those services and converts the weights to dollars using a conversion factor. In 1997 Congress replaced an existing spending constraint with the Sustainable Growth Rate (SGR) to reduce reimbursements if overall physician spending exceeded the growth in the economy. Congress, however, has routinely overridden the SGR because of concerns that reduced payments to physicians would limit patients' access to care. Under continued pressure to override scheduled fee reductions or eliminate the SGR altogether, Congress is now considering legislation that would reimburse physicians to improve quality and lower costs-two things that the current system does not do. This article reviews several promising models, including patient-centered medical homes, accountable care organizations, and various payment bundling pilots, that could offer lessons for a larger reform of physician payment. Pilot projects that focus exclusively on alternative ways to reimburse physicians apart from payments to hospitals, such as payments for episodes of care, are also needed. Most promising, Congress is now showing bipartisan, bicameral interest in revising how Medicare reimburses physicians. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

Physicians in the United States have been affected by significant changes in the pattern(s) of medical practice evolving over the last several decades. These changes include new measures to 1) curb increasing costs, 2) increase access to patient care, 3) improve quality of healthcare, and 4) pay for prescription drugs. Escalating healthcare costs have focused concerns about the financial solvency of Medicare and this in turn has fostered a renewed interest in the economic basis of interventional pain management practices. The provision and systemization of healthcare in North America and several European countries are difficult enterprises to manage irrespective of whether these provisions and systems are privatized (as in the United States) or nationalized or semi-nationalized (as in Great Britain, Canada, Australia and France). Consequently, while many management options have been put forth, none seem to be optimally geared toward affording healthcare as a maximized individual and social good, and none have been completely enacted. The current physician fee schedule (released on July 12, 2007) includes a 9.9% cut in payment rate. Since the Medicare program was created in 1965, several methods have been used to determine physicians’ rate(s) for each covered service. The sustained growth rate (SGR) system, established in 1998, has evoked negative consequences on physician payment(s). Based on the current Medicare expenditure index, practice expenses are projected to increase by 34.5% from 2002 to 2016, whereas, if actual practice inflation is considered, this increase will be 90%. This is in contrast to projected physician payment cuts that are depicted to be 51%. No doubt, this scenario will be devastating to many practices and the US medical community at large. Resolutions to this problem have been offered by MedPAC, the Government Accountability Office, physician organizations, economists, and various other interested groups. In the past, temporary measures have been proposed (and sometimes implemented) to eliminate physician payment cuts. At present, the US Senate and House of Representatives are separately working on 2 different mechanisms to address and rectify these cost-payment discrepancies. The effects of both the problem and the potential solutions on interventional pain management may be somewhat greater than those on other specialties. Physician payments in interventional pain management may evidence cuts of 10% to 15%, whereas if procedures are performed in an office setting, such cuts may range from 29% to 39% over the period of the next 3 years if the proposed 9.9% cut is not reversed. Medicare cuts also impact other insurance payments, incurring a “ripple effect” such that many insurers will seek to pay at or around the Medicare rate. In this manuscript, we discuss universal healthcare systems, the CMS proposed ruling and its attendant ripple effect(s), historical aspects of the Medicare payment system, the Sustained Growth Rate system, and the potential consequences incurred by both proposed cuts and potential solutions to the discrepant cost-payment issue(s). As well, ethical issues of policy development upon the infrastructure and practice of interventional pain management are addressed. Key words: Health policy, physician payment policy, physician fee schedule, Medicare, sustained growth rate formula, interventional pain management, regulatory reform, ethics

Physician spending is complex related to national health care spending, government regulations, health care reform, private insurers, physician practice, and patient utilization patterns. In determining payment rates for each service on the fee schedule, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) considers the amount of work required to provide a service, expenses related to maintaining a practice, and liability insurance costs. The value of 3 types of resources are adjusted on a yearly basis of the combined total multiplied by a standard dollar amount, called the fee schedules conversion factor, which was$33.98 in 2011, to arrive at the payment amount. This factor will stay almost the same ($ 34.03) unless a 27.4% cut in the sustainable growth rate (SGR) takes place or CMS enacts further reductions. With a 27.4% cut, the conversion factor will be $24.67 in 2012 after the first 2 months if Congress fails to act. Since the inception of Medicare programs in 1965, several methods have been used to determine the amounts paid to physicians for each covered service. The SGR was enacted in 1997 to determine physician payment updates under Medicare Part B with intent to reduce Medicare physician payment updates to offset the growth and utilization of physician services that exceed gross domestic product (GDP) growth. This is achieved by setting an overall target amount of spending for physicians’ services and adjusting payment rates annually to reflect differences between actual spending and the spending target. Since 2002, the SGR has annually recommended reductions in Medicare reimbursements. Payments were cut in 2002 by 4.8%. Since then, Congress has intervened on 13 separate occasions to prevent additional cuts from being imposed. The Medicare physician payment rule of 2012, which is still undergoing revisions -- but considered as the final rule-- is a 1,235 page document, released in November 2011. In this manuscript, we will describe important aspects of the 2012 physician fee schedule which include potentially disvalued services under the physician fee schedule, expansion of the multiple procedure payment reduction (MPPR) policy, establishment of the valuebased payment modifier, changes to direct practice expenses (PEs), electronic prescribing, the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS), and lab testing signatures, along with their implications. Additionally, the impact of multiple changes on interventional pain management will be described. In conclusion, interventional pain management is facing widespread challenges in the U.S. health care system. A historic reform, which has been passed by Congress and signed into law, whose survivability is not quite known yet, is affecting medicine drastically in the United States. Interventional pain management, like other evolving specialties, will probably most likely suffer under the new affordable health care law and regulatory burden. Key words: Health policy, physician payment policy, physician fee schedule, Medicare, sustained growth rate formula, interventional pain management, regulatory reform

