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The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
The imposition of federal conservatorships on September 6, 2008, at the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation—commonly known as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—was one of the most dramatic events of the financial crisis. These two government-sponsored enterprises play a central role in the US housing finance system, and at the start of their conservatorships held or guaranteed about $5.2 trillion of home mortgage debt. The two firms were often cited as shining examples of public-private partnerships—that is, the harnessing of private capital to advance the social goal of expanding homeownership. But in reality, the hybrid structures of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were destined to fail at some point, owing to their singular exposure to residential real estate and moral hazard incentives emanating from the implicit guarantee of their liabilities. We describe the financial distress experienced by the two firms, the events that led the federal government to take dramatic action in an effort to stabilize housing and financial markets, and the various resolution options available to US policymakers at the time; and we evaluate the success of the choice of conservatorship in terms of its effects on financial markets and financial stability, on mortgage supply, and on the financial position of the two firms themselves. Conservatorship achieved its key short-run goals of stabilizing mortgage markets and promoting financial stability during a period of extreme stress. However, conservatorship was intended to be a temporary fix, not a long-term solution, and more than six years later, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac still remain in conservatorship.
Journal Article
Guaranteed to fail
The financial collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008 led to one of the most sweeping government interventions in private financial markets in history. The bailout has already cost American taxpayers close to
eBook
The mortgage wars : inside Fannie Mae, big-money politics, and the collapse of the American dream
\"The former Fannie Mae CFO's inside look at the war between the financial giants and government regulators A provocative true-life thriller about the all-out fight for dominance of the mortgage industry--and how it nearly destroyed the global financial systemMany books have been written about the 2008 financial crisis, but they miss the biggest story of the meltdown: the battle between giant financial companies to dominate the $11 trillion mortgage market that almost destroyed the global financial system. For more than twenty years, until 2004, Timothy Howard was a senior executive at the best known of those companies, Fannie Mae, and he was in the middle of that fight.In The Franchise, Howard explains how seemingly unrelated developments in banking regulation, housing policy, Wall Street financial innovation, and political lobbying all combined to wreak havoc on the American housing market and the world economy.Timothy Howard was Vice Chairman and Chief Financial Officer of Fannie Mae until 2004. Prior to this, he was senior financial economist at Wells Fargo Bank in San Francisco\"-- Provided by publisher.
Book
The Financial Crisis: An Inside View
This paper reviews the policy response to the 2007–09 financial crisis from the perspective of a senior Treasury official at the time. Government agencies faced severe constraints in addressing the crisis: lack of legal authority for potentially helpful financial stabilization measures, a Congress reluctant to grant such authority, and the need to act quickly in the midst of a market panic. Treasury officials recognized the dangers arising from mounting foreclosures and worked to facilitate limited mortgage modifications, but going further was politically unacceptable because public funds would have gone to some irresponsible borrowers. The suddenness of Bear Stearns' collapse in March 2008 made rescue necessary and led to preparation of emergency options should conditions worsen. The Treasury saw Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac's rescue that summer as necessary to calm markets, despite the moral hazard created. After Lehman Brothers failed in September, the Treasury genuinely intended to buy illiquid securities from troubled institutions but turned to capital injections as the crisis deepened.
Journal Article
A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis
Using detailed information on lobbying and mortgage lending activities, we find that lenders lobbying more on issues related to mortgage lending (i) had higher loan-to-income ratios, (ii) securitized more intensively, and (iii) had faster growing portfolios. Ex-post, delinquency rates are higher in areas where lobbyist' lending grew faster and they experienced negative abnormal stock returns during key crisis events. The findings are robust to (i) falsification tests using lobbying on issues unrelated to mortgage lending, (ii) a difference-in-difference approach based on state-level laws, and (iii) instrumental variables strategies. These results show that lobbying lenders engage in riskier lending.
eBook
What Can We Learn from Past Mistakes? Lessons from Data Mining the Fannie Mae Mortgage Portfolio
Fannie Mae has been widely criticized for its role in the recent financial crisis, yet no detailed analysis of the systematic patterns of the mortgage defaults that occurred has been published. To address this knowledge gap, we perform data mining on the Fannie Mae mortgage portfolio of the fourth quarter of 2007, which includes 340,537 mortgages with a total principal value of $69.8 billion. This portfolio had the highest delinquency rate in the agency’s history: 19.4% versus the historical average of 1.7%. We find that although a number of information variables that were available at the time of mortgage acquisition are correlated with the subsequent delinquencies, building an accurate model proves challenging. Identification of the majority of delinquencies in the historical data comes at a cost of low precision.
Journal Article
Federal Use of Implied Guarantees: Some Preliminary Lessons from the Current Financial Distress
The U.S. financial crisis and recession that began in 2007 poses profound challenges for public policy and administration. It also provides useful information about the effects of economic policies. This paper considers the implications of current developments for the use of implied guarantees as an instrument for the use of implied guarantees as an instrument of public policy. It draws on experience with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to argue that implied federal guarantees have a severe disadvantage. Their costs are largely unmeasured, unrecognized in the budget, and unmanaged. Yet their use appears to be increasing in the current crisis. To minimize the costs of the expanded financial safety net, government should measure and manage those costs more effectively. To that end, this paper proposes new budgetary treatments of federal implied guarantees.
Journal Article