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Conditions for the P-intersection and P-intersection of falsity-external (resp. indeterminacy-external and truth-external) neutrosophic cubic sets to be an falsity-external (resp. indeterminacy-external and truth-external) neutrosophic cubic set are provided. Conditions for the P-union and the P-intersection of two truth-external (resp. indeterminacy-external and falsity-external) neutrosophic cubic sets to be a truth-internal (resp. indeterminacy-internal and falsity-internal) neutrosophic cubic set are discussed.

Source memory for truth is usually better than for falsity, and similar effects are observed for important compared with unimportant information. A recently found interaction between information veracity and importance indicates that people effectively prioritize encoding true information (but not false). Yet it is unclear whether the feedback about veracity and importance of the information is integrated into joint memory representation. In the following experiment, we investigated whether source memory for veracity and importance dimensions is stochastically dependent. Students ( N  = 82) memorized trivia statements along with their veracity and importance status, which resulted in four different combinations of sources (“true and important”, “true and unimportant”, “false and important”, “false and unimportant”). The analysis with a multidimensional source memory multinomial model revealed that the joint retrieval of “true” and “important” feedback as compound information is better than for all other combinations. Moreover, the veracity dimension was memorized better than the importance dimension, showing that we remember whether information is true or false better than whether it is important or unimportant.

Internet advertising, while enabling unprecedented commercial reach, has become a pervasive vehicle for deceptive practices that inflict measurable harm on consumers. This study empirically investigates the structural relationships between internet advertising falsity and consumer harm by integrating analyses of the mediating role of consumer cognitive processes and the moderating role of consumer vulnerability within a unified structural framework. Survey data were collected from 600 adult consumers with online purchase experience in the Republic of Korea—an advanced digital economy characterized by exceptionally high mobile-commerce penetration, mature e-commerce infrastructure, and evolving digital consumer protection regulation—and analyzed using structural equation modeling (SEM) with AMOS 24.0, supplemented by Hayes’ PROCESS macro Model 59 for conditional process analysis. All 13 hypotheses were supported, although path magnitudes varied substantially across falsity dimensions and mediator pathways—with direct effects ranging from β = 0.156 (false scarcity) to β = 0.224 (performance exaggeration), and indirect effects dominated by the risk assessment distortion pathway. Among the four sub-dimensions of advertising falsity—factual misrepresentation, performance exaggeration, price deception, and false scarcity—performance exaggeration exerted the strongest direct effect on consumer harm. The three cognitive mediators—perceived advertising credibility, risk assessment distortion, and purchase decision pressure—all demonstrated significant partial mediation, with risk assessment distortion emerging as the most powerful indirect pathway. All four consumer vulnerability dimensions—digital literacy level, demographic vulnerability, prior victimization experience, and impulsive buying tendency—significantly moderated the falsity–harm relationship, with low-digital-literacy consumers experiencing approximately 1.7 times the adverse effect of high-literacy counterparts. Moderated mediation analysis revealed that the conditional indirect effect for the high-vulnerability group was approximately 2.3 times that of the low-vulnerability group, confirming that the cognitive harm mechanism intensifies systematically for vulnerable consumers. These findings advance consumer vulnerability theory in the digital context and offer evidence-based implications for consumer protection policy, platform governance, and digital literacy education.

Does lying require objective falsity? Given that consistency with ordinary language is a desideratum of a philosophical definition of lying, empirical evidence plays an important role. A literature review reveals that studies employing a simple question-and-response format, such as “Did the speaker lie? [Yes/No]”, favour the subjective view of lying, according to which objective falsity is not required. However, it has recently been claimed that the rate of lie attributions found in those studies is artificially inflated due to perspective taking; and that if measures are applied to avoid this problem, the results actually support the objective view of lying. This paper presents three experiments that challenge this claim by showing that the findings used to support the objective view have been misinterpreted. It is thus concluded that the folk concept of lying does not require objective falsity, which is consistent with the dominant view in the philosophical literature.

