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Highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza (HPAI H5N1) viruses occasionally infect, but typically do not transmit, in mammals. In the spring of 2024, an unprecedented outbreak of HPAI H5N1 in bovine herds occurred in the USA, with virus spread within and between herds, infections in poultry and cats, and spillover into humans, collectively indicating an increased public health risk 1 , 2 , 3 – 4 . Here we characterize an HPAI H5N1 virus isolated from infected cow milk in mice and ferrets. Like other HPAI H5N1 viruses, the bovine H5N1 virus spread systemically, including to the mammary glands of both species, however, this tropism was also observed for an older HPAI H5N1 virus isolate. Bovine HPAI H5N1 virus bound to sialic acids expressed in human upper airways and inefficiently transmitted to exposed ferrets (one of four exposed ferrets seroconverted without virus detection). Bovine HPAI H5N1 virus thus possesses features that may facilitate infection and transmission in mammals. HPAI H5N1 virus isolated from infected cow milk is characterized in mice and ferrets, was inefficiently transmitted in ferrets, and bound to sialic acids expressed in human upper airways, showing features that may facilitate infection in mammals.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) is the aetiological agent of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), an emerging respiratory infection caused by the introduction of a novel coronavirus into humans late in 2019 (first detected in Hubei province, China). As of 18 September 2020, SARS-CoV-2 has spread to 215 countries, has infected more than 30 million people and has caused more than 950,000 deaths. As humans do not have pre-existing immunity to SARS-CoV-2, there is an urgent need to develop therapeutic agents and vaccines to mitigate the current pandemic and to prevent the re-emergence of COVID-19. In February 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) assembled an international panel to develop animal models for COVID-19 to accelerate the testing of vaccines and therapeutic agents. Here we summarize the findings to date and provides relevant information for preclinical testing of vaccine candidates and therapeutic agents for COVID-19. The findings of a World Health Organization expert working group that is developing animal models to test vaccines and therapeutic agents for the treatment of COVID-19, and their relevance for preclinical testing, are reviewed.

Coronaviruses are enveloped RNA viruses capable of causing respiratory, enteric, or systemic diseases in a variety of mammalian hosts that vary in clinical severity from subclinical to fatal. The host range and tissue tropism are largely determined by the coronaviral spike protein, which initiates cellular infection by promoting fusion of the viral and host cell membranes. Companion animal coronaviruses responsible for causing enteric infection include feline enteric coronavirus, ferret enteric coronavirus, canine enteric coronavirus, equine coronavirus, and alpaca enteric coronavirus, while canine respiratory coronavirus and alpaca respiratory coronavirus result in respiratory infection. Ferret systemic coronavirus and feline infectious peritonitis virus, a mutated feline enteric coronavirus, can lead to lethal immuno-inflammatory systemic disease. Recent human viral pandemics, including severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and most recently, COVID-19, all thought to originate from bat coronaviruses, demonstrate the zoonotic potential of coronaviruses and their potential to have devastating impacts. A better understanding of the coronaviruses of companion animals, their capacity for cross-species transmission, and the sharing of genetic information may facilitate improved prevention and control strategies for future emerging zoonotic coronaviruses. This article reviews the clinical, epidemiologic, virologic, and pathologic characteristics of nine important coronaviruses of companion animals.

Hepatitis E virus (HEV) is one of the leading causes of acute viral hepatitis worldwide. In this work, a pulse-triggered ultrasensitive electrochemical sensor was fabricated using graphene quantum dots and gold-embedded polyaniline nanowires, prepared via an interfacial polymerization and then self-assembly approach. Introducing an external electrical pulse during the virus accumulation step increases the sensitivity towards HEV due to the expanded surface of the virus particle as well as the antibody-conjugated polyaniline chain length, compared to other conventional electrochemical sensors. The sensor was applied to various HEV genotypes, including G1, G3, G7 and ferret HEV obtained from cell culture supernatant and in a series of fecal specimen samples collected from G7 HEV-infected monkey. The sensitivity is similar to that detected by real-time quantitative reverse transcription-polymerase chain (RT-qPCR). These results suggests that the proposed sensor can pave the way for the development of robust, high-performance sensing methodologies for HEV detection. Detection of viral biomarkers is important for disease treatment and prevention. Here, the authors report on a system that uses an electrical pulse-induced electrochemical sensor for the detection of hepatitis E virus, and demonstrate potential application of the device.

