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result(s) for
"FOREIGN INTERVENTION"
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Externalizing the burden of war: the Obama Doctrine and US foreign policy in the Middle East
2016
In the aftermath of the Arab Spring the Middle East has plunged into a state of instability. The United States has responded to these rising insecurities in a region of strategic importance with hesitation or half-hearted commitments. The Obama administration, plagued by the increasingly difficult decision of defining America's role in an apolar world while managing the political and economic legacy of the Bush administration, has relied on a policy of delegation. Obama neither refrained from military options nor showed any willingness to commit American ground troops to one of the strategically and operationally most complex environments of the world. Instead, Obama's preferred way of war is one relying on surrogates—both human and technological—that allow the United States to externalize, partially or wholly, the strategic, operational and tactical burden of warfare. Unlike any other previous US administration surrogate warfare has become the principal means of protecting US interests in the Middle East that are perceived to be all but vital. The need for deniability and legitimacy, cost–benefit considerations as well as the lack of capability have made warfare by surrogate a preferred option in the Middle East. The consequences for US policy in the region are profound, as the lack of control and oversight have empowered surrogates whose long-term interests are not compatible with those of the United States. More severely, the US might have jeopardized its standing as the traditional guarantor of security in the Middle East— something that partners and adversaries alike have exploited.
Journal Article
Resilience, complexity and post-liberalism
2014
Resilience is one of the dominant tropes in contemporary policy, practice and academic debate. This paper situates resilience within historical and contemporary approaches to international intervention, governance and analysis. It contains three related arguments suggesting that resilience reflects and seeks to offer a positive alternative to the loss of modern frameworks. First, it is argued that resilience emerged in international intervention as a response to the limits of liberal internationalism in the 1990s. Second, that resilience has emerged as a post-liberal episteme that reflects and seeks to engage the 'reality' of complex life as an alternative to modernist frameworks of analysis. Today, rather than being seen as a limit, complexity is positively foregrounded under resilience frameworks as an active force that has moved beyond the limitations of modern frameworks. Third, this emergence of resilience as a post-liberal episteme that actively responds to complex life can be usefully explained through reflecting on recent work that engages Foucault's notions of biopower and biopolitics.
Journal Article
Hobbes and the Congo: Frames, Local Violence, and International Intervention
2009
Why do international peacebuilders fail to address the local causes of peace process failures? The existing explanations of peacebuilding failures, which focus on constraints and vested interests, do not explain the international neglect of local conflict. In this article, I show how discursive frames shape international intervention and preclude international action on local violence. Drawing on more than 330 interviews, multi-sited ethnography, and document analysis, I develop a case study of the Democratic Republic of Congo's transition from war to peace and democracy (2003–2006). I demonstrate that local agendas played a decisive role in sustaining local, national, and regional violence. However, a postconflict peacebuilding frame shaped the international understanding of violence and intervention in such a way that local conflict resolution appeared irrelevant and illegitimate. This frame included four key elements: international actors labeled the Congo a “postconflict” situation; they believed that violence there was innate and therefore acceptable even in peacetime; they conceptualized international intervention as exclusively concerned with the national and international realms; and they saw holding elections, as opposed to local conflict resolution, as a workable, appropriate, and effective tool for state- and peacebuilding. This frame authorized and justified specific practices and policies while precluding others, notably local conflict resolution, ultimately dooming the peacebuilding efforts. In conclusion, I contend that analyzing discursive frames is a fruitful approach to the puzzle of international peacebuilding failures beyond the Congo.
Journal Article
Why Europe intervenes in Africa : security, prestige and the legacy of colonialism
Analyzes the underlying causes of all European decisions for and against military interventions in conflicts in African states since the late 1980s. It focuses on the main European actors who have deployed troops in Africa: France, the United Kingdom and the European Union. When conflict occurs in Africa, the response of European actors is generally inaction. This can be explained in several ways: the absence of strategic and economic interests, the unwillingness of European leaders to become involved in conflicts in former colonies of other European states, and sometimes the Eurocentric assumption that conflict in Africa is a normal event which does not require intervention. When European actors do decide to intervene, it is primarily for motives of security and prestige, and not primarily for economic or humanitarian reasons. The weight of past relations with Africa can also be a driver for European military intervention, but the impact of that past is changing. This book offers a theory of European intervention based mainly on realist and post-colonial approaches. It refutes the assumptions of liberals and constructivists who posit that states and organizations intervene primarily in order to respect the principle of the 'responsibility to protect'.
THE LIBYAN CRISIS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: CHARTING A PATH THROUGH INSTABILITY TOWARD LASTING PEACE
2025
The article provides an extensive review of the protracted crisis in Libya, triggered in 2011 by the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi and meanwhile grown into a multi-faceted conflict with all the classic characteristic features: political disunity and foreign interventions. It traces the line of historical development from the autocratic rule of Gaddafi through the development of rival governments, subsequent civil wars, and how the country has retained a locus of instability. Key themes explored include the role of internal divisions and external actors in perpetuating the conflict, such as the involvement of countries like Turkey, Egypt, the US or Russia, alongside their various strategic interests in the region. The article also argues that despite the limited success of the UN and EU in resolving the crisis, recent geopolitical shifts— such as the reorientation of Libya's traditional backers towards the Middle East—offer a new potential window for stabilization. Accordingly, the article reviews the prospects of the EU in playing an important role in shaping Libya’s future, assessing the opportunities and constraints it may face in the current geopolitical context and analysing the EU's options for promoting political stability, economic recovery, and institutional reforms.
Journal Article
John Stuart Mill on the Suez Canal and the limits of self-defence
2024
Michael Walzer's use of John Stuart Mill's A Few Words on Non-Intervention (1859) helped to inaugurate it as a canonical text of international theory. However, Walzer's use of the text was highly selective because he viewed the first half as a historically parochial discussion of British foreign policy, and his interest in the second was restricted to the passages in which Mill proposes principles of international morality to govern foreign military interventions to protect third parties. As a result, theorists tend to see those canonized passages as if through a glass darkly. Attention to the detail and context of Mill's first-half critique of Lord Palmerston's opposition to the Suez Canal project reveals that his discussion of purely protective intervention is embedded in a broader exploration of the limits of self-defence, including the moral permissibility of preventive military force and the use of protective interventions for defensive purposes. Moreover, reading the text holistically facilitates a refutation of some objections directed at it by Michael Doyle to the effect that Mill's conception of self-defence incorporates elements of aggression which makes it extremely dangerous when adapted for application to the contemporary world.
Journal Article