Image segmentation is an important step in image processing application, especially for medical images. It is also a very important task in breast cancer detection. There are various stages for breast cancer detection. The first stage is extraction/segmentation of region of interest followed by detection and classification. In this paper, a new clustering procedure is proposed to extract/segment the region of interest/lesion in mammogram images using neutrosophic set (NS). A variety of image segmentation algorithms are in the literature, but accuracy is still a crucial problem. NS has an ability to handle indeterminant information thus reducing the uncertainty in the images. The image is initially converted to an NS domain, which is described using three membership sets: degree of truth (T), degree of indeterminacy (I), and degree of false (F). In our work, indeterminate degree is computed using a novel technique that uses Shannon entropy and standard deviation. Then, a neutrosophic similarity-based image is formed using neutrosophic similarity function, which is then clustered to detect lesion/tumor. In the clustering algorithm, three image features and also a second criterion function, which is an exponential entropy, are used. The proposed algorithm has been tested on different types of mammogram images along with a comparative study with existing methods both quantitatively and qualitatively. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can segment the mammogram images more effectively and accurately.

PurposeThe study draws upon three accounts to examine post-truth politics and its link to accounting. In studying Petrobras, a Brazilian petrochemical company embroiled in a corruption scandal, the authors draw upon a politics of falsity to understand how different depictions of similar events can emerge. The authors depict Petrobras' corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures during the period of corruption juxtaposed against the Brazilian Federal Police investigation (the Lava Jato/Car Wash Operation) and Petrobras' response to the allegations of institutional corruption.Design/methodology/approachThe data set consisted of 56 Petrobras reports including Annual Reports, Financial Statements, Sustainability Reports and Form 20-Fs from 2004 to 2017, information disclosed by the Brazilian Federal Police concerning the Lava Jato Operation and media reports concerning Petrobras and the corruption scandal. The paper employs a discourse analysis approach to depict and interpret the accounts.FindingsThrough examining the connection between ontic accounts and ontological presuppositions, the authors illustrate a post-truth logic underpinning accounting, due to the interpretive, contestable and contingent nature of accounting information. Consequently, the authors turn to the “ethics of the real” as a response, as citizen subjects must be cautious in how they approach accounting and CSR disclosures.Originality/valueRather than relying on simplistic true/false dualities, the authors argue that the “ethics of the real” provides a courageous position for citizen subjects to interrogate the organisation by recognising the role of discourse and disclosure expectations on organisations in a post-truth environment. The study also illustrates how competing, contingent accounts of the same timeframe and events can emerge.

Abstract According to Deborah Tollefsen, from the analytic perspective called \"interpretivism\", there is a reasonable way in which groups can be said to have mental states. She bases her argument on the every-day use of language, where people speak as if groups have states such as intentions, desires and wishes. Such propositional attitudes form the basis of any account of truth-conditional semantics, the rules by which people grasp the conditions under which an utterance is true. If groups (abstract units of people) have mental states, perhaps superhuman agents have them too. One argument that may contradict this premise is one that says that, whereas groups exist, superhuman agents do not. However, if groups exist on the basis of normative narratives about them and the institutionalized actions they carry out in the world, the same can be said for superhuman agents. They are like legal fictions: fictional but real. Superhuman agents are fictional and real in a similar sense as groups.1

It is often presumed by those who use propositions in their theories that propositions are representational; that is, that propositions represent the world as being some way. This paper makes two claims against this presumption. First, it argues that it does not follow from the fact that propositions play the theoretical roles usually attributed to them that they are representational. This conclusion is reached by rebutting three arguments that can be made in support of the claim that propositions are representational. This paper then advances the further claim that propositions are not representational. It considers several ways to overcome the difficulties traditionally associated with this claim, particularly how to account for falsity.

This paper argues that truth values of sentences containing predicates of \"personal taste\" such as fun or tasty must be relativized to individuals. This relativization is of truth value only, and does not involve a relativization of semantic content: If you say roller coasters are fun, and I say they are not, I am negating the same content which you assert, and directly contradicting you. Nonetheless, both our utterances can be true (relative to their separate contexts). A formal semantic theory is presented which gives this result by introducing an individual index, analogous to the world and time indices commonly used, and by treating the pragmatic context as supplying a particular value for this index. The context supplies this value in the derivation of truth values from content, not in the derivation of content from character. Predicates of personal taste therefore display a kind of contextual variation in interpretation which is unlike the familiar variation exhibited by pronouns and other indexicals.