Only four mutations in H5N1 HA are required to enable ferret-to-ferret transmission of a reassortant virus containing the H5 HA and the remaining seven gene segments from a human pandemic H1N1 influenza virus. Elements involved in H5N1 transmission Whether avian H5N1 viruses can gain the ability to transmit between humans was uncertain. The viral haemagglutinin protein (HA) mediates virus binding to host-specific cellular receptors, but previous studies have shown that alterations in HA that enable binding to human-type receptors are not sufficient to enable respiratory droplet transmission of H5N1 viruses in ferrets, the best animal model for human-to-human transmission. Imai et al . show that only four mutations in H5N1 HA are required to enable ferret-to-ferret transmission of a reassortant virus containing H5 HA, with the remaining genes from human pandemic H1N1 influenza virus. It is probable that further adaptations in other avian virus genes would be required to mediate transmission of wholly avian H5N1 in mammals, but human H1N1 and H5N1 viruses are genetically compatible and the emergence of H5-HA-containing viruses might be expected to cause a pandemic because humans lack immunity to H5 viruses. Knowledge of the mutations involved in adapting H5 HA to mammalian transmission could help with surveillance and monitoring of H5N1 viruses adapting towards pandemic potential. Highly pathogenic avian H5N1 influenza A viruses occasionally infect humans, but currently do not transmit efficiently among humans. The viral haemagglutinin (HA) protein is a known host-range determinant as it mediates virus binding to host-specific cellular receptors 1 , 2 , 3 . Here we assess the molecular changes in HA that would allow a virus possessing subtype H5 HA to be transmissible among mammals. We identified a reassortant H5 HA/H1N1 virus—comprising H5 HA (from an H5N1 virus) with four mutations and the remaining seven gene segments from a 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus—that was capable of droplet transmission in a ferret model. The transmissible H5 reassortant virus preferentially recognized human-type receptors, replicated efficiently in ferrets, caused lung lesions and weight loss, but was not highly pathogenic and did not cause mortality. These results indicate that H5 HA can convert to an HA that supports efficient viral transmission in mammals; however, we do not know whether the four mutations in the H5 HA identified here would render a wholly avian H5N1 virus transmissible. The genetic origin of the remaining seven viral gene segments may also critically contribute to transmissibility in mammals. Nevertheless, as H5N1 viruses continue to evolve and infect humans, receptor-binding variants of H5N1 viruses with pandemic potential, including avian–human reassortant viruses as tested here, may emerge. Our findings emphasize the need to prepare for potential pandemics caused by influenza viruses possessing H5 HA, and will help individuals conducting surveillance in regions with circulating H5N1 viruses to recognize key residues that predict the pandemic potential of isolates, which will inform the development, production and distribution of effective countermeasures.

A newly emerged H7N9 virus has caused 132 human infections with 37 deaths in China since 18 February 2013. Control measures in H7N9 virus—positive live poultry markets have reduced the number of infections; however, the character of the virus, including its pandemic potential, remains largely unknown. We systematically analyzed H7N9 viruses isolated from birds and humans. The viruses were genetically closely related and bound to human airway receptors; some also maintained the ability to bind to avian airway receptors. The viruses isolated from birds were nonpathogenic in chickens, ducks, and mice; however, the viruses isolated from humans caused up to 30% body weight loss in mice. Most importantly, one virus isolated from humans was highly transmissible in ferrets by respiratory droplet. Our findings indicate nothing to reduce the concern that these viruses can transmit between humans.

