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This paper assesses the nature of fiscal discipline under alternative exchange rate regimes. First, it shows in a simple theoretical framework that fiscal agencies under a currency union with a fixed exchange rate can have the largest incentive to overspend or \"free-ride\" (compared to those under other exchange rate regimes) owing to their ability to spread the costs of overspending in terms of the inflation tax across both time-given the fixed exchange rate-and space-given the currency union. In contrast, such free-riding behavior does not arise under flexible regimes owing to the immediate inflationary impact of spending. Next, empirically, it shows that fiscal stances in countries with fixed pegs and currency unions regime demonstrate greater free-riding behavior than countries with more flexible regimes in 15 Caribbean countries during 1983-2004.

Compared with developed economies, China implements the Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) within a fundamentally distinct political-economic-institutional context. This study aims to investigate the internal mechanisms and external constraints of emission trading scheme in achieving the dual benefits of environmental preservation and economic advancement within the institutional context of fiscal decentralization. We demonstrate that the transmission from emission reduction to economic returns inherently facilitates the realization of dual benefits, and further propose a restrictive effect of local fiscal pressure on the effectiveness of the emission trading scheme. Using panel data of 284 prefectural-level cities from 2003 to 2017, we conduct a quasi-experiment based on China’s emission trading scheme pilot policy in 2007. The results indicate three primary conclusions: First, the implementation of emission trading scheme in China generally yields dual environmental-economic benefits, with emission reduction serving as a transmission channel for realizing economic gains. Second, high fiscal pressure on local governments not only directly undermines policy effects but also indirectly affects the transmission channel. Finally, the dual benefits have been realized in eastern China, but not yet in the central and western regions. This study contributes to the research on market-oriented environmental governance under fiscal decentralization. The theoretical logic of this study can be applied to a wide range of market-based mechanisms for green factors trading, providing valuable insights for countries facing similar challenges.

Using an international sample of banks and country-level indices for individualism and uncertainty avoidance as proxies for national culture, we study how differences in culture across countries affect accounting conservatism and bank risktaking. Consistent with expectations, our cross-country analysis indicates that individualism is negatively (positively) related to conservatism (risk-taking) and uncertainty avoidance is positively (negatively) related to conservatism (risk-taking). We also find that cultures that encourage higher risk-taking experienced more bank failures and bank troubles during the recent financial crisis.

PurposeThis paper examines the impact of fiscal constraints on education expenditure in Nigeria from 1981 to 2021, using annual time series data.Design/methodology/approachThe study deployed cointegration techniques with structural breaks.FindingsCointegration was found between education expenditure, debt servicing (a proxy for fiscal constraint) and associated variables. In both the long and short run, debt servicing negatively and significantly impacts education expenditure. While government revenue has a positive and significant impact on education expenditure in the long and short run, political institution has a negative and significant impact in the long run. Political institution is thus critical to education financing in Nigeria. The impact of debt is positive and significant in the short run, but not significant in the long run. There is a unidirectional causality from debt servicing to education expenditure.Practical implicationsPolitical institutions are critical towards contracting only productive debts and checkmating the adverse political environment through political will that prioritizes education financing.Originality/valueThe study extends the empirical literature on the fiscal constraint-education expenditure first by investigating fiscal constraint-education expenditure nexus given the institutional environment, and second by extending the methodology using cointegration techniques in the midst of structural breaks.Peer reviewThe peer review history for this article is available at: https://publons.com/publon/10.1108/IJSE-10-2022-0682.

A Development Emergency: the title of this year's Global Monitoring Report, the sixth in an annual series, could not be more apt. The global economic crisis, the most severe since the Great Depression, is rapidly turning into a human and development crisis. No region is immune. The poor countries are especially vulnerable, as they have the least cushion to withstand events. The crisis, coming on the heels of the food and fuel crises, poses serious threats to their hard-won gains in boosting economic growth and reducing poverty. It is pushing millions back into poverty and putting at risk the very survival of many. The prospect of reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, already a cause for serious concern, now looks even more distant. A global crisis must be met with a global response. The crisis began in the financial markets of developed countries, so the first order of business must be to stabilize these markets and counter the recession that the financial turmoil has triggered. At the same time, strong and urgent actions are needed to counter the impact of the crisis on developing countries and help them restore strong growth while protecting the poor. Global Monitoring Report 2009, prepared jointly by the staff of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, provides a development perspective on the global economic crisis. It assesses the impact on developing countries, their growth, poverty reduction, and other MDGs. And it sets out priorities for policy response, both by developing countries themselves and by the international community. This report also focuses on the ways in which the private sector can be better mobilized in support of development goals, especially in the aftermath of the crisis.

Debtholders' demand has been widely discussed as a key determinant of conservatism but clear causal evidence is not yet established. Using a natural experiment setting, wherein a Delaware court ruled that the fiduciary duties of directors in near insolvent Delaware companies extend to creditors, we predict and find that firms subject to the ruling significantly increased their accounting conservatism. In addition, our results suggest that the increase in conservatism is more pronounced in near insolvent Delaware firms with stronger boards, confirming that the court ruling takes effect through the channel of the board of directors. Our results are robust to using alternative measures of conservatism and near insolvency status, and controlling for potential confounding factors and other stakeholders' demand for conservatism. Overall, our study provides empirical evidence to support the causal relation between debtholders' demand and accounting conservatism previously suggested in the literature, and offers some insights into the role of the board of directors in financial reporting.

A government is fiscally constrained if it is unable to raise sufficient tax revenue to finance the first-best level of public spending. When involved in emission trading, a fiscally constrained government will potentially seek to close its fiscal gap through emission permit sales. This fiscal incentive therefore generates a fiscal externality in the permit market that is endogenous to the extent of fiscal constrainedness among the participating countries. Our theory explains how, and when, fiscal externalities may be expected to arise. Moreover, we show that in a permit market equilibrium with fiscal externalities, the initial allocation of emission permits between countries will affect: (1) the price of emission permits, (2) the global distribution of abatement effort, and (3) total greenhouse gas mitigation costs. This is contrary to the textbook model of emission permit markets. Our findings are especially relevant for the EU which is about to allow for trading in emission rights between EU member countries for all emissions outside the European Emissions Trading System.

We examine the effect of lender monitoring through board representation, which we label \"affiliated banker on board\" (AFB) on conservative accounting. We hypothesize that monitoring reduces lenders' demand for conservatism-facilitated control transfers through debt covenants by reducing the information asymmetry that underlies the agency problem of debt. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that AFB firms have markedly lower conservative accounting than non-AFB firms. This result is robust to a battery of tests that account for bias from both observable and unobservable factors. We also find additional evidence to support key elements of our hypothesis. First, an examination of the relation between borrower-unfavorable renegotiations and covenant violations suggests that board representation allows lenders to renegotiate in a timelier manner based on private information. Second, an examination of the relation between covenant intensity and conservative accounting suggests that board representation decreases lenders' reliance on conservatism-facilitated control transfers. Finally, an analysis that uses relationship lending as an alternative proxy of lender monitoring suggests that it is lender monitoring, and not AFB per se, that reduces demand for conservative accounting.