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Yet, this citizen suit provision has rapidly begun losing its potency-particularly in cases where claimants allege only intangible, psychological injuries-because of the Supreme Court's interpretation of standing requirements.\" The letter concluded with the following statement: \"The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, we will not sue you for it, we will not report it to any credit reporting agency, and payment or nonpayment of this debt will not affect your credit score.\" According to the Supreme Court, Article Ш-Бавей standing \"is built on a single basic [constitutional] idea-the idea of separation of powers.\" [...]standing not only poses a challenge to the powers of private individuals to bring actions to federal courts, but also to Congress, whose laws cannot empower individuals through civil suit provisions to bring claims that would bypass standing requirements.\"

The Supreme Court's decision in Spokeo, Inc v Robins clarified the \"concreteness\" element of the injury-in-fact requirement for standing. The Court explained that while some statutory violations are concrete injuries, others are merely procedural and insufficient for standing without additional allegations of concrete harms. Federal courts have divided on the decision's application to many statutory causes of action, including the mandatory disclosure requirements of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). While some courts view FDCPA mandatory disclosure violations as concrete injuries if they threaten the plaintiff's concrete interests, others view the violations as merely procedural and never sufficient for standing. This Comment argues for a third view, that an FDCPA mandatory disclosure violation is always a concrete injury regardless of whether it causes the plaintiff to suffer or risk subjective harm. That conclusion flows from a new view: applying Spokeo to statutory violations turns on whether the provision at issue has a deterrent or a compensatory function. Because the FDCPA's text, remedies, statutory purpose, legislative history, and treatment in other contexts indicate that it is deterrent, violations of its mandatory disclosure provisions are concrete injuries.

For the last fifty years, Congress has valorized the act of borrowing money as a catalyst for equality, embracing the proposition that equality can be bought with a loan. In a series of bedrock statutes aimed at democratizing access to loans and purchase money for marginalized groups, Congress has evinced a “borrowing-as-equality” policy that has largely focused on the capacity of “credit,” while acoustically separating its treatment of “debt” as though one can meaningfully exist without the other. In taking this approach, Congress has proffered credit as a means of equality without expressly accounting for the countervailing force of debt relative to social subordination. Yet, debt has itself functioned as a mechanism of the very subordination that Congress’s invocation of “credit” aspires to address. This Article argues that because in articulating a borrowing-as-equality policy Congress is implicitly encouraging debt among marginalized communities, Congress should develop policies that recognize both the potential upside value of borrowing and the particular vulnerabilities that debt creates for socioeconomically marginalized groups. More broadly, any policy that invokes borrowing as a social good must engage more deeply with how credit and debt work in a social context. In other words, credit cannot meaningfully function as a social good without due attention to and a solution for the work of debt as a social ill.

PurposeThis paper aims to explore the consumer insights and ethical concerns surrounding the online payday loan services available in the Google Play Store. This research was conducted to compare whether the presence or absence of debt collection protection acts in a country creates differences in consumer experiences regarding the ethics of payday loan collection. Specifically, the study compares customers’ experiences in both the Indonesian and US markets.Design/methodology/approachIndonesia and the USA were chosen because they have very different regulatory structures for the payday loan industry. The data was scraped using Python from 27 payday loan apps on the Indonesian Play Store, resulting in a total of 244,697 reviews extracted from the Indonesian market. For the US market, 446,010 reviews were extracted from 14 payday loan apps. The data was further analyzed using NVIVO.FindingsThe results suggest that consumers of payday loans in Indonesia and the USA hold positive views about the benefits of payday loan apps, as revealed by the word frequency and word cloud analysis. Notably, customers in both countries did not express any negative sentiments regarding the unethical interest rate charged by the payday loan, contradicting what is commonly reported in academic literature. However, a distinct pattern of unethical conduct was observed in both countries concerning marketing communication and debt collection practices. In the Indonesian market, payday loan companies were found to engage in unethical debt collection activities. In the US market, payday lenders exhibited unethical behavior in their marketing communication, particularly through deceptive advertising that makes promises to consumers that are not delivered.Originality/valueThe study aims to provide evidence on the various experiences of customers in the presence and absence of debt collection regulations using a novel methodology and a large sample, which strengthens the results and conclusions of the study. The study also intends to inform policymakers, particularly the Indonesian government, about the need for specific laws to regulate the debt collection process and prevent unethical practices. Ultimately, the study is expected to protect the rights of consumers from a deceptive marketing communication or unethical debt collection practices in both the Indonesian and US markets.

After years of development in the rulemaking process,1 the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (\"CFPB\") published its final Debt Collection Rule (\"Rule\") with an effective date of November 30, 2021.2 Published in two parts, the Rule is intended to interpret the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (\"FDCPA\") that was enacted in 1977 to \"eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.\"3 Addressing technological advancements since the FDCPA was enacted in 1977, Part 1 of the Rule expands on the provisions of the FDCPA, while attempting to clarify how debt collectors can use new communication technologies, including email, voice mail, and text messages, to communicate with consumers. It also identifies certain policies and procedures that, if implemented, would create safe harbors for debt collectors. Part 2 of the Rule clarifies the information debt collectors must provide at the outset of debt collection, prohibits debt collectors from threatening litigation or bringing suit on time-barred debts, and eliminates the practice of passive debt collection through credit reporting.4

Because modern litigation is time-intensive and expensive, a consumer has no monetary incentive to sue over a low-value claim-even when the defendant has clearly violated that consumer's legal rights. But the defendant may have harmed many consumers in the same way, causing significant cumulative damage. By permitting the aggregation of numerous small claims, class action lawsuits provide a monetary incentive for lawyers and plaintiffs to pursue otherwise low-value suits. Often, an important part of this incentive is the \"incentive fee,\" an additional payment awarded to the named plaintiffs as compensation for the time they spend and risks they assume in representing the class. But such fees have the potential to create dangerous conflicts of interest-named plaintiffs may be \"bought off' with a large incentive fee to give their approval to an otherwise unfair settlement. To avoid this problem, courts must review and approve requests for incentive fees. Unfortunately, courts do not adequately evaluate the dangers of incentive awards and balance these dangers against the justifications for such awards. This Note proposes a new test to better guide courts in assessing the propriety of incentive fees. Specifically, courts should look at (1) the amount of time and effort that the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation; (2) risks that the named plaintiff faced in bringing and advancing the litigation; and (3) evidence of conflicts of interest that might prejudice the class.