Objective: To quantify the economic impact of premenstrual syndrome (PMS) on the employer. Methods: Data were collected from 374 women aged 18-45 with regular menses. Direct costs were quantified using administrative claims of these patients and the Medicare Fee Schedule. Indirect costs were quantified by both self-reported days of work missed and lost productivity at work. Regression analyses were used to develop a model to project PMS-related direct and indirect costs. Results: A total of 29.6% (n = 111) of the participants were diagnosed with PMS. A PMS diagnosis was associated with an average annual increase of $59 in direct costs (P < 0.026) and $4333 in indirect costs per patient (P < 0.0001) compared with patients without PMS. Conclusions: A PMS diagnosis correlated with a modest increase in direct medical costs and a large increase in indirect costs.

Background Pricing drugs in the California Workers’ Compensation System (CAWCS) has become more difficult as there are increasingly fewer drugs listed in the Medi-Cal primary fee schedule, which is used as the source for CAWCS drug prices. This presents a challenge of providing timely and accurate CAWCS reimbursement. The objectives of this study are (1) to explore any trends in physician-dispensed drug prices; (2) to compare the proportion of drugs with and without a price and to determine the financial implications of repricing CAWCS physician-dispensed drugs with five alternative pricing benchmarks; and (3) to offer recommendations for the pricing benchmark to maximize pricing coverage and to remain budget neutral. Methods We evaluated physician-dispensed drugs at the transaction level, reimbursed in the CAWCS. Frequency, reimbursement rate, and total and average paid costs were reported. We matched each claim line in the CAWCS to the corresponding unit price of an alternative price benchmark including average wholesale price, wholesale acquisition cost, direct prices, national average drug acquisition cost, and Federal Upper Limit. Results Average wholesale price provided prices for 99.9% of physician-dispensed drug claims, while Medi-Cal, the current primary physician-dispensed drug benchmark provided prices for a lower percentage (92.7%) of claims. The CAWCS prices were equivalent to 49% of the average wholesale price, 95.5% of Medi-Cal, 126.7% of the wholesale acquisition cost, 266% of the Federal Upper Limit, 64.4% of direct prices, and 197% of national average drug acquisition cost-estimated prices. Conclusions The CAWCS current Medi-Cal pricing for physician-dispensed drugs is better than all alternatives in terms of price availability, transparency, and budget neutrality, but pricing availability may decrease over time as Medi-Cal moves to managed care. National average drug acquisition cost is the next best alternative, but it requires combinations of pricing benchmarks to maximize its price availability.

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the current surgical reimbursement system in Japan reflects resource utilization after the revision of fee schedule in 2014. Design/methodology/approach – The authors collected data from all the surgical procedures performed at Teikyo University Hospital from April 1 through September 30, 2014. The authors defined the decision-making unit as a surgeon with the highest academic rank in the surgery. Inputs were defined as the number of medical doctors who assisted surgery, and the time of operation from skin incision to closure. An output was defined as the surgical fee. The authors calculated surgeons’ efficiency scores using data envelopment analysis. Findings – The efficiency scores of each surgical specialty were significantly different (p=0.000). Originality/value – This result demonstrates that the Japanese surgical reimbursement scales still fail to reflect resource utilization despite the revision of surgical fee schedule.

Strategic purchasing of health services involves a continuous search for the best ways to maximize health system performance by deciding which interventions should be purchased, from whom these should be purchased, and how to pay for them. In such an arrangement, the passive cashier is replaced by an intelligent purchaser that can focus scarce resources on existing and emerging priorities rather than continuing entrenched historical spending patterns. Having experimented with different ways of paying providers of health care services, countries increasingly want to know not only what to do when paying providers, but also how to do it, particularly how to design, manage, and implement the transition from current to reformed systems. 'Designing and Implementing Health Care Provider Payment Systems: How-To Manuals' addresses this need. The book has chapters on three of the most effective provider payment systems: primary care per capita (capitation) payment, case-based hospital payment, and hospital global budgets. It also includes a primer on a second policy lever used by purchasers, namely, contracting. This primer can be especially useful with one provider payment method: hospital global budgets. The volume's final chapter provides an outline for designing, launching, and running a health management information system, as well as the necessary infrastructure for strategic purchasing.

A 2005–2015 analysis of the accuracy of valuations of 293 common surgical procedures showed substantial absolute discrepancies in operative times estimated by the Relative Value Scale Update Committee (RUC) and times recorded in a surgical registry, but the RUC did not systematically over- or underestimate times.