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"Falkland Islands War, 1982 Causes"
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The Falklands War : An Imperial History
\"Why did Britain and Argentina go to war over a wintry archipelago that was home to an unprofitable colony? Could the Falklands War, in fact, have been a last-ditch revival of Britain's imperial past? Despite widespread conjecture about the imperial dimensions of the Falklands War, this is the first history of the conflict from the transnational perspective of the British world. Taking Britain's painful process of decolonisation as his starting point, Ezequiel Mercau shows how the Falklands lobby helped revive the idea of a 'British world', transforming a minor squabble into a full-blown war. Boasting original perspectives on the Falklanders, the Four Nations and the Anglo-Argentines, and based on a wealth of unseen material, he sheds new light on the British world, Thatcher's Britain, devolution, immigration and political culture. His findings show that neither the dispute, the war, nor its aftermath can be divorced from the ongoing legacies of empire\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
Logics of War
Most wars between countries end quickly and at relatively low cost. The few in which high-intensity fighting continues for years bring about a disproportionate amount of death and suffering. What separates these few unusually long and intense wars from the many conflicts that are far less destructive? In Logics of War, Alex Weisiger tests three explanations for a nation’s decision to go to war and continue fighting regardless of the costs. He combines sharp statistical analysis of interstate wars over the past two centuries with nine narrative case studies. He examines both well-known conflicts like World War II and the Persian Gulf War, as well as unfamiliar ones such as the 1864–1870 Paraguayan War (or the War of the Triple Alliance), which proportionally caused more deaths than any other war in modern history.
eBook
Asymmetric conflicts : war initiation by weaker powers
This book examines a question generally neglected in the study of international relations: why does a militarily and economically less powerful state initiate conflict against a relatively strong state? T. V. Paul analyses this phenomenon by focusing on the strategic and political considerations, domestic and international, which influence a weaker state to initiate war against a more powerful adversary. The key argument of deterrence theory is that the military superiority of the status quo power, coupled with a credible retaliatory threat, will prevent attack by challengers. The author challenges this assumption by examining six twentieth-century asymmetric wars, from the Japanese offensive against Russia in 1904 to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands in 1982. The book's findings have wide implications for the study of war, power, deterrence, coercive diplomacy, strategy, arms races, and alliances.
eBook
The British Resort to Force in the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict 1982: International Law and Just War Theory
During the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982, both Britain and Argentina defended their resort to military action on the basis of some sort of Just War principles. This article analyses the justifications given for the British resort to force. A summary of the history of the dispute and the legal arguments with regard to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands provides the context for this analysis. It is found that both Britain and Argentina have a strong, but not conclusive case. The rigorous application of Just War criteria shows that the British resort to force fails to satisfy each one. In particular, it is shown that British objectives went beyond possible just causes due to Argentine aggression. It is also argued that the British claim to have acted in the enforcement of international law is not tenable. An analysis of how the decision to send the Task Force to the South Atlantic was made, involving the Government, the Royal Navy and Parliament, reveals various extraneous factors and pressures. It is argued that the threat to the Government's survival as a result of the Argentine invasion was the main determining factor in the conduct of the conflict. The crucial turning-point was the week-end of the 1-2 May when the chances for a negotiated solution diminished after the sinking of the General Belgrano. Britain's military action also fails to satisfy the principle of proportionality. The main conclusions of this study are that Britain's resort to force did not satisfy Just War criteria, that a negotiated solution more just than the resort to force may have been possible, and that the Falklands conflict has not been successfully resolved despite Britain's military achievements.
Journal Article