Here, biological attributes of two early human isolates of the newly emerged H7N9 influenza viruses are characterized: the potential of these viruses to infect and/or transmit within various animal models is discussed, as is their relative sensitivity to neuraminidase inhibitors and experimental polymerase inhibitors compared to an H1N1 pandemic strain. Transmission of emerging H7N9 virus By 20 July 2013, there had been 134 laboratory-confirmed human cases of infection with avian influenza A H7N9 virus infection, including 43 deaths. Yoshihiro Kawaoka and colleagues characterize the biology of two recent isolates of the virus. They provide a wealth of data from infections in mice, pigs, macaques and ferrets. H7N9 virus is shown to be less sensitive to neuraminidase inhibitors than pandemic H1N1 virus, but equally susceptible to an experimental polymerase inhibitor. Terrence Tumpey and colleagues determine the capacity of two clinical H7N9 isolates to cause disease and transmit between mammals. They show that the virus can replicate in human airway cells and in the respiratory tract of ferrets to a higher level than can seasonal H3N2 virus, and show higher lethality in mice than genetically related H7N9 and H9N2 viruses. In transmission studies, the H7N9 virus showed limited transmission in ferrets by respiratory droplets. Ron Fouchier and colleagues investigate the transmissibility of H7N9 virus between ferrets. They show that airborne transmission can occur, but inefficiently. They also show that on passage in ferrets, virus variants that have higher avian receptor binding, higher pH of fusion and lower thermostability are selected, and they suggest that these characteristics may result in reduced transmissibility. Avian influenza A viruses rarely infect humans; however, when human infection and subsequent human-to-human transmission occurs, worldwide outbreaks (pandemics) can result. The recent sporadic infections of humans in China with a previously unrecognized avian influenza A virus of the H7N9 subtype (A(H7N9)) have caused concern owing to the appreciable case fatality rate associated with these infections (more than 25%), potential instances of human-to-human transmission 1 , and the lack of pre-existing immunity among humans to viruses of this subtype. Here we characterize two early human A(H7N9) isolates, A/Anhui/1/2013 (H7N9) and A/Shanghai/1/2013 (H7N9); hereafter referred to as Anhui/1 and Shanghai/1, respectively. In mice, Anhui/1 and Shanghai/1 were more pathogenic than a control avian H7N9 virus (A/duck/Gunma/466/2011 (H7N9); Dk/GM466) and a representative pandemic 2009 H1N1 virus (A/California/4/2009 (H1N1pdm09); CA04). Anhui/1, Shanghai/1 and Dk/GM466 replicated well in the nasal turbinates of ferrets. In nonhuman primates, Anhui/1 and Dk/GM466 replicated efficiently in the upper and lower respiratory tracts, whereas the replicative ability of conventional human influenza viruses is typically restricted to the upper respiratory tract of infected primates. By contrast, Anhui/1 did not replicate well in miniature pigs after intranasal inoculation. Critically, Anhui/1 transmitted through respiratory droplets in one of three pairs of ferrets. Glycan arrays showed that Anhui/1, Shanghai/1 and A/Hangzhou/1/2013 (H7N9) (a third human A(H7N9) virus tested in this assay) bind to human virus-type receptors, a property that may be critical for virus transmissibility in ferrets. Anhui/1 was found to be less sensitive in mice to neuraminidase inhibitors than a pandemic H1N1 2009 virus, although both viruses were equally susceptible to an experimental antiviral polymerase inhibitor. The robust replicative ability in mice, ferrets and nonhuman primates and the limited transmissibility in ferrets of Anhui/1 suggest that A(H7N9) viruses have pandemic potential.

SARS-CoV-2 emerged in late 2019 and caused a pandemic, whereas the closely related SARS-CoV was contained rapidly in 2003. Here, an experimental set-up is used to study transmission of SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 through the air between ferrets over more than a meter distance. Both viruses cause a robust productive respiratory tract infection resulting in transmission of SARS-CoV-2 to two of four indirect recipient ferrets and SARS-CoV to all four. A control pandemic A/H1N1 influenza virus also transmits efficiently. Serological assays confirm all virus transmission events. Although the experiments do not discriminate between transmission via small aerosols, large droplets and fomites, these results demonstrate that SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2 can remain infectious while traveling through the air. Efficient virus transmission between ferrets is in agreement with frequent SARS-CoV-2 outbreaks in mink farms. Although the evidence for virus transmission via the air between humans under natural conditions is absent or weak for SARS-CoV and SARS-CoV-2, ferrets may represent a sensitive model to study interventions aimed at preventing virus transmission. Some epidemiological data suggests that SARS-CoV-2 can be transmitted through the air over longer distances. Here, Kutter et al. show in the ferret model that SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV can be transmitted through the air over more than a meter distance, however, data should be interpreted with care, as ferrets are likely more susceptible to coronavirus infections.

