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What is wrong with today's banking system? The past few years have shown that risks in banking can impose significant costs on the economy. Many claim, however, that a safer banking system would require sacrificing lending and economic growth.The Bankers' New Clothesexamines this claim and the narratives used by bankers, politicians, and regulators to rationalize the lack of reform, exposing them as invalid. Admati and Hellwig argue we can have a safer and healthier banking system without sacrificing any of the benefits of the system, and at essentially no cost to society. They show that banks are as fragile as they are not because they must be, but because they want to be--and they get away with it. Whereas this situation benefits bankers, it distorts the economy and exposes the public to unnecessary risks. Weak regulation and ineffective enforcement allowed the buildup of risks that ushered in the financial crisis of 2007-2009. Much can be done to create a better system and prevent crises. Yet the lessons from the crisis have not been learned. Admati and Hellwig seek to engage the broader public in the debate by cutting through the jargon of banking, clearing the fog of confusion, and presenting the issues in simple and accessible terms.The Bankers' New Clothescalls for ambitious reform and outlines specific and highly beneficial steps that can be taken immediately.

We show that peer firms play an important role in determining corporate capital structures and financial policies. In large part, firms' financing decisions are responses to the financing decisions and, to a lesser extent, the characteristics of peer firms. These peer effects are more important for capital structure determination than most previously identified determinants. Furthermore, smaller, less successful firms are highly sensitive to their larger, more successful peers, but not vice versa. We also quantify the externalities generated by peer effects, which can amplify the impact of changes in exogenous determinants on leverage by over 70%.

Who writes the rules of global finance? This article explains how the transnational financial policy community can influence the content of financial governance by organizing itself via a club model. This agent-centered explanation advances the concept of a club to highlight the mechanisms through which actors operate, the expertise and skills valued by this community and the way in which principles for what constitutes appropriate financial governance are derived. Evidence is provided by an investigation of the Group of Thirty, part-think tank, part-advocacy group, a hybrid organization whose members are active in both the official and private sectors. Club characteristics can be seen in the group's high profile and prestigious membership, which self-presents a strong sense of honor. The article highlights the club as a location for those traditionally understood as financial elites. It emphasizes the collective attributes of the club, such as reputational consistency of membership, but also the importance of a track record of policy work for the enduring relevance of club arrangements in agenda-setting, consensus building and establishing mechanisms for private influence in financial governance. The study draws on 80+ interviews with key stakeholders from the community, including group members, conducted between 1998 and 2010.

We find that firms mitigate refinancing risk by increasing their cash holdings and saving cash from cash flows. The maturity of firms' long-term debt has shortened markedly, and this shortening explains a large fraction of the increase in cash holdings over time. Consistent with the inference that cash reserves are particularly valuable for firms with refinancing risk, we document that the value of these reserves is higher for such firms and that they mitigate underinvestment problems. Our findings imply that refinancing risk is a key determinant of cash holdings and highlight the interdependence of a firm's financial policy decisions.

We study the impact of the enforcement of financial regulation by the United Kingdom’s regulatory authorities on the market price of penalized firms. Existing studies rely on analyses of multiple events that may distort the measurement of reputational losses. In the United Kingdom, the entire enforcement process involves only one public announcement and is accompanied by complete information on legal penalties. We find that reputational losses are nearly nine times the size of fines and are associated with misconduct harming customers or investors but not third parties.

We study the causal effects of analyst coverage on corporate investment and financing policies. We hypothesize that a decrease in analyst coverage increases information asymmetry and thus increases the cost of capital; as a result, firms decrease their investment and financing. We use broker closures and broker mergers to identify changes in analyst coverage that are exogenous to corporate policies. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that firms that lose an analyst decrease their investment and financing by 1.9% and 2.0% of total assets, respectively, compared to similar firms that do not lose an analyst.

This paper presents a new data set of capital controls by inflows and outflows for 10 asset categories in 100 countries during 1995-2013. Building on the data in Schindler (2009) and other data sets based on the analysis of the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER), this data set covers additional asset categories, more countries, and a longer time period. The paper discusses in detail the construction of the data and characterizes them with respect to the prevalence and correlation of controls across asset categories and between inflow and outflow controls, the aggregation of the separate categories into broader indicators, the experience of some particular countries, and the comparison of these data with others indices of capital controls.

We use the introduction of a financial transaction tax (FTT) in France in 2012 to test competing theories on its impact. We find no support for the idea that an FTT improves market quality by affecting the composition of trading volume. Instead, our results are in line with the hypothesis that a lower trading volume reduces liquidity and in turn market quality. Consistent with theories of asset pricing under transaction costs, we document a shift in security holdings from short-term to long-term investors. Finally, we find that moderate aggregate effects on market quality can mask large adjustments made by individual agents.

This paper synthesizes recent advances in the theoretical and empirical literature on capital controls. We start by observing that international capital flows have both benefits and costs, but some of these are not internalized by individual actors and thus constitute externalities. The theoretical literature has identified pecuniary externalities and aggregate demand externalities that respectively contribute to financial instability and recessions. These externalities provide a natural rationale for countercyclical capital controls that lean against boom and bust cycles in international capital flows. The empirical literature has developed several measures of capital controls to capture different aspects of capital account openness. We evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of different measures and provide an overview of the empirical findings on the effectiveness of capital controls in addressing the externalities identified by the theory literature, that is, in reducing financial fragility and enhancing macroeconomic stability. We also discuss strategies to deal with the endogeneity of capital controls in such statistical exercises. We conclude by providing an overview of the historical and current debates on the role of capital controls in macroeconomic management and their relationship to the academic literature.

This paper examines the effect of financial sanctions on cross-border capital flows. While sanctions can be expected to hinder international transactions, thereby putting political and economic pressure on a target country, we study the patterns of adjustment in bilateral financial relationships after the imposition of sanctions along various dimensions. Our analysis is based on highly disaggregated, monthly data from the German balance of payments statistics for the period from 2005 through 2014. During this time, Germany imposed financial sanctions on 20 countries; two of these sanctions have been lifted. Applying a differences-in-differences approach, we find two key results. First, financial sanctions have a strong and immediate negative effect on direct financial flows with the sanctioned country, with cross-border flows reduced in either direction. Second, sanctions imposed by the European Union alone, and therefore only enforced by their member countries instead of the United Nations, are evaded as flows with major trading partners of sanctioned countries increase. We conclude that financial sanctions do matter for capital flows.