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Ingroup favoritism-the tendency to favor members of one's own group over those in other groups-is well documented, but the mechanisms driving this behavior are not well understood. In particular, it is unclear to what extent ingroup favoritism is driven by preferences concerning the welfare of ingroup over outgroup members, vs. beliefs about the behavior of ingroup and outgroup members. In this review we analyze research on ingroup favoritism in economic games, identifying key gaps in the literature and providing suggestions on how future work can incorporate these insights to shed further light on when, why, and how ingroup favoritism occurs. In doing so, we demonstrate how social psychological theory and research can be integrated with findings from behavioral economics, providing new theoretical and methodological directions for future research.

How does economic inequality affect support for redistribution to native citizens and immigrants? While prior studies have examined the separate effects of inequality and immigration on redistribution preferences, the interaction between inequality and communal identity has been largely overlooked. This article explains that inequality triggers selective solidarity. Individuals exposed to inequality become more supportive of redistribution – but only if the redistribution benefits native-born citizens. Inequality therefore reinforces the already popular opinion that native citizens deserve welfare priority and widens the gap between support for natives and support for immigrants. This study first provides cross-national evidence with survey data linked to contextual socio-economic indicators from advanced industrialized countries. To evaluate causally identified effects, it then presents the results of a survey experiment administered to a nationally representative sample of Italian citizens. The findings imply that economic inequality can increase support for populist radical right parties that advocate discrimination in access to welfare services based on native citizenship.

Partisanship continues to divide Americans. Using data from the American National Election Studies (ANES), we find that partisans not only feel more negatively about the opposing party, but also that this negativity has become more consistent and has a greater impact on their political participation. We find that while partisan animus began to rise in the 1980s, it has grown dramatically over the past two decades. As partisan affect has intensified, it is also more structured; ingroup favoritism is increasingly associated with outgroup animus. Finally, hostility toward the opposing party has eclipsed positive affect for ones' own party as a motive for political participation.

The study utilizes a unique dataset of 16,575 research papers published in 68 national Business and Economics journals to investigate editorial bias towards insiders in Turkish academia. The study questions insiders’ motive for their choice of journal and predicts faster acceptance for papers that contain insider authors relative to the outsider papers in anticipation of favorable editorial treatment. The findings show that insiders not only publish in large numbers in their affiliated institutions’ journals but also do so at significantly faster speeds. Specifically, 4938 (29.79% of) papers have at least one insider author, and they are accepted 41.5 days faster than the average outsider submission. Papers in English, junior professors, and new-generation university journals are less likely to have insider authors; while papers in Turkish, senior professors, old-generation university journals, and papers originating from graduate theses are more likely. Remarkably, national journals indexed in ESCI do not engage in editorial favoritism towards insiders and require considerably longer time to accept submissions. As Turkish universities are leading publishers of academic journals, the findings have important implications for the Turkish academia. We note a declining trend of insider authorship and provide suggestions to mitigate insider bias.

Ingroup favoritism and intergroup discrimination can be mutually reinforcing during social interaction, threatening intergroup cooperation and the sustainability of societies. In two studies (N = 880), we investigated whether promoting prosocial outgroup altruism would weaken the ingroup favoritism cycle of influence. Using novel methods of human-agent interaction via a computer-mediated experimental platform, we introduced outgroup altruism by (i) nonadaptive artificial agents with preprogrammed outgroup altruistic behavior (Study 1; N = 400) and (ii) adaptive artificial agents whose altruistic behavior was informed by the prediction of a machine learning algorithm (Study 2; N = 480). A rating task ensured that the observed behavior did not result from the participant’s awareness of the artificial agents. In Study 1, nonadaptive agents prompted ingroup members to withhold cooperation from ingroup agents and reinforced ingroup favoritism among humans. In Study 2, adaptive agents were able to weaken ingroup favoritism over time by maintaining a good reputation with both the ingroup and outgroup members, who perceived agents as being fairer than humans and rated agents as more human than humans. We conclude that a good reputation of the individual exhibiting outgroup altruism is necessary to weaken ingroup favoritism and improve intergroup cooperation. Thus, reputation is important for designing nudge agents.