Influenza vaccines that confer broad and durable protection against diverse viral strains would have a major effect on global health, as they would lessen the need for annual vaccine reformulation and immunization 1 . Here we show that computationally designed, two-component nanoparticle immunogens 2 induce potently neutralizing and broadly protective antibody responses against a wide variety of influenza viruses. The nanoparticle immunogens contain 20 haemagglutinin glycoprotein trimers in an ordered array, and their assembly in vitro enables the precisely controlled co-display of multiple distinct haemagglutinin proteins in defined ratios. Nanoparticle immunogens that co-display the four haemagglutinins of licensed quadrivalent influenza vaccines elicited antibody responses in several animal models against vaccine-matched strains that were equivalent to or better than commercial quadrivalent influenza vaccines, and simultaneously induced broadly protective antibody responses to heterologous viruses by targeting the subdominant yet conserved haemagglutinin stem. The combination of potent receptor-blocking and cross-reactive stem-directed antibodies induced by the nanoparticle immunogens makes them attractive candidates for a supraseasonal influenza vaccine candidate with the potential to replace conventional seasonal vaccines 3 . A nanoparticle influenza vaccine candidate is shown to induce broad cross-reactive antibody responses in animal models.

A novel platform for vaccines has been developed using self-assembling ferritin-based nanoparticles displaying influenza virus haemagglutinin; the haemagglutinin–nanoparticle vaccine induces more broad and potent neutralizing antibodies against diverse virus strains than a licensed influenza vaccine in mice and ferrets. A nanoparticle influenza vaccine The efficacy of the current generation of vaccines for seasonal influenza is limited by the need to produce new vaccines — using dated and time-consuming technologies — to cope with the rapidly evolving virus. This study presents a novel approach to influenza vaccination using self-assembling ferritin-based nanoparticles fused to the native viral attachment protein, haemagglutinin. The haemagglutinin–nanoparticle vaccine is shown to induce neutralizing antibodies and to generate higher immunity against diverse viral subtypes than a licensed influenza vaccine. For example, antibodies elicited by a 1999 haemagglutinin–nanoparticle vaccine neutralized H1N1 viruses from 1934 to 2007 and protected ferrets from infection by a 2007 H1N1 virus. Influenza viruses pose a significant threat to the public and are a burden on global health systems 1 , 2 . Each year, influenza vaccines must be rapidly produced to match circulating viruses, a process constrained by dated technology and vulnerable to unexpected strains emerging from humans and animal reservoirs. Here we use knowledge of protein structure to design self-assembling nanoparticles that elicit broader and more potent immunity than traditional influenza vaccines. The viral haemagglutinin was genetically fused to ferritin, a protein that naturally forms nanoparticles composed of 24 identical polypeptides 3 . Haemagglutinin was inserted at the interface of adjacent subunits so that it spontaneously assembled and generated eight trimeric viral spikes on its surface. Immunization with this influenza nanoparticle vaccine elicited haemagglutination inhibition antibody titres more than tenfold higher than those from the licensed inactivated vaccine. Furthermore, it elicited neutralizing antibodies to two highly conserved vulnerable haemagglutinin structures that are targets of universal vaccines: the stem 4 , 5 and the receptor binding site on the head 6 , 7 . Antibodies elicited by a 1999 haemagglutinin–nanoparticle vaccine neutralized H1N1 viruses from 1934 to 2007 and protected ferrets from an unmatched 2007 H1N1 virus challenge. This structure-based, self-assembling synthetic nanoparticle vaccine improves the potency and breadth of influenza virus immunity, and it provides a foundation for building broader vaccine protection against emerging influenza viruses and other